Regulating securities market abuse:a comparative legal study of United Kingdom and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s financial regulatory systems by Almutairi, Marzouq
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulating Securities Market Abuse: A Comparative Legal Study of United 
Kingdom and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Financial Regulatory Systems 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the University of Abertay Dundee  
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy in Law 
 
 
Marzouq Almutairi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
University of Abertay Dundee 
 
2016  
 
Contents 
Legislations ...................................................................................................................... 5 
Case law ........................................................................................................................... 7 
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................... viii 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................... x 
Acknowledgment ........................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter One: Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Purpose of the research ........................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Significance of the study .......................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 4 
1.4 Structure ................................................................................................................... 5 
1.5 General Introduction ............................................................................................... 6 
1.6 Islamic economic principles .................................................................................. 11 
1.7 Saudi Arabia’s ambition for a developed and open financial market system 
that converges with global standards ......................................................................... 14 
Chapter Two ................................................................................................................. 18 
Developing market products and services through innovation and constraints .... 18 
2.1 Introductions .......................................................................................................... 18 
2.2 Developing Islamic financial market amidst systemic constraints .................... 20 
2.3 Innovations and harmonisation ............................................................................ 29 
2.4 Challenges of Shari’ah compliance ...................................................................... 31 
2.5 Discussing compatibility: Islamic vs. Western regulatory approach ................ 36 
2.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 41 
Chapter Three .............................................................................................................. 45 
Transformation of the Islamic Capital Market Economy: A conceptual perspective
........................................................................................................................................ 45 
3.1 Introduction. ........................................................................................................... 45 
3.2 The concept of Islamic customs in finance (Urf) ................................................. 45 
3.3. Islamic financial products: Sukuk and other instruments ....................................... 48 
(a).  Mudarabah and Musharakah ......................................................................... 49 
(b). Murabaha ........................................................................................................ 52 
(c). Ijarah ................................................................................................................... 52 
(d). Istinsa .............................................................................................................. 56 
(e). Takaful ................................................................................................................. 56 
(f). Qard Hasan .......................................................................................................... 58 
3.4 Alternative innovations in futures and bonds commodities ............................... 59 
(a). The legitimacy of bonds ....................................................................................... 60 
(i). Ijarah bonds .......................................................................................................... 62 
(ii). Istisna bonds ........................................................................................................ 63 
3.4.1 The structure of Istisna bond. ................................................................................ 64 
(iii). Mudaraba and Musharaka bonds ...................................................................... 66 
3.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 67 
Chapter Four ................................................................................................................ 70 
Market Abuse: A theoretical perspective .................................................................. 70 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 70 
4.2 Different strands of arguments about market abuse .......................................... 72 
4.2.1 Utilitarian approach .............................................................................................. 72 
4.2.2 The rights-based approach .................................................................................... 74 
4.2.3 Level playing field theory ..................................................................................... 77 
4.2.4 Fiduciary duty argument ....................................................................................... 80 
4.2.5 Fairness vs. fraud argument .................................................................................. 82 
4.3. Islamic theory ........................................................................................................ 83 
4.3.1 Duty of the State in regulating market .................................................................. 84 
4.3.2 Principles on dishonesty in dealings and abuse of market .................................... 85 
4.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 86 
Chapter five .................................................................................................................. 89 
Legal framework for financial market regulation, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Kingdom ....................................................................................................................... 89 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 89 
5.2 Structuring of the Saudi Arabian financial market ........................................... 89 
5.2.1 The Capital Market Law (CML) ........................................................................... 92 
5.2.2 General framework of the CML ........................................................................... 95 
5.2.3 Regulations under the CML .................................................................................. 97 
(a) Regulation on market abuse ................................................................................. 97 
(b). Regulations on Initial and continuous Disclosure ............................................ 105 
(c). Regulation on dispute and violations. ................................................................ 106 
(d). Regulation on jurisdictional boundaries ........................................................... 107 
(e). Regulation on exclusion of instrument ............................................................... 108 
5.3 Framework of UK Market laws .......................................................................... 109 
5.3.1 The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993 ................................................................. 110 
5.3.2 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) ..................................... 111 
5.4 MAD and MAD II ................................................................................................ 117 
5.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 119 
Chapter Six ................................................................................................................. 122 
The Nature and Trajectories of Regulatory Authorities: Saudi Arabia and the UK
...................................................................................................................................... 122 
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 122 
6.2 The Capital Market Authority (CMA) .............................................................. 123 
6.2.1 Structure of the CMA .......................................................................................... 125 
6.2.2 Role of the CMA ................................................................................................. 125 
(a). Regulatory ......................................................................................................... 125 
(b). Publicity and public awareness. ........................................................................ 127 
(c) Swap agreements as means of attracting foreign investment. ............................ 128 
6.3 The UK regime. .................................................................................................... 132 
6.3.1 From the FSA to FCA ......................................................................................... 133 
6.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 139 
Chapter Seven ............................................................................................................ 141 
Enforcement and Penal Regime in the UK and Saudi ........................................... 141 
7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 141 
7.2 Structure of penal regime for market abuse in the United Kingdom ............. 142 
7.2.1 Nature of criminal sanction for market abuse in the United Kingdom ............... 143 
7.2.2 Nature of civil responsibility in the UK .............................................................. 149 
7.3 Challenges of market size in the UK .................................................................. 152 
7.4 Regional legislation on enforcement ................................................................... 153 
7.5 Framework of penal enforcement under the Saudi Arabia financial market 
regime .......................................................................................................................... 155 
7.5.1 Causes of action in Saudi Arabia ........................................................................ 158 
7.5.2. Procedure for investigation and trial in Saudi .................................................... 160 
7.5.3 Nature of penalty in Saudi .................................................................................. 162 
7.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 164 
Chapter Eight ............................................................................................................. 167 
General conclusion ..................................................................................................... 167 
8.1 General conclusion and recommendation ......................................................... 167 
8.2 Recommendations. ............................................................................................... 180 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 182 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legislations 
 
United Kingdom Law 
 
Limited Partnership Act 1907. 
 
Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 
c.8. Criminal Justice Act 1993 c.36. 
 
Financial Services Act 2012 (FSAct) 2012 c.21. 
Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000 
c.8. 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2002/682 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001/544 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2001/3544 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 2) 
Order 2003/1476 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 1) 
Order 2003/1475 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 3) 
Order 2003/2822 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2004/1610 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment)(No.2) 
Order 2004/2737 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No.2) 
Order 2005/1518 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Carrying on Regulated Activities by Way of 
Business) (Amendment) Order 2005/922 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2005/593 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment No. 3) 
Order 2006/3384 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No.2) 
Order 2006/2383 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) 
(Amendment) Order 2006/1969 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2007/1339 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2007/3510 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2009/1342 
 
Financial Services and Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2009/1389 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2010/86 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
 
2010/86 • Financial Services and 
 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2016. 
 
European Union Laws 
 
European Council Directive 2001/34/EC. L 184/1 
 
EU Market Abuse Directive (MAD) 2003/6/EC. L 
96/16 2003. 
 
Directive 2004/72/EC. L 162/70 
Directive 2003/124/EC. L 
339/70 Directive 2003/125/EC L 
339/73 
 
Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) (EU) No 596/2014. L 173/1 
 
Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse (CSMAD). 2014/57/EU. L 
173/179. Commission Implementing Directive (EU) 2015/2395. L332/1 
 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia laws 
 
Royal Decree No. M/11, 29/05/1404H (Jan. 3, 1984). 
 
Royal Decree No. M/35, 28/12/1412H (June 28, 1992). 
 
Royal Decree No. M/35, 28/12/1412H (June 28, 
1992). Saudi Capital Market Laws (CML) 2003. 
 
Royal Decree No. M/30 of 2/5/1424H (July 31, 2003). 
Royal Decree No. 2-11-2004, 20/8/1425H (April 10, 
2004). Royal Decree No. 1-11-2004, 20/8/1425H (April 
10, 2004). 
      v 
Offers of Securities Regulations 20/8/1425H (10 April, 
2004). Royal Decree No. M/25, 4/5/1425H (June 22, 2004). 
 
Royal Decree No. 1-83-2005, 21/05/1426H (June 28, 2005). 
 
Royal Decree No. 2-83-2005, 21/05/1426H (June 28, 2005). 
 
Capital Market Authority Board Resolution, No. 2-128-2006. 
 
Royal Decree No. 1-193-2006, 19/6/1427H (July 15, 2006). 
Royal Decree No. 1-212-2006, 21/10/1427AH (Dec. 11, 
2006). Royal Decree No. 1-50-2007, 21/9/1428H (Mar. 10, 
2007). 
 
Board of the Capital Market Authority Resolution No. 1-39-2008, 3/12/1429H (Jan. 12, 
2008). 
 
Capital Market Authority Board Resolution No. 1-39-2008. 
 
Capital Market Authority Board Resolution, No. 1-28-
2008 Saudi Stock Exchange Listing Rules. 
 
Sahih Muslim (Vol. 6). Beirut: Dar El-Mareefah. 
The Holy Quran Translation by Abdullahi Yusf 
Ali. 
 
 
Case law 
 
David Massey v The Financial Service Authority, [2011] All ER (D) 95 (Feb) 
 
Davidson and Tatham v Financial Services Authority [2006] UKFSM FSM031. 
 
Engels v Netherlands, ECHR 3, 5100/71, (1976) 1 EHRR 647. 
 
FCA v Da Vinci Invest Limited and Others [2015] EWHC 2401 (Ch). 
 
Grande Stevens and Others v Italy (App No.18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10). 
(2014) ECtHR 4 March 2014. 
 
Hannam v FCA [2014] UKUT 0233. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
 
 
viii 
Ipourgos Ikonomikon Proistamenos DOI Amfissas v Charilaos Georgakis Case C-
391/04.  
Kenneth George Carver FCA Notice, 30th March, 2015.  
Mackie v HMA [1994] JC 132. 
 
Markus Geltl v Daimler AG [C-19/11]. 
 
R v Gosh [1982] QB 1053. 
 
R v Grunwald [1963] QB 935. 
 
R v Hayes [2015] EWCA Crim 1944. 
 
R v Page [1996) Crim LR 821. 
 
Spector Photo Group NV, Chris Van Raemdonck v. Commissie voor het Bank Financie-
en Assurantiewezen (CBFA), Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Third 
Chamber) of 23 December 2009, Case C-45/08, 
 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521U.S.642, 1997. 
 
Winterflood Securities Ltd & Ors v Financial Services Authority [2009] UKFSM 
FSM066. 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
ACRSC   Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts. 
AAOFI  Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial 
Institutions. 
BCMAR  Board of the Capital Market Authority Resolution. 
CJA   Criminal Justice Act. 
CMA   Capital Market Authority. 
CMABR  Capital Market Authority Board Resolution. 
CMBR   Capital Market Authority Board Resolution. 
CML   Capital Market Law. 
COMAC  Code of Market Conduct. 
CPL   Criminal Procedure Law. 
CRSD   Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes. 
CSMAD  Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive. 
ECD   European Council Directive. 
FCA   Financial Conduct Authority. 
FSA   Financial Service Act. 
FPC   Financial Policy Committee. 
FSC   Financial Strategy Committee. 
FSMA  Financial Services and Markets Act.  
IOSCO   International Organization of Securities Commissions. 
LSE   London Stock Exchange. 
MAD   Market Abuse Directive. 
MAR   Market Abuse Regulation. 
OSR   Offers of Securities Regulations. 
PRA   Prudential Regulation Authority. 
 
 
ix 
RDC   Regulatory Decisions Committee. 
SAMA   Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority. 
SIB   Securities and Investments Board Limited. 
SSE   Saudi Stock Exchange Listing Rules. 
UCITS   Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities. 
WTO   World Trade Organisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
ABSTRACT 
Financial markets play a crucial role in the development of trade and investment across 
the world. They have also helped in shaping the economy of many countries through 
emerging resolve to diversify their economy by building financial markets that are 
attractive to both domestic and foreign investors. But beyond the participation of 
investors, there has been continuous determination to establish robust regulatory 
frameworks in order to make the market safer for investors and for the economy. To 
achieve this, the need for effective legislation and proper enforcement against market 
abuse has become a prominent part of policy decisions across nations and regions. This 
works looks at the development of financial market in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 
comparison with developments in the United Kingdom. In doing so, the study makes a 
contribution to the field of knowledge by critically discussing the challenges of 
emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia in not only expanding its financial industry but 
in restructuring the industry with new regulations, products and services that are also 
protected from market abuse. The study is also one that for the first time, compares 
these two jurisdictions in the context of financial market regulations and legal 
mechanisms against market abuse. 
 
The study examines these regimes from a legal perspective, by looking at the 
development of the two financial markets regimes and especially the way regulatory 
frameworks modelled and implemented to deal with market abuse. The thesis also 
looks at the critical issues and challenges of dealing with insider trading and market 
manipulation in the face of Saudi’s growing ambition to reach out to the global market 
while keeping it traditional model of Islamic finance. These issues were discussed in 
comparison to the model in the UK and how the UK legal framework works to curtail 
abuse of the market, ensure compliance and investor safety as well as issues relating to 
penalties for offenders. The thesis further relates these aspects of financial markets to 
the challenges of dealing with the growing volume of products and services that are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated in a global market that has continued to become 
interconnected. 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the research 
This study aims to examine the structure of Saudi Arabia’s financial market and the 
nature of its regulatory institutions in comparison to the system in the United Kingdom. 
It looks at the various characteristics that define the financial institutions, ranging from 
aspects of development to those of reform. The study also aims to discuss and analyse 
the nature and character of the various products and services; from the traditional to the 
modern in an effort to understand how the Saudi market has changed over the decades 
and the extent to which its contemporary character match with the financial system in 
the UK and beyond. Further, this study intends to explain the complexities and 
challenges surrounding Saudi Arabia’s quest for expansion of its financial market and 
the challenges of preserving traditional Islamic values. It also looks at aspects of 
financial market regulations in Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom in the context of 
their convergence and divergence on the principal aspects of transparency, ethics and 
enforcement of rules on the protection of market participants and penalisation of 
violations.  
The study then looks at the experience of the Saudi financial market through its 
transitional period to what is applicable today in terms of the establishment and 
implementation of laws to prevent market abuse as a prime example of the 
requirements for transparency, ethical standards and the appropriateness of sanctions 
for the breach of the applicable rules. In the context of this discussion, the thesis looks 
at how the system in Saudi is comparable to the market regulation regime in the UK. 
Through contents of the Capital Market Laws and the role of the Capital Market 
Authority in Saudi this study looks at various regulatory developments and 
implementation of laws in an increasingly growing market, and that which is becoming 
interconnected with the global financial market. 
In order to achieve these, the study looks at the financial market framework of Saudi 
Arabia and the UK, and attempts to answer certain important questions that include: 
a) The transition and challenges of Saudi financial market reform from a 
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system based on orthodox Islamic principles to one that adopts modern 
products and services. 
b) The contents of the various laws in Saudi Arabia and how it has shaped and 
reformed the current financial market, and the extent to which it can be 
related to western financial markets standards, especially in the UK.  
c) The extent to which the Laws against market abuse in Saudi Arabia are 
effective and their comparison with what is applicable in the UK.  
Other areas of this research include: 
1) Exploring the nature and process of enforcement penalties over market abuse as 
applied in Saudi Arabia in comparison to the UK. 
2) Identifying specifically what constitutes financial market abuse and points of 
similarity and distinction between the two regimes. 
3) Identifying the nature and reasons for the similarities and distinction in the way 
penalties are enforced and disputes resolved. 
 
4) Examining the legal remedies for investors in Saudi as compared to the UK and 
the nature of prosecution and regulatory sanctions available to both 
jurisdictions.  
5) Identifying the challenges of reforms, enforcements and regulations in Saudi 
Arabia compared to the UK and offering some recommendations. 
 
1.2 Significance of the study 
The need for this study was as a result of many reasons. The first is that studying Saudi 
Arabia’s financial market, which is the largest financial market in the Arab Gulf region, 
gives a good understanding of the challenges of reform, as well as the extent of 
convergence and divergence between institutions and regulations in the Islamic world 
and those in the West. The research is also meant to examine financial market 
legislation in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and how laws were designed to conform to 
global financial market standards, as well as the extent to which this convergence 
resembles and how it is distinct with the framework in the United Kingdom. The 
research also intends to explain the nature of regulations, and the extent to which the 
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regulatory institutions have created a safe environment for those dealing in products 
and services within the financial markets leading to increasing investment from both 
domestic and international market participants. This area of research gives special focus 
to issues of insider trading and market manipulation which are the principal forms of 
market abuse and how the new regulatory framework keeps up with international best 
practices and investor confidence.  
 
It is evident that this area of scholarship has not been dealt with extensively, and there 
is the need to look at some of these issues. Perhaps scholars have written about market 
manipulation and insider dealings, it is important to fill the gaps, especially with 
regards to how these regulations in the Kingdom resemble other regulations in financial 
markets of the west which are larger and more proliferated with different kinds of 
products and services. This thesis is also an attempt to look at the areas of divergence 
and the reasons for that divergence. While in simple and ordinary sense, one might be 
tempted to compare the Saudi financial market to other markets such as Malaysia, 
United Arab Emirate or even Pakistan (which are also emerging and have similar 
cultural values as Saudi Arabia), the fact that Saudi Arabia is a member of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), and has since proven to be attractive to western investors is 
a motivation for a study in which the comparative perspective is targeted towards 
financial markets in jurisdiction whose financial market, legal culture and approach to 
investments is bigger and different.  
 
It is however noted that comparative legal scholarship of this nature often demands a 
detailed understanding of different laws in different jurisdiction that are radically 
different in their approach to legislation, legal reform and even jurisprudence. Yet, in 
areas such as commercial laws where the world is becoming increasingly 
interconnected and laws governing markets becoming harmonised and 
internationalised, comparing Saudi Arabia’s financial market with that of the United 
Kingdom helps in opening the gate to understand how even with a great deal of 
disparity in culture, custom and legal structure, financial market laws of different 
jurisdiction are structured to serve the purpose and aspirations of investors that 
constantly cross both borders in search of investment opportunities. How these 
purposes are achieved within the context of the similarities and differences of these 
laws is a matter of great relevance to this research. In the end, this kind of study 
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highlights the legal and regulatory challenges, opportunities and future of emerging 
financial markets (Saudi Arabia) in comparison to leading financial markets (United 
Kingdom). 
 
While this study looks at these issues, it is, like all other studies limited in its scope as it 
does not expand to areas such as Islamic Banking which in itself is a topical issues 
when one discusses areas of financial law and market development in Saudi Arabia and 
the United Kingdom. The relevance of this subject cannot be ignored, however, it is 
also an area of scholarship that may demand an extensive and comprehensive 
independent research which will include but not limited to banking regulations, the 
economics of interest-free financial system as well as the cultural and religious 
dynamics of the growth and development of Islamic financial principles in a world that 
has become largely dominated by secular neo-liberal capitalism that is often defined by 
a banking system that operates on lending for interest 
1.3 Methodology  
This study is based on a methodological approach that looks at the transition in 
financial market development, regulations and enforcement from a legal perspective. It 
relies on both primary and secondary data from statutes, case law and scholarly work to 
explain these along with a comparative study of the issues and trajectories that define 
what is applicable in Saudi and how it converges or diverges from what is found in the 
UK. This approach entails a study of the Saudi financial market laws and those of the 
UK, looking at the nature and character of the rights and responsibilities of market 
players and regulatory institutions. In doing this, the study also looks at various texts in 
journals and books to digest the debates on the most relevant issues regarding the two 
jurisdictions. Hence, an effort was made to identify the significance of regulating 
financial markets as well as the different priorities applicable to both regimes and how 
they were designed and achieved.  
In a world where financial services and capital markets are becoming increasingly 
interconnected and their regulations harmonised in line with global standards, case 
work in legal research and comparative analysis has become significantly relevant to 
the field of knowledge. Essentially, the methodology of comparative study is key to 
understanding the convergence as well as the divergence of regulations and the 
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structural dynamics between emerging financial markets and those that are already 
established. This methodological framework also helps give and insight into 
understanding both the legal culture of different jurisdictions as well as the distinct 
perspectives through which regulations are formulated and enforced.  The idea 
therefore tends to explain and resolve certain key parameters on how two different 
jurisdictions (here United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) the contents of 
legal provisions are understood; their effect on the financial market, protection of the 
legitimate interest of market participants as well as the regulatory framework that 
defines the extent and limits of accepted market behavior. By doing this, the approach 
of this research is to analyse both the context through which laws and regulations were 
influenced, promulgated and the underlying structure of regulatory bodies as they work 
to make the law effective and enforceable. This also suggest that the methodology is 
capable of explaining the cultural and religious dynamics of places like Saudi Arabia 
and how these social trajectories influence the design of law and regulations. 
 
Being that this thesis is essentially comparative legal study i.e., comparing the laws of 
one country against that of another, a careful but comprehensive analysis was 
undertaken to understand the different but relevant provisions of the law and 
regulations by looking at various legal data points in both jurisdictions. This also 
includes a clear understanding and appraisal of the meaning and application of these 
laws. The thesis then goes on to evaluate, compare and contrast the laws under review, 
which gives the opportunity to understand the rationale for the similarities and the 
reasons for the differences. It also entails contextualising the functionality and 
relevance of these laws to each of the jurisdictions. 
1.4 Structure 
This research begins with an introduction to the classical aspects of Islamic economics 
and how products and services were conceptualised. It then goes further to examine 
how the Saudi financial market has evolved from its traditional system to new 
transformations and innovations. The study then went further to look at the theoretical 
aspects of market abuse that include the utility, right based arguments, level playing 
field, fiduciary duties as well as aspects that revolve around the theories of fairness and 
fraud. In subsequent parts, the research looks at the legal framework for the financial 
markets of the two jurisdictions i.e. Saudi and the UK. This leads to the exploration of 
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the role and responsibility of regulatory bodies in both jurisdictions. Furthermore, the 
research looks at the nature of enforcement of penalties for market violations and the 
procedure involved in both regimes. It concludes by making a concise but analytical 
exposé of all the questions and the debate contained in the body of the research as well 
as areas of recommendations and what is open for future research. 
1.5 General Introduction 
Scholarship has incessantly revealed how financial markets play a significant role on 
the economy of states and the world as a whole. To fulfil this role, financial markets are 
also expected to check against abuses. Evidence has shown that fraud, manipulation, 
and insider dealing remain significantly present in today’s financial markets. Proper 
regulation is, therefore, a necessary element for the effective operation of financial 
markets and attracting investors.  
 
Historically, financial markets have been victims of abusive and unethical practices, 
from market manipulation to others such as predatory lending where money is lent on 
security knowing that the debtor is likely to default and seeking to profit from that 
default on the realisation of securities. 1  While some of these practices do not 
necessarily qualify as market abuse, market manipulation appears to be among the 
prevalent  incidents in financial markets. There had been continuous attempt in making 
regulatory reforms that will enhance transparency, accountability, trust and confidence 
in the market and among investors and participants is now more than ever.2  
 
The main rationale behind the regulations against market abuse is to deter individuals 
or groups, who through their professional, official of a privileged position, use or 
misuse information to manipulate the market in order to accrue for themselves or 
proxies some gain to the detriment of others. Although some scholars pose a different 
claim that insider dealing sustains markets by promoting inflows of information, 
essential to an efficient stock market,3  the most prevalent argument is that insider 
dealings and market manipulations have the tendency to affect the notion of trust and 
                                                
1 Squires, G. D. (2004). Why the poor pay more: How to stop predatory lending. Greenwood Publishing 
Group, p 2 2	These	include	laws	such	as	the	EU	Market	Abuse	Directive,	2003.	3	Ashe,	T.M.	(1990).	Insider	Dealing.	Company	Lawyer,	11(7),	1-26.		
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brings about a great deal of undue advantage to a few while affecting the investment 
and capital of the majority of unsuspecting participants.4  
One of the keys to determining the value of securities in the market under the ‘capital 
market hypothesis’ is the availability of information on the value of securities. This 
suggests that the value of companies’ securities directly corresponds with information 
available in the financial market.5 Hence, if there is transparency of financial and other 
relevant information about the company publicly available then that will allow the 
market to properly establish that value. The invaluable nature of such information and 
the way in which they are obtained determines whether they were used in the 
appropriate manner or to perpetrate what may be regarded as market abuse.6 Described 
generally as insider dealing and market manipulation, such acts are generally perceived 
as undermining the moral functionality and confidence in the market and have led to 
series of regulation in many countries. 
 
In general, market abuse can come in many ways. The common characteristic of each is 
the individual or groups aim to exploit the market immorally and unlawfully for 
personal or institutional gain.7 The most commonly referred types of market abuse are 
market manipulation and insider trading. These acts are targeted and sanctioned most 
municipal and international law as offences that are punishable. Depending on the 
jurisdiction, different legal frameworks are often present to deal with acts of market 
abuse.8 In many cases, market abuse is aimed at either manipulating the value of a 
security on a financial market or altering the perceptions of its price and value, thereby 
altering the underlying view of market participants. This according to Dabbah is often 
achieved in two distinctive ways i.e. ‘Market-based manipulation and information-
based manipulation.’ 9  The former is mainly done in financial markets and mainly 
involves false and misleading information regarding the values, quantity or other 
related information about company securities such as volume and frequency of trading. 
                                                4	McVea,	H.	(1995).	What’s	wrong	with	insider	dealing?	Legal	Studies,	13(3),	390-406.	5	Hannigan,	B.	(1994).	Insider	Dealing.	2nd	Ed,	Longman,	London.	6	The	case	of	Spector Photo Group C-45/08 See discussion  in Jesper-Lau, H. (2009). What constitutes 
insider dealing? International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, Forthcoming. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499093	
7 Minenna, M. (2003). The detection of market abuse on financial markets: A quantitative approach. 
Quaderni di finanza, (54). 8	ibid	
9 Dabbah, M. M. (2007). Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East. Cambridge University Press. 
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The latter which is often referred to as insider trading, is the misuse of information to 
exploit the financial market when such information is not available to the public but 
known to the party due to certain privileges.10 Rider et al., defined insider dealing as 
trading in “price sensitive information gained through the insider’s special relationship 
with the company.”11 Other scholars such as Mangelsdorf defined market manipulation 
as the act of “creating a false or misleading impression about financial instruments or 
their issuers by distorting the market, often by price manipulation.”12 In reference to the 
Published in 2003, the EU Market Abuse Directive (MAD) published in 2003 to 
implement an EU-wide market abuse regime, the Directive also went on to define 
insider trading as any act of buying or selling financial instruments, or advising or 
instructing someone else to do so, when in possession of inside information.13 For the 
purpose of this research, it is important to look at the statutory definition of insider 
trading under both the Saudi, UK and EU laws, and to also understand the nature and 
character of these definitions. Under MAD, insider dealing is the use of non-public 
information of a precise nature that would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of the relevant financial instruments.14 The Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), 
which was published in 2014 expanded this definition to make it clear that inside 
dealing includes using such information that a reasonable investor would be likely to 
use as part of the basis of his investment decisions.15  
 
The design and development of laws and regulatory framework of the modern financial 
markets are however influenced by various factors including the need to adapt to 
international best standards, which often are the dictates and extent required by leading 
global players in the financial markets. This is evident in the principles of the ‘most 
favoured nation clause’.16 The United Kingdom (UK), which has one of the oldest 
                                                
10 Minenna, M. (2003). The detection of market abuse on financial markets: A quantitative approach. 
Quaderni di finanza, (54). 11	Rider,	A.,	and	Linklater,	L.	(2002).	Market	abuse	and	Insider	dealing.	Butterworths,	London.	
12 Mangelsdorf, A. (2005). The EU market abuse directive: Understanding the implications. Journal of 
Investment Compliance, 6(2), 30-37. 13	Market	Abuse	Directive	2003/6/EC,	also	see	Swan,	E.	(2004).	Market	Abuse:	a	new	duty	of	fairness.	Company	Lawyer,	25(3)	67-68,	p67.		14	Commission	Implementing	Directive	(EU)	2015/2395	of	17th	December	2015.	15	Market	Abuse	Regulation,	(EU)	No.	596/2014.	
16 See Thuen-Paulsen, T. K. (2016). Most Favoured Nation-Clauses; Schill, S. W. (2009). 
Mulitilateralizing investment treaties through most-favored-nation clauses. Berkeley J. Int'l Law, 27, 496. 
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known institutions of modern finance and banking, has been at the leading role of 
shaping and reforming the nature and character of financial market practices. It has also 
played a leading role in terms of the introduction of different products and services 
while developing the way contracts are implemented and designed among the various 
players in the market, setting limits and obligations upon parties and regulators.  
 
In Saudi, one may argue that that the Fifth Development Plan that began gathering 
momentum in 1984 and the concept of the Saudi Industrial Market were among the 
major aspects that saw the beginning of a more concerted effort for reform of the 
financial industry. The emphasis was to create an economy that is based on industry and 
not only reliant on oil. Similarly, the development of specialised credit institutions such 
as Saudi Industrial Development Bank (SIDB) also bolstered this drive. Although this 
was an approach different from the prior reliance on the oil boom, it still became clear 
that there is the need to develop beyond just credit from a single institution. This saw 
the engagement of professional stakeholders and for the first time, private sector played 
a significant role in the country’s economy. The need also arose for significant 
capitalisation if the goal of industrialisation set was to be achieved. The first point of 
access to finance was the SIDB but that alone proved insufficient. 
 
In general, the Saudi system had been one governed mainly by Shari’ah law. This has 
created a gap because the system had for years not developed clear financial laws and 
therefore the system has remained one that is mainly governed through general legal 
provisions. Paradoxically, the Kingdom was ambitious to join other nations in 
developing and opening its financial market to investors both within and 
internationally. This also includes the decision to join the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). These ambitious policies necessitated far-reaching legal and institutional 
reforms some of which were negotiated in 2005 as part of the process to comply with 
being a member of the WTO.17 This process includes numerous bilateral agreement 
signed into legally binding documents in line with the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) standards. These decisions by Saudi were to fulfil its 
                                                17	Dar,	H	and	Azami,	M.	T.	A.	eds.	(2011)	‘Regulatory	Issues:	Challenges	and	Solutions’.	Global	Islamic	
Finance	Report.	London:	BMB	Islamic	UK	Limited.	
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strategic commitments to expand its financial industry and tap from the opportunities 
that the global market offers.18  
 
Remodelling what is seen as ineffective domestic regulations became an imperative for 
the Kingdom in its move to support capital market expansion. 19  The implication 
however is that, these proposals for reorganisation are modelled on a western paradigm 
especially in the legal aspects of rights and responsibilities of parties. Evidence 
however indicates, there were some legal proposals long before the WTO agreement 
i.e. the executive/enforcement law, the finance lease law, the real estate mortgage law, 
the real estate finance law and the law on supervision of finance companies.20 What 
emerged after the WTO agreements generated ambiguity in the regulation of some 
financial products that are seen as transactions prohibited from an Islamic perspective. 
An example of these is the corporate insurance regulation, which lacks guidance as to 
what constitute corporate insurance.21   
 
Notwithstanding the hindering factors, there appears to be an increasing domestic 
demand for Islamic financial products on one hand and the call to attract foreign 
investors on the other. For domestic investors, there is a peculiar challenge in the 
absence of well-established financial laws and guidance to deal with contracts such as 
Takaful, a common feature of Islamic finance that would be discussed in the later in 
part of this research. 22  Moreover, the effect of the absence of Shari’ah compliant 
products as well as mortgage laws are very profound in sectors such as real estate, 
where demand for owning houses by nationals through the western market model is 
very difficult due to protracted waiting list and wealth constraints. The way to remedy 
this according to observers is by enactment of mortgage laws capable of boosting the 
real estate market, diversify bank’s balance sheet and propel opportunities for issuance 
of Sukuk bonds.23 Doing this they argue will enhance the needed liquidity and boost the 
                                                18	Malkawi,	B.	H.	(2006).	Anatomy	of	the	Case	of	Arab	Countries	and	the	WTO.	Arab	Law	Quarterly,	20,	2,	110-151,	p1.	
19 Ramady, M. A. (2010). The Saudi Arabian economy: Policies, achievements, and challenges. Springer 
Science & Business Media. See also Kobayashi, Y. (2007). Corporate strategies of Saudi Aramco. The 
James A Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, Texas, US. 20	Saudi	Gazette	(2012) 
21 Dar, H and Azami, M. T. A. eds. (2011) ‘Regulatory Issues: Challenges and Solutions’. Global 
Islamic Finance Report. London: BMB Islamic UK Limited. 
22 ibid.  23	The	concept	of	Sukuk	bonds	will	be	discussed	in	the	subsequent	chapters.	
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market to enable the issuance not only of different products but also of providing micro 
and macro credit as well as financing of mortgages and other market products.24  
 
The absence of a well characterised financial market body and the non-integration of 
standards such as Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial 
Institution (AAOIFI), the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA) etc. left unfilled the legal gap 
that could have enabled the smooth operation of markets in relation to financial 
products. Similarly, the absence of diverse Shari’ah compliant products has reduced the 
willingness, especially for domestic investors to invest. In the banking sector for 
example, 60 – 80 per cent of transactions undertaken in Saudi Arabia retail and 
corporate banking are Shari’ah compliant products.25  
 
1.6 Islamic economic principles 
Islamic economic principles, which are the main regulatory framework upon which the 
Saudi capital market operates makes emphasis on the principles of Shari’ah that all 
transactions either of property or finances must be fair to all parties involved.26 It also 
insists on the principle of commensurate share and equity that must be respected by all 
stakeholders in any financial or business dealing.27 These principles have are generally 
invoked in designing Islamic finance.  Even at the point of difference in opinion or 
interpretation of what is contained in Shari’ah, the terms ‘equity’ and ‘fairness’ remain 
at the epicentre of all discussions. This ideology is mainly at the centre of Muslims’ 
understanding of socio-economic principles. 
What causes divergence of opinion is mainly caused by the differences in the sources 
and hierarchy of Islamic law. While the Qur’an and Sunnah are the primary sources, 
other sources include the secondary sources of Ijtihad or personal reasoning which 
mainly depends on the intellectual capabilities of scholar. The primary sources address 
certain issues in general terms and often need interpretations and are capable of 
different interpretations. Mujtahid (scholars that do Ijtihad) are those with obligation to 
                                                
24 Wilson, R. (2004). Overview of the sukuk market. Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring 
and Investing in Sukuk. Euromoney Books, London, 6-7. 
25 ibid.	26	Lahsasna,	A.	(2013).	Maqasid	Al-Shari’ah	in	Islamic	Finance.	Kuala	Lumpur:	Institute	of	Banking	
and	Finance	Malaysia.	27	El-Gamal,	M.	A.	(2006).	Islamic	finance:	Law,	economics,	and	practice.	Cambridge	University	Press.	
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take into consideration the effects of necessity, public interest and the needs of 
community, which together cause differences in interpretation and opinion.28 Moreover, 
the influence of major Islamic schools of jurisprudence impact differently on 
Mujtahids.29 For example, the emergence of the modern concept of Tawarruq30 was 
first in Saudi Arabia, where the prevailing school is the Hanbali School of Islamic 
jurisprudence, which is also the only classical school that has explicitly approved this 
type of trading.31 In Tawarruq, the buyer purchases a commodity from a seller on a 
deferred payment and the buyer sells the property immediately to a third party and 
raises the money he needs. This system is to avoid Riba in buying and selling. Yet, it is 
important to state that advent and growth of Islamic finances and new market products 
have necessitated resort to Ijtihad and the differing opinions and interpretations on 
compliance of contracts and products to the rules of Shari’ah.32 In places like Malaysia 
for example, the Shafi’i School influences Ijtihad.33 
Along these lines, regulators tasked with the responsibility of designing capital market 
regulations in Saudi and other Muslim nations have struggled to balance the demands 
of consumers, the choice for expansion beyond local markets and the need to comply 
with Shari’ah principles.34 This becomes even more challenging as economic needs 
change and new products and services emerge. Hence, scholars of Islamic principles 
have continued the search for ways in which these products and services can be 
                                                
28 Kamali, Mohammaed Hashim (2000), Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiyyah 
Publishers, pp.367-370. 29	Hallaq,	W.	B.	(1986).	On	the	Origins	of	the	Controversy	about	the	Existence	of	Mujtahids	and	the	Gate	of	Ijtihad.	Studia	Islamica,	129-141.	30	The	concept	of	Tawarruq	is	an	Islamic	financial	transaction	where	an	individual	(customer)	buys	an	asset	at	a	particular	marked	up	price	to	be	paid	at	a	later	date.	The	customer	can	then	sell	such	property	instantly	to	raise	the	capital	he	or	she	needs	
31 Siddiqi, M. N. (2007, February). Economics of Tawarruq: how its Mafasid overwhelm the Masalih. In 
Tawarruq Seminar organised by the Harvard Islamic Finance Programme, at London School of 
Economics, London, UK on (Vol. 1). See also Al-Amine, M.B.M. (2001), "The Islamic bond market: 
Possibilities and challenges", International Journal of Islamic Financial Services. (3),1. 
32 Al-Amine, M.B.M. (2001), "The Islamic bond market: Possibilities and  challenges",  International 
Journal of Islamic Financial Services, (3), 1. See also Hammad, Nazih (2007), “Takyif Sharikatai al-
[Aqd wa Atharuhu fi Tatbiqat al- Sukuk wa al-Musharakah al-Mutanaqisah”, paper presented at the Fifth 
Shari[ah Conference organized by the Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), February, Bahrain.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Wilson, R. (2013). The development of Islamic finance in the gulf cooperation council states. The 
Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order, 146. See also Khatkhatay, M. H., 
and Nisar, S. (2007). Shari’ah compliant equity investments: An assessment of current screening norms. 
Islamic Economic Studies, 15(1), 47-76. 
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internalised without breaching the rules of Shari’ah.35 For example, the Holy Prophet 
Muhammad (s.a.w) recommended that when one intends to exchange a commodity for 
another, he should sell his own commodity and use the proceeds to purchase the other 
instead of bartering in commodities that differ in quality.36 This according to Sunna is 
to avoid the situation where one of the parties would feel he or she received unfair price 
or a deal that is not fair.37 This suggests that when dealing with products, especially if it 
involves exchange instead of purchase, there is the need to ensure that the value (or 
quantity) of the product is proportionate to the one exchanged.38  Jabeen and Khan, 
however39 states that, what is striking about this ruling is the “weight of importance 
given to standardisation of commodities, an important concept of quality management. 
Injunctions against barter etc. were likely to have been contrary to normal practice and 
may well have been very novel ideas, at the time of the Prophet. 
Another central point of this debate is the concept of Usury (Riba), which resonates in 
every discourse with Islamic finance.40 This idea of lending for interest has engaged 
many researchers not only in the Islamic but also in conventional economics. Yet, one 
has to admit that, in today’s global economics and finance, the business of lending is 
mainly that which involves interest. In Islamic finances however, the idea had been that 
in which the lender purchases from the market and sells it to the customer through 
which he or she makes profit for the sale. This system varies depending on the contract. 
It could be Murabahah, which is some form of ‘trust sell’ in which the seller purchases 
                                                
35 Sundararajan, V., and Errico, L. (2002). Islamic financial institutions and products in the global 
financial system: Key issues in risk management and challenges ahead (Vol. 2). International Monetary 
Fund. 
36 Rosly, S. A. (2005). Critical issues on Islamic banking and financial markets: Islamic economics, 
banking and finance, investments, Takaful and Financial Planning. Dinamas Publishing. 
37 Usmani, M. I. A., and Ansari, J. A. (2010). Meezan bank’s guide to Islamic banking. Research Journal 
Of The Institute Of Business Administration Karachi-Pakistan, 5(1), 171. 
38 Uusmani, M. T., and Taqī ʻUs̲mānī, M. (2002) discussed this aspect taking reference from hadith of the 
Holy Prophet, (SAW) contained in Bukhari, Kitab al-Buyu', Bab idha arada bay'a tamrin bi tamrin 
khayrun minhu; and also in Nasa'i narrated from Abu Sa'id and Abu Hurayrah (RA) “A man employed 
by the Prophet,(SAW) , in Khaybar brought for him janibs [dates of very fine quality]. Upon the 
Prophet's (SAW) asking him whether all the dates of Khaybar were such, the man replied that this was 
not the case and added that "they exchanged a sa' [a measure] of this kind for two or three [of the other 
kind]". The Prophet,(SAW) , replied, "Do not do so. Sell [the lower quality dates] for dirhams and then 
use the dirhams to buy janibs. [When dates are exchanged against dates] they should be equal in weight."  
39 Jabeen, Z., and Khan, M. R. (2008). An Inquiry into The Usage of Real Assets in Islamic Transactions 
and Their Benchmarking: The Implications for Islamic Capital Markets. Islamic Capital Markets, 69. 
40 Gavin, M., and Hausmann, R. (1996). The roots of banking crises: the macroeconomic context. See 
also, Everett, J., and Watson, J. (1998). Small business failure and external risk factors. Small Business 
Economics, 11(4), 371-390; Diamond, D. W., and Rajan, R. G. (2005). Liquidity shortages and banking 
crises. The Journal of finance, 60(2), 615-647. 
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an item from a seller at a specified profit margin payable to the seller,41 or Musharaka, 
which is a return on equity kind of partnership in which parties involved contribute to 
towards the financing of a venture, share profits on a pre-agreed ratio and also losses 
according to each parties equity participation.42  The third most common is Ijarah, 
which simply means a lease. In this type of contract, the intermediary, usually a bank 
purchases an asset and leases it to a client for fixed termly payments.43 This may 
include an option for the lessee to buy the asset at the end of the lease. All of these 
transactions are similar to what is found in other global markets, the difference, 
however, is when it comes to outright interest (usury) that is prohibited as an essential 
condition in a contract.  
Despite the fact that it has evolved, Islamic principles on the strict prohibition of Usury 
have not been modified. For example, religious leaders protested the recent IPO by 
National Commercial Bank (NCB) of $6 billion offering of a total of 500 million shares 
with 300 million of those going to the public in the kingdom.44 Despite the initial 
amount of interest in the IPO, the statement by the Kingdom’s Grand Mufti that the 
IPO is forbidden under Islam, which bans usury has kept many people away.45 NCB 
said it plans to become fully compliant with the regulations on usury over the next five 
years. Yet, it is evident that religious authorities were not convinced that is enough.46 
Islamic jurist are insistent that Islamic Finance is comprehensive and covers all 
business exchanges in which usury is seen not only as cheating, it is also considered a 
form of exploitation.  
1.7 Saudi Arabia’s ambition for a developed and open financial market   system that 
converges with global standards 
The optimism that pushed for most of the regulatory reforms towards today’s Saudi 
financial market was largely due to the fact that, through reforms and enactments, 
authorities believe the existing Islamic financial services industry has the potential of 
                                                
41 Alsayyed, N. (2010). The uses and misuses of commodity murabaha: Islamic Economic Perspective. 
42 Smolo, E., and Kabir Hassan, M. (2011). The potentials of Musharakah mutanaqisah for Islamic 
housing finance. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 4(3), 
237-258. 
43 Rohmatunnisa, D. (2008). Design of Ijarah Sukuk. Unpublished MA in Finance and Investment, 
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. 44	See,	http://www.cnbc.com/id/102140240.	45	ibid.	46	Ibid.	
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converge to modern governance practices. With a view to making capital markets 
attractive to both foreign and domestic investments, initiatives were made towards 
corporate governance in a way that will be significantly close to international standards. 
Essentially Shari’ah is the primary source of law; it is believed that the concepts of 
transparency, accountability and fiduciary responsibility in the context of Shari’ah can 
possibly work in developing a financial market system and regulation that will fulfil the 
needs and confidence of investors. For the development of an Islamic stock market, 
Islamic scholars are unanimous that transparency, the absence of insider trading and 
market manipulation are essential, and excessive exposure to financial risk is both 
immoral and unethical.47 
Generally, the Islamic finance has always been aware of the need for the protection of 
the buyer, seller, borrower and lender from fraud and dubious behaviour and also 
allows the state to regulate these conducts and to adjudicate trade disputes. The 
principal area of divergence between Islamic law and secular legislation has always 
been the area of interest on investment. Hence, it is noteworthy that while convergence 
of Shari’ah principles to modern financial products and services is possible in the 
context of creating efficiency and accountability to financial market, aspects 
surrounding interest for investment are not likely to pass the Shari’ah validity test. 
What the Saudi regime continued to work on was later to become legislation in 2000 
called the Capital Market Law (CML), which is also the law that established the Capital 
Market Authority (CMA) as the regulatory body for financial markets in the country. 
Although bodies similar to the CMA unofficially began since the early fifties, it was the 
current CML, promulgated pursuant to Royal Decree No. M/30 of 2/6/1424AH, which 
formally brought the CMA into full implementation. This reform was seen as the first 
phenomenal financial market law that allows for convergence of the interest of the 
regime and the interest of investors. The CML is enforced through the CMA, which is a 
government organisation mandated with the role of applying and enforcing financial 
market regulations. The main goal was to create an investment environment that is 
                                                
47 Alhabshi, S. O. (1994, January). Development of capital market under Islamic principles. In 
Conference on Managing and Implementing Interest–Free Banking/Islamic Financial System, Kuala 
Lumpur. 
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attractive, secure and that which holds companies and individuals accountable for 
violation.  
The role of the regulatory body is consolidated by quasi-judicial committees that have 
jurisdiction over disputes falling under the provisions of the CML. These are the 
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) and the Appeal 
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts (ACRSC). The committees 
enforce rules and instructions issued by the CMA and the Saudi Stock Exchange with 
respect to both public and individual actions. 
 
The general foundation of these reforms is to introduce a financial market system that 
would ensure transparency, prohibit insider dealing and deal with agency problems and 
ensure that agents act in the best interest of the principal. One of the arguments 
however is on the kind of model to adapt. One of the most debated issues was to 
introduce a system that U.S style securities market, which some argue is capable of 
triggering economic growth. 48
 
Opponents however argued against this proposal, 
highlighting “the distinct socio-economic and political features of each society that may 
not only resist the transplanted reforms but such features may also persist.”49 They also 
pointed to the realities of deep-rooted local culture and its significance on any reform 
that is to be made on corporate governance. 50  Yet, the desire to transition from 
orthodox market structure to a modern system influenced the enactment of the 
provisions of the CML, including the idea to shift the jurisdiction of market disputes 
from conventional Shari’ah courts in Saudi to an institution solely dedicated for this 
purpose i.e. the CRSD. This is despite the concern that these types of convergence limit 
the chances of broader corporate evolution and may result in a system that is 
unbalanced and lacking certainty.51  
Despite these concerns, the reform went ahead, based on the conviction that the future 
                                                
48 Paredes, T. A. (2003). Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing US 
Corporate Law Isn't the Answer. A. Wm. & Mary L. Rev., 45, 1055. 
49 Ibrahim, A. A. (2006). Convergence of corporate governance and Islamic financial services industry: 
toward Islamic financial services securities market. Georgetown Law Graduate Paper Series, 3. 
50 Licht, A. N. (2000). The mother of all path dependencies: Toward a cross-cultural theory of corporate 
governance systems. Available at SSRN 208489. 
51 Gilson, R. J. (2001). Globalizing corporate governance: Convergence of form or function. The 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 329-357. 	
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of the financial industry depends on global competitiveness, which can only be 
achieved through reforms, innovations and market regulations to deal with market 
abuse based on standardised global practices. This resulted in the development of 
institutions and regulatory frameworks. What is evident is that these reforms have 
changed the Saudi market and have opened up new opportunities for foreign investors. 
 
 
18 
Chapter Two 
Developing market products and services through innovation and constraints 
2.1 Introductions 
The global transformation of the financial market economy especially during the 1950s 
and 1960s is one that reshaped both the field of financial econometrics and regulatory 
endeavours of policy makers and officials in the financial market arena.52 In particular, 
the globalisation of various industries since the 1980s was indicative of a deeper 
business and financial interconnectivity as well as across nations. As much as this 
commercial and economic renaissance brought about gains across borders, it also came 
with challenges of competition and regulation. Nations and institutions continued to 
find a way for cohesion, healthy competition and a coherent system that can guarantee 
the safety of investment as well as robust dispute resolution mechanisms. One of the 
challenges that became imminent is the one involving financial markets, which has 
become more sophisticated, more complex and even more vulnerable to abuses and 
manipulation. The interconnectivity of these financial institutions across borders as well 
as their interdependence reveal even a deeper need for a consolidated framework 
especially in terms of regulations and policing of financial dealings that affect various 
companies and investors cutting across different borders. While regimes continue to 
deal with these challenges, they also continue to benefit from the kind of diverse 
opportunities that financial markets bring. The enormous amount of investment in this 
sector has boosted economies and allowed for diversification in different kinds of 
products and services. 
 
These challenges and advantages do not affect some nations as they do others. 
Developed economies in Europe and the Americas continue to benefit enormously from 
capital market industries. In others such as Saudi and many gulf nations where trades 
and investment are mainly built on Islamic principles, the need arises to explore ways 
to open up their markets to diverse investment both from within and from foreign 
investors. This has necessitated regimes such as in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which 
look outward to a future in which they can adapt to some of the overarching global 
system of finance markets and benefit from such diversification. To access this 
                                                
52 Easton, G. (2002). Marketing: a critical realist approach. Journal of business research, 55(2), 103-109, 
p103. 
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opportunity, they were compelled not only to establish a strong and attractive financial 
market but to also introduce regulatory frameworks that would ensure safety of 
investment and deal with issues such as dispute resolution and market abuse to a 
standard that would be acceptable to investors. These are known incentives that must be 
put in place in order to attract investment and also connect the domestic market with 
bigger markets across different nations.53  
 
The challenge however is that, despite the quest to open up the market for emerging 
and innovative products and services, there is also the desire to preserve distinctive 
Shari’ah principles regarding finances and market transactions. This has, on many 
occasions, sparked enormous debate over when convergence and harmonisation might 
be taken too far.54 Yet, what many instances revealed was the willingness of Islamic 
financial institutions to manifest the legitimacy of their interest while drawing closer to 
prevailing movements toward standardisation and global corporate governance.55  
 
In particular, the question this part raises is on the issues relating to the extent and 
limits of how Islamic financial institutions become embedded in the wider framework 
of financial practices across the world. 
 
This chapter intends to explore the nature and dynamics of the various finances in a 
system influenced by Islamic principles and approach of Shari’ah scholars and 
economist on financial market products these products can be replicated in 
conventional markets that is open and attractive to investors in other parts of the world. 
The chapter would also look at the challenges of compatibility with conventional 
western financial systems and products and how this has brought new challenges but 
also open the ways for harmonisation towards new opportunities. This would lead to 
discussions on the features of Islamic financial instruments and how they relate to some 
existing western financial instruments. Attempts would also be made to discuss issues 
in light of the contemporary developments and challenges with regards to Islamic 
market expansion and the concept of alternative products and futures that are capable of 
forming the future of the Saudi market without breaching the fundamental tenets of 
                                                
53 El Qorchi, M. (2005). Islamic finance gears up. Finance and Development, 42(4), 46. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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Shari’ah.  
 
2.2 Developing Islamic financial market amidst systemic constraints 
The question of efficient financial markets in the contemporary global financial system 
has taken many standpoints among the mainstream perspectives, which have argued 
either for robust official regulations or for a freedom that should allow the  market 
system to regulate itself.56 In the context of Islamic law, the need for regulation of the 
economic activities including and financial markets is also the subject of debate, with 
conditions articulated based on the ensuing event of any particular market transaction. 
Bianchi argues that the development of Islamic financial systems represents a revival 
and re-adaptation of Shari’ah principles along a broad spectrum of culture and politics, 
and a potential bridge across gaps that have historically divided the Muslim world from 
other civilisations.57 In International comparative law, discourse on Islamic finance has 
essentially been a field of research driven by legal and religious pluralism, and the 
cross-fertilization of different legal traditions, both Western and non-Western.58 Hence, 
it stands at the intersections of law and economics and of Religion and politics.59 
Within the larger framework, one witnesses an International financial regime that is 
evolving and often dominated by financial regulatory guidelines of the more 
industrialised nations of Europe and North America.60  
 
Often, Islamic financial institutions have operated under legal frameworks that are 
consonant with Shari’ah principles. It has been seen that the Islamic financial markets 
flourish globally, within its limits, for more than a quarter of a century, gaining some 
success and also facing certain challenges. In the over 75 countries where Islamic 
finances are present, they account for about $300 billion in annual growth,61 with recent 
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report valuing them at the excess $1 trillion.62 These challenges become even more 
obvious in the contemporary global market structure which prompts financial markets 
in the Islamic world to attempt a wide range of innovations and harmonisation in order 
to adapt to ever expanding markets around the word, while keeping to the fundamental 
rules of Shari’ah. What is obvious is that, over the last decade, Islamic finance, 
especially Islamic banking, has experienced global growth rates of 10-15 per cent per 
annum, and has been moving into an increasing number of western financial systems at 
an unprecedented pace where Islamic financial institutions are now present in over 51 
countries.63 Despite this consistent growth, there is still much left to be discussed in 
research and scholarship on the process by which the larger framework of Islamic 
finance were reformed and designed to work within a Western system, especially when 
it comes to the different products, services and regulations in financial market. But as 
Iqbal et al., argue, the lack of robust institutional support had continued to hinder this 
objective for expansion of the market.64  Developing an institutional set-up that would 
grow the market and open it to investors at home and abroad is one challenge that the 
Saudi capital market struggled with for decades. But as will be discussed later in 
chapter five, the last decade has seen a number of functional and robust regulations 
been established. These measure have modified the system and brought in innovations 
and rules that helped in opening the market to many products and investors.   
While these developments and expansion were expected to take into account Islamic 
regulations, scholars argue that transactions in banking and company laws in most 
Islamic countries are increasingly becoming fashioned on the Western pattern65 Those 
laws contain provisions that narrow the scope of activities. Parties can structure their 
agreements according to an Islamic contract; the enforcement of those agreements in 
courts may require extra effort and costs.66 Hence, the reforms came to include special 
initiatives and laws for the introduction and practice of Islamic banking, capital markets 
etc. Such laws eventually came to facilitate the operation of these institutions. Scholars 
maintained that the main reasons for these regulatory regimes were to make the market 
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attractive, protect investors, check and supervise companies as well as to improve 
control of monetary policy. In the case of Islamic banks, there is an additional 
dimension of supervision, which relates to Shari’ah supervision, regarded as imperative 
for the safety of deposits and investments. 67  In many instances, the prudential 
supervision desirable in Islamic finances is similar to those of western financial 
markets, which is to ensure and maintain financial stability by demanding safety in the 
system. 68  But because Islamic regulations are relatively unwilling to allow very 
complex and unclear financial products and services and do not often take the kinds of 
risks that western financial institutions take, they are often less susceptible to 
vulnerabilities of their western counterparts. For example, the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis reveals that most Islamic banks suffered less and remained resilient to the effect 
of the crisis.69  
As markets continue to grow in the midst of many reforms and challenges, scholars 
have continued to observe and debate on these numerous changes in both markets in the 
west and those in the Islamic world, such as Saudi. Some scholars have continued to 
point out to defects in the recommendations.70 They pointed to the lack of viability for 
more risk-sensitive capital ratios, especially taking into account the importance of risk 
mitigation techniques and emphasising supervision and market discipline.71 The Basel 
III Accord, 72  for example, came with a major principle i.e., a mandatory ‘capital 
conservation buffer’, equivalent to 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets and also banks 
are mandated to hold a total of 7% CET1 capital.73 This serves as a significant element, 
“to deal with pro-cyclicality through dynamic provisioning based on expected losses.”74 
                                                
67 Ibid 
68 Errico, M. L., and Farahbaksh, M. M. (1998). Islamic banking: issues in prudential regulations and 
supervision. International Monetary Fund. 
69 In  a report by Prof. Rodney Wilson of the London School of Economics, in May 2009, he points out 
that “Islamic banks have been less adversely affected than the major international banks by the 2008-9 
crisis, making them more attractive to investors.” See, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/news/archives/2009/05/IslamicBanking.aspx. 
70 Caouette, J. B., Altman, E. I., and Narayanan, P. (1998). Managing credit risk: the next great financial 
challenge (Vol. 2). John Wiley and Sons. 
71 Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., and Levine, R. (2004). Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?. 
Journal of Financial intermediation, 13 (2), 205-248. 
 Danielsson, J., Embrechts, P., Goodhart, C., Keating, C., Muennich, F., Renault, O., and Shin, H. S. 
(2001). An academic response to Basel II. 
72 See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm 
73 Blundell-Wignall, A., & Atkinson, P. (2010). Thinking beyond Basel III. OECD Journal: Financial 
Market Trends, 2010(1), 9-33. 
74 Basel II. See also, Lindblom, T., Sjögren, S., and Willesson, M. (2014). Financial systems, markets 
and institutional changes. Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
 
23 
Some scholars argue that Basel III has “not properly address the most fundamental 
regulatory problem that the "promises" that make up any financial system are not 
treated equally.”75 They also maintained that existing risk models treat risk as a fixed 
exogenous phenomenon, when in reality the market could be volatile  based on both 
internal and external forces.76 For example, markets can become volatile due to mergers 
and acquisition, collapse of a big company or some external factors such as natural 
disasters, war etc.  
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson also raised issues regarding risk-weighting approach of 
markets, which they say encourages portfolio concentrations in low-weighted assets 
e.g., government bonds and mortgages are incentives to capital as they expand 
businesses into lower-weighted areas.77 But as Le Leslie and Avramova argue, some 
banks, regulators and market participants have doubts about the adequacy, transparency 
and even the comparability of capital.78 They further pointed that this lack of trust as to 
the reliability of risk weighted assets reported by banks could have a number of 
consequences i.e. making market participants re-calculate banks' capital ratios and 
disregard regulatory reported ratios. Assuming a lender can assess risk effectively, they 
may require higher capital ratios to compensate for the low perceived reliability of the 
denominator or they could stop using risk-based capital ratios altogether and turn to the 
leverage ratio, or even restrict lending to banks for which they have doubts about 
reported capital adequacy. This approach however evolved at the same time as did the 
market for credit default swaps, (CDS)79 and contract for differences (CFD), which 
essentially created the potential for complete markets in credit and banks had the 
leverage to transform risks with derivatives without having to trade much securities on 
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primary markets.80 Essentially, what risk transformations connotes is the idea where 
intermediaries offer low-risk securities to primary investors in order to attract funds. 
These funds are then used to purchase higher-risk securities issued by the ultimate 
borrowers. 81  What this does according to some scholars is that it undermines the 
fundamental idea of capital weights, as it favours assets with low-risk weights. 82 
Although the new Basel III, seemed to have made enormous improvements with 
regards to some aspects of the capital management process under the Basel II, it still 
appears not to address the fundamental problems of the risk-weighting approach, which 
essentially is now part of the ongoing discussions on Basel IV.83 This problem of 
offering low-risk securities and using the fund to buy high-risk securities contradicts 
the idea of transparency in the information available to the market. This may certainly 
lead to market abuse. 
The endorsement of Basel III for example was seen by some scholars as a critical step 
in the process of strengthening the capital rules by which banks are required to 
operate.84 It will, they argue, have considerably significance in reducing the probability 
and severity of a crisis in the financial sector, thereby reducing the potential for global 
financial stability.85 Others however contend that many of the fundamental concerns 
were not properly addressed even with the successive implementation of the Basel 
Accords. These issues include those concerned with the general modelling of the Basel 
framework, issues surrounding regulatory and tax arbitrage and those issues to do with 
the need for more capital.86 Thus, these challenges have paved the way for Islamic legal 
theorists and jurists to buttress their position for a more pluralistic perspective against 
mono-models, especially given the multiculturalism in contemporary societies as well 
as the globalisation of financial system. This entails the need to revisit some of the 
principles of the Islamic financial model as a means of collaborating and rebalancing 
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the structural fragility of the market. Some scholars for instance argue that the state 
must play an active role in defining and guiding financial markets.87 For example, 
Stiglitz argues that in some of the growing economies of East Asia, governments have 
taken a centre stage in both the creation and regulation, and in even in directing credit, 
both in ways that enhance the stability of the economy and the solvency of the financial 
institutions.88 This they argue has ensured prospect, confidence and security.89 
 
Although the Saudis and other Islamic countries did not go to the extent of having such 
robust debate as their European counterparts, scholars of Islamic finance rose up to 
point at the negative and overwhelming effect of a financial system that approves of 
excessive and imprudent lending by banks as the major cause of most financial 
collapses. 90  Hence, in their capacity and influence within the social and political 
institutions of these Islamic countries, they proposed that financial institutions and 
activities in capital markets must be regulated by state agencies to ensure that 
imprudent and excessive transactions are avoided.  
 
The most fundamental questions however are, what encourages banks to engage in this 
imprudent repetition of risky practices, and how does strict government regulations 
work side by side with the idea of a liberal market? In relation to this, scholars such as 
Ahmed identified some of the main causes.91 The first he said is inadequate market 
discipline in the financial system and the second is the enormous expansion in the size 
of derivatives, particularly Credit Default Swaps (CDSs).92 There are, however, other 
issues related to this, which include the failure of those accepting CDSs to appreciate 
the risk from the insurers issuing them, and also given the active trading of CDSs, it 
sometimes becomes difficult to identify the actual counterparty legally responsible for 
compensating a bank if an ‘insured’ security failed, causing some bank counterparties 
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to develop massive exposures to CDS risk.93 This difficulty also arises because CDS 
were generally sold as Over-The-Counter Market (OTC) 94  rather than through a 
regulated market so there is the risk which is uncontrolled through regulated markets.  
 
Another point of interest to scholars in the west and those of Islamic finance is in 
relation to the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States which was seen to be 
caused by the mixing of prime and subprime debt, paving the way for mortgage 
originators to pass the counterparty risk to even subprime debt to the purchasers, who 
would have ordinarily been reluctant to accept such risk.95 Although the risk may have 
passed to the counterparty, they still may have the benefit of the CDS so the risk passes 
to the CDS originator. This type of complexity in partnership is disallowed under 
Shari’ah because it does not involve clear risk sharing. Instead, it shifts to one party or 
the other. Most fundamentally, when contracts are in form of mortgage that involves 
Riba, Islamic law frowns at it. Yet, Islamic scholars are aware of the changes sweeping 
the Islamic capital market and the way western products are modified to suit Islamic 
principles. Hence, they were quick to lend their voices to the principle that Islam 
financial system has to adhere to the core principle that ensures the financier and the 
entrepreneur equitably share the profit as well as the loss “no risk, no gain.”96 They 
argued that only then would unhealthy lending practices be avoided, and also the 
attitude of financiers that may produce some relatively safer financial system can be 
ascertained.97 
 
Another key elements, which is one that has remained old and unchanged in defining 
the various aspects of operations, products, and service delivery in Islamic markets and 
finances is the clear and unequivocal prohibition of interest.98 This is mainly interpreted 
within the juristic context on the understanding that the financial system has to be 
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“asset based”, and that money cannot be used as a means of gain through interest.99 
Perhaps the principle allows for secured lending operations to finance the purchase of 
real commodity.100 
 
As the appeal for a pluralistic model is seen to be desirable, other concerns raised by 
professionals and scholars include the question of common denominators to formulate 
such a model. This desirability will hinge on the feasibility of these propositions, which 
suggest the complementarity of regulatory regimes, especially on issues relating to 
market abuses. On the other hand, there is another proposition as to the aspect of 
regulation relating to financial market products and services per se. The question raised 
here that eluded most secular approaches is the principles that the structure of the 
products and services of financial institutions must be sold to customers with the 
maximum level of transparency. In a study by Howcroft et al., it was revealed that 
majority of customers lacked confidence in their ability to choose ‘good’ financial 
products due to lack of transparent information about products.101  
 
The debate on harmonisation also reflects on the importance of ‘legal origins’ of 
countries’ laws.102 Specifically, commercial transactions and the questions of private 
ownership rights have influence in the way each regime approaches the development of 
its financial market system. Legal theories, for instance, emphasise two interrelated 
channels through which legal origin influences finance.103 The first contention is that 
while the protection of private contracting rights forms the basis of financial 
development, legal traditions differ in terms of the priority they assign to ownership of 
private property versus the rights of the state.104 Although the world seemed to be 
drifting more towards a convergent regulatory regime, what many legal scholars agree 
on is that a system that accepts jurisprudence and allows judges to give interpretations 
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of laws in terms of efficiency and transparency is more likely to produce a lucid and 
clear systemic framework than the one which does not.105 
 
Yet, one needs to understand the trajectories of contemporary financial markets, formal 
or informal, as vehicles for allocating capital and also risk,106 and whose efficiency lies 
in transnational coherency, transparency and connectivity of institutions and investors 
moving across state boundaries. 107  Understanding financial markets from this 
perspective, i.e., agents, lenders and intermediaries and efficient secondary market 
prices, market products etc. are aspects that can hardly be determined through some 
unilateral municipal legislations.108  Hence, regulatory regimes are seen as the best 
emerging concept. 109   Thus, from the broader understanding of these contending 
perspectives on the legal personality of financial markets, the incompleteness of 
municipal laws and indeed the importance of a stable global financial markets are major 
issues to be considered in examining the feasibility of a pluralist approach to law 
enforcement regime.  
 
In the remainder of this part, this study will further examine the questions briefly 
highlighted above by shedding more light on issues such as the nature of Islamic law 
enforcement approach in financial market regulation. This will include its legal 
products, its principles, objectives and the challenges facing the Islamic approach. 
Similarly, to understand the differences of legal origins between the Saudi Capital 
Market Authority and UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), this study will 
examine the nature of UK’s law and the principles that structured the financial market 
products and services in order to drawn comparisons. As comparative analysis, this 
study is aimed to establish a pluralist approach for regulatory regime that effectively 
enforces laws that stabilises the financial market and deters abuses and ensures the 
transparency in financial transactions are accorded to the market participants. Thus, the 
need to discern the regulatory imperatives of financial markets products and services 
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should not overlook the role of government intervention in examining the problems 
related to the mood of financing the financial markets products and services and the 
nature of the laws binding the transactions.  
 
2.3 Innovations and harmonisation  
Generally, the ambition for a robust financial market is to encourage and supports 
growth of big and small industries and to allow small and large fund traders to take 
advantage of trading in stocks and commodities. This initiative where people with small 
capital can now find ways to trade while institutions also invest in goods and services 
has seen the global development and sophistication of the financial market. But beyond 
development in various sovereign frontiers, there is also the integration of markets, 
which allows people to trade in commodities within and outside their national or local 
constituencies. What integration does essentially is to complement growth and also to 
enhance regulation and dispute resolution while supporting the financial and economic 
infrastructure of nations.  
 
As Simmons argues in his work, the globalisation of capital markets has complicated 
the tasks of national financial regulators by increasingly making it difficult to regulate 
the broad range of transactions by banking and securities firms on a national level.110 
Hence, several factors come into play to influence how markets connect and work, 
which include institutional arrangements, market pressure and even political 
pressure.111 For systems like Saudi Arabia, one of the main challenges is whether they 
can acquire the incentives to emulate the regulatory frameworks of mature markets like 
the United Kingdom, and whether the dominant financial markets experience negative 
externalities in the process.112  
 
Putting up a financial market system that has the incentives of reaching international 
standards and attracting large amount of foreign investment has been a challenge for 
systems like Saudi Arabia where finances are regulated by rules that are embedded in 
the principles of Shari’ah law. Opening the market to international participants is 
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challenged by this inherent structure of the system. The continued and future success of 
the Saudi industry is therefore dependent on many variables, which include reforming 
the regulatory framework to meet international standards and also ensure that some of 
the inherent principles of Shari’ah are present to attract local participants. This 
according to Vogel and Hayes it appears inevitable and requires “ambitious 
innovation.”113 These have to include the development of clear laws and initiatives to 
include “developing doctrines governing the creation and regulation of an Islamic 
public financial market.”114 This need for standardisation is seen to be an essential part 
of any framework.  
 
In April 2015, the Saudi Capital Market Authority announced its intention to open the 
Saudi capital market (Tawadul) to qualified foreign institutional investors and state 
rules guiding the market.115 The Saudi Arabian stock market capitalisation is projected 
be around $528bn.116 This is marginally larger than all the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) stock markets combined. As Khalid Al-Rabiah, chairman of Tadawul, stated, 
the goal of the Tadawul is not only about the local market but also a move to attract 
foreign investment.117 Jan Dehn, head of research at Ashmore added, “Saudi Arabia is a 
very large, liquid market. It will potentially be the seventh largest Emerging Markets 
(EM) equity market-by-market capitalisation, which places it just behind South Africa 
($543bn), but ahead of Russia, Malaysia, Mexico and Indonesia. The Tawadul trades 
on average $2.4bn per day across 162 listed companies and offers a rich selection of 
opportunities ranging from banks to consumer-driven businesses.”118  
The main points of this release by the Saudi authorities stress that qualified foreign 
institutions wanting to participate in the Saudi financial market must have a minimum 
$5bn in assets under management and have been operational for a minimum of five 
years. This, observers think, is a good move by the Saudi market regulators in their 
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attempt to diversify and reach out to international markets and investors, especially 
with the fall in price of oil.119 
However, the need to expand the market is also challenged by other significant issues 
that are rooted in Islamic principles that define most of the economic regulations of the 
Saudi capital market. Economics and regulatory bodies that determine the regulations 
for Saudi and other Islamic economics understand the influence played by Shari’ah 
principles in guiding transactions and in shaping the system and its rules.120 Through its 
history, the Saudi market is influenced largely by these regulations as contained in 
Islamic principles. In particular, aspects to do with the prohibition of relation to usury, 
and contracts that have the tendency of replicating the character of gambling or 
speculation.121 In line with these principles which are embedded in Shari’ah, officials 
were able to draw a framework for products and services they consider do not violate 
these principles.122 But as the industry is poised to reach out to international investors 
and markets, challenges arise as to how the system will adapt into the larger framework 
of international finances. 123  What further adds to this challenge is the familiar 
divergence of opinion among scholars as a result of different interpretations.124 Hence, 
the question of harmonisation and standardisation of these regulations become even 
more imminent as the industry expands beyond its traditional jurisdiction of Islamic 
countries. 
2.4 Challenges of Shari’ah compliance 
As the Saudi capital market advances, the issue of compliance with Shari’ah and 
adapting to conventional models has been a subject of interest, especially in recent 
times.125  The Saudi Stock Market also has mutual funds that are equally Shari’ah 
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compliant.126 But questions of risk and return are among the challenges of not only 
conventional economics; it is also a question that challenges issues of investment and 
Shari’ah compliance under Islamic economics.127 Yet, over the last two decades, there 
had been a growth in interest on Islamic finance and capital market. This is largely due 
to the growth of the industry, especially in the gulf nations. And globally, the size of 
Shari’ah compliant assets has also risen to an estimated $400 to $500 billion.128 Other 
monitoring agencies like Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services estimate the potential of 
Islamic financial services to be closer to $4 trillion. The market share of these financial 
institutions is estimated at 17 per cent in the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), and 
it is growing. 129  Recent figures indicate that Islamic banks operating in over 75 
countries have total assets of about $300 billion and their annual growth rate exceeds 
15 per cent.130 In 2010, The Financial Times estimates the value of the industry at the 
excess of $1 trillion.131 
 
Nienhaus, however pointed out that despite any administrative or bureaucratic role 
given to Shari’ah scholars, they often see themselves more as legal advisers and 
custodians of religious principles than officers in the business and financial 
regulation.132  The perspective of Islamic economists is that which saw the developing 
of models of interest-free and profit and loss-sharing economies since the second half 
of the last century.133 With this growing “idea of 'form over substance’, which will be 
discussed later, Islamic finance has become a profitable segment of the global finance 
industry.”134 In its present form he argues, it is neither more ethical nor more efficient 
or stable than 'prudent' conventional finances because the replication of conventional 
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products including complex structured products similar to those that contributed to the 
recent financial crisis took place with the approval of prominent scholars on the 
Shari’ah boards of Islamic financial institutions.135 
 
Scholars such as Chong and Liu argued that in practice Islamic banking is not very 
different from conventional banking and that Islamic deposits are not interest-free, but 
are closely pegged to conventional deposits.136 This however cannot be generalised as 
the study was restricted to Malaysian finance institutions which shows that only a 
negligible portion of Islamic bank financing is strictly on profit and loss sharing basis. 
The general situation of contemporary global capital market including most financial 
institutions in the Islamic world is that most of the governing laws when it comes to 
contract that involve investment that relate to foreign institutions are conventional 
laws.137  This is despite the fact that these contracts are supposed to be based on 
Shari’ah principles.  
 
What is rather important however is that, even as some Islamic finances mimic 
conventional ones; there is still the deep ethical underpinning that is often guided by 
Islamic principles. This entails the avoidance of any contract or investment that 
involves interest (riba), Gambling (maysir) and uncertainty (gharar).138 Islamic jurists 
claim those investments that are devoid of this phenomenon of uncertainty; interest and 
gambling are more stable, fair and efficient. Hence, finances and investment in Islamic 
countries are keen to adopt what is clearly devoid of these factors. Nienhaus went 
further to argue that the practice of Islamic banking has reduced the potential 
differences to actually subtle distinctions in the contractual basis of financial 
transactions.139  
The greater challenge is that the existing mechanism of Shari’ah in product 
development; compliance and approval may be insufficient for a rapidly expanding and 
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interconnected global market.140  The need to adhere to international standards and 
practices as well as the changing nature of customer demands for new and different 
forms of products is a real challenge. Hence, bodies such as the Organisation of Islamic 
Countries (OIC) or the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) have made attempts to deal with these challenges but there are 
still suffering from a number of shortcomings.141 As would be seen in the subsequent 
chapters of this research for instance, the practical aspects of Ijarah or even 
Musharakah, have not been extensively discussed by the OIC Fiqh Academy, despite 
the presence of these finances in the market for many years and that Academy is the 
highest and most influential Shari’ah institution addressing financial issues.142  
The implication of this is that, since these products have been in the market for some 
time, any future pronouncement by the Academy, especially if it comes out to denounce 
these contracts as non-compliant with Islamic principles is bound to raise grave 
controversies. 143  Likewise, any approval of the existing structures, despite their 
shortcomings, might generate another controversy as some jurists might take it as a 
compromise of Shari’ah principles.144  
 
Some Islamic bankers argue that the principle of Islamic finance may even have a 
positive effect in underpinning the stability of the international economy.145 This they 
argues is because Islamic financing system, investments or finance is targeted not only 
towards the profit and also the reliability and the needs of the parties.146 Moreover, the 
investors and financiers must exercise due diligence in monitoring the investments and 
do not have the leverage of raising a variety of unsecured debts that may later affect the 
borrower.147  This they argue is contrary to conventional Western financing which, 
through different methods and products lacks a corrective mechanism to stop excessive 
borrowing beyond individual companies’ means. In good times argued Zaher, “raising 
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funds is easy, while in bad times the cost of raising funds is high; therefore, the risk to 
the financing institution is increased.”148  
Principally, the regulations guiding Islamic finances are those rooted in Islamic 
theology. Islamic jurists have continuously provided economic rationales to support this 
position. Some of these rationales as described by the International Association of 
Islamic Banks can be summarised as follows:149 That Islamic principle on the allocation 
of funds to investment should be based on soundness of the project and profit sharing 
and return on capital will depend on productivity. It should also include the creation of 
additional wealth to the owner of the original capital. Hence, speculative businesses 
have to be avoided but one can engage in secondary markets for trading stocks based on 
fair profit-sharing principles. But it is also a principle that the supply of money does not 
overstep the supply of commodity. This is to curb inflation.150 
However, it is important to note that Shari’ah contains no condemnation of what is seen 
as fair investments that yield profits.151 What is clearly prohibited is the paying or 
receiving of interest. Hence, this challenge of compliance to Islamic tenets often 
prevents observant Muslims from taking out mortgages, carrying balances on credit 
cards or investing in any fixed income securities or any other financial security that 
promises a guaranteed return. 152  This goes to show that Islam does not frown at 
investment that yields profit. The underlying issues lies in the areas of the emphasis on 
tangible products and the equitable sharing of profit and risk. It is therefore obvious that 
Islamic financing functions much like Western equity financing where investors and 
lenders have the right to a decent rate of return, the distinction comes when issues 
relating to certainty of the return is brought in. As Zaher states, the “direct correlation 
between investment and profit differentiates Islamic banking from conventional or 
western banking, which defines maximization of the shareholders’ wealth as the sole 
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objective of the firm.”153  
What is obvious about the growth of the Islamic finance is that it is still challenged by 
the debate on compliance with strict principles of Shari’ah. This debate is expected to 
go on as more products and services emerge. But the Islamic market is also poised to 
harness the opportunities that the global capital market presents. Hence, there is the 
need to continue revisiting these issues and devise ways that would sustain the Islamic 
capital market in the long run.  A robust research and collaboration among Shari’ah 
jurists and Islamic economists to device ways that and standards that will enable 
cooperation with international financial market is important.  
 
2.5 Discussing compatibility: Islamic vs. Western regulatory approach 
The extent to which Islamic financial regulatory approach is compatible with western 
models in co-opting new products and services and also addressing the challenges of 
financial markets seemed to be a question of how well the harmonisation of different 
products and services are made and how they are traded in the market. But it is also 
evident that statutory provisions in economic laws of the state that cover both products 
and services are mainly constructed to accommodate most of the fundamental issues of 
Shari’ah finance such as issues of interest and of gambling. Hence, the Saudi CMA, for 
instance, spelt out that questions of compatibility in terms of products, services and 
regulations general has little or no relevance since there are legal provisions, which are 
meant to manage Shari’ah compliant products and services in a full-fledged Islamic 
context.154 This study would show later that these are quite distinct from systems in 
western countries where the question of interest is an integral part of standard banking 
and finance and products that could amount to gambling in Islamic context are well 
within the accepted industry practice in the west. To be precise, gambling industries are 
big businesses allowed to flourish in most western countries. 
 
There are other issues that define regulations in Islamic communities, which include the 
question of regulatory manner adopted as formal, substantive or dual. In a formal 
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regulatory model, for example, the requirements for the Shari’ah Supervision Board to 
achieve standards for Shari’ah compliant outcome is determined by regulator’s 
powers.155 Thus, Shari’ah scholars affiliated with regulatory entities are tasked with 
responsibility of making rulings on the standards that financial market and services 
should comply with. In a ‘substantive’ model however, the regulators or its delegated 
Shari’ah scholars rather than the regulated entities are responsible for making such 
rulings.156  In the ‘dual’ regulatory approach, the regulators are not only issuers of 
rulings or licences, they are also saddled with the responsibility of ensuring the 
enforcement of the Shari’ah-compliance of the products and services of regulated 
entities.157   Again, these individuals or groups are mandated to give rulings based on 
Shari’ah principles as against the western system, which is purely secular, and 
regulations are guided by economic theories as well as the trajectories that guide the 
interests of the state and the financial industry.  
 
Epistemologically, the law and enforcement mechanism of Shari’ah compliant products 
and services is distinct from their western counterparts. 158  These distinctions often 
depend on moral obligations that validate the right of ownership and manner of 
transferability of such ownership within an economic context and nature of products 
being traded.  As practised throughout civilisation, the right of ownership of property is 
one of the cardinal principles enshrined under Islamic law. This principle is validated 
under the jurisprudential rubric that allow one person to lawfully transfer ownership of 
his belonging to another. One of the recognised ways through which such ownership 
can be transferred is through an honest financial transaction.159 i.e., transactions  done 
ethically and based on agreed terms and conditions such as offering certain goods or 
services and acceptance of the same upon agreed price and payment mode on specified 
date.  
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The invalidation of financial transactions under Islamic law mostly occurs due to 
certain unlawful practices that are contrary to Islamic norms and values.160 While there 
are clear positions on western trading methods, common products and party consent, 
there are certain exceptionally grey areas that have evolved as a result of changes in the 
nature of markets. Some of these challenges for example are those regarding products 
of financial markets, which, in Islamic finance are seen as complex in terms of trading 
and legitimacy. They include such things as debentures, bonds, preferred stocks, 
commercial paper, etc. The unsettled question on trading in these financial instruments 
in Islamic financial law is due to the fact that they are debt-based securities and 
therefore have the potential of some form of interest and conditionality attached to 
them.161 Although Preferred stock is often capital rather than debt finance, it still has 
the tendency of having features of debt such as a fixed coupon and a preference as to 
payment over ordinary shares. In some cases, it may be redeemable which may give the 
appearance of a more debt-like structure. The lack of consensual legal opinion on 
permissibility or otherwise of trading in these financial markets’ instruments, which is 
due to methodological question raised for ruling on such trading matter that depends on 
personal opinion of Shari’ah scholars.162   
 
However, the lack of consensual legal opinion on tradability of some of these financial 
instruments is both methodological and theoretical of concern to contemporary Shari’ah 
scholars. It has created an array of complexity and contemplation on how to screen such 
instruments to comply with Islamic financial standards. The most common 
methodological provisions to consider while determining the permissibility of trading 
in these instruments depends on, which of the four classical legal paradigms Shari’ah 
scholars derived their ruling from. This is because there is no clear textual ruling in 
primary and secondary Islamic legal sources, Qur’an and Sunnah. This is due to novelty 
of the nature of trading practice in the financial instruments in question. To those jurists 
who approve business transactions in financial instruments to the extent of one of the 
accounts generating low-interest income and their financing bearing below-average 
debt-to-equity ratio, the permissibility of such trading is granted on condition that the 
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profits generated from such interest-bearing account shall be purified if the amount of 
the profits realised from interest-bearing account is granted to charity directly or 
through charitable organisations. This is because Islamic financial law prohibited the 
debt-financing transaction given the reason of interest it bears.  
 
With the introduction of the contemporary financial market instruments, the Shari’ah 
scholars’ understanding of the concept of interest (riba), has shifted qualitatively and 
quantitatively on the extent to which a transaction in debt-based financing practice is 
prohibited in Islam.  As Farooq argues that the prohibition in the Qur’an and the 
commonly cited hadiths to that defined riba can be easily understood in the case of riba 
al-jahiliyyah, and the rationale for it is unambiguous.163 But, all the definitions of riba 
and especially to broaden the scope to reach interest in the modern economy in all its 
forms (including interest in a competitive, regulated environment) is a daunting task.164 
 
This, according to Farooq, is because Islamic economics developed as part of the 
revivalist movements seeking to bring about the Islamic model that would be in lieu of 
other systems of economy, including capitalism and socialism.165 The challenge then 
became that of dealing with Islamic rulings that will guide the emerging and changing 
complexity in capital and commodity markets. Osman for instance discussed this 
complexity and the ‘risk factor’ associated with it.166 He argues that the contemporary 
global village has developed in terms of mass marketing that an Australian company 
may have an enterprise in Malaysia or Pakistan and may rely on financing from 
European banks.167 This according to Osman, has increased the need for specialised 
establishments to deal with a globalised and interconnected financial system.168 Added 
to this ethos is the fact that such financial institutions are often not owned by 
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individuals, instead they rely on the patronage and investment of wide range of 
depositors, borrowers, and shareholders.169 
 
One of the conundrums therefore became the issue of discerning of interest-based 
facilities from non-interest ones. Although there is a strong and overwhelming position 
among most scholars on the prohibition of riba (usury), there are also some minority 
opinions on the subject matter, especially outside the main areas that involve interest 
relating to deferment of payments (riba al-nasia) and those relating to exchange of 
commodities (riba al-fadl). Despite the differences in opinion and interpretation, the 
general consensus among Islamic jurists is that interest is prohibited, especially the 
ones clearly defined are prohibited.170Gradually however, Islamic jurists extended the 
scope, based on new developments into include all forms of interest i.e. high or low 
rate, nominal or real, etc. The debate has not stopped yet.171 
 
Taking these theoretical models of Islamic financial screening differently into 
consideration, the underlining issues they raised inform how the understanding of 
concept of interest is one of the central concerns in Islamic financial system. And the 
extent to which the variation in opinion on criteria to rule on its permissibility or 
otherwise among the classical and contemporary Islamic scholars, which have shifted 
the debate on legal issues in regulating trading in debt financing of some markets’ 
instruments. The qualitative method of screening permissibility or otherwise of trading 
opportunities in financial markets is based on passing judgment on issues that there is 
clear textual rulings on them derived from the first and second sources of Islamic Law, 
Qur’an and Sunnah. For example, investing in a market whose business activities 
constitute trading in alcoholic beverages or pork are religiously prohibited and therefore 
considered impermissible. The quantitative method, however, is a screening approach, 
which is aimed to define Islamic financial index by assessing the company’s financial 
ratio. For example, some Shari’ah Advisory Boards measure debt-to-equity of the 
company’s financial ratio over market capitalisation (i.e. business’s worth), criteria that 
used by Dow Jones Islamic Market World, DJIM. Other Shari’ah Advisory Boards like 
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Financial Time and London Stock Exchange (FTSE) and Morgan Stanley Capital 
International’s (MSCI) financial ratio measurement is debt-to-equity over the assets. 
The significance of these screening techniques is to measure the interest and debt rates 
to determine the rate of income generated by the interest and liabilities incurred by the 
debt.172   
 
In reference to the vehement opposition to the concept of interest-based financial 
services, some contemporary Islamic scholars have illustrated how interest-free capital 
is less volatile and more secure, while the paying of higher interest rates diminishes 
liquidity and is likely to destabilise the market. The question of interests and those of 
the legitimacy of products and services has been at the centre of every debate on 
Islamic finances. It is also relevant to regulatory frameworks of Islamic financial 
markets, their stability and indeed the ability to prevent market abuses.  
 
How financial transactions should be conducted via an institutionalised and interest-
free model in the contemporary financial markets that are dominated by secular 
practices as well as sophisticated and innovative financial products and services, is a 
challenge for Islamic finances. Hence, the need to thoroughly study and scrutinised the 
system and products to determine their compatibility with Shari’ah values. To resolve 
this and other issues brought about by western financial market models, contemporary 
Shari’ah scholars have constantly admitted how daunting and painstaking their task is, 
especially that which entails interpreting the 14th Century legal texts in offering rulings 
as to the legality of some of contemporary financial transactions. Thus, the extent to 
which the conception of interest in traditional practice differs from the contemporary 
interest-based financial transactions need to be discerned.        
 
2.6 Conclusion 
As markets around the world continue to come up with innovative products and 
services, they also become more integrated and interrelated, the Saudi capital market is 
also poised to expand beyond its present status. This is evident in the growth that the 
industry has seen over the last two decades. Yet, the continuous globalisation of the 
                                                
172 El-Hawary, Dahlia, Wafik, G. and Zamir, I. (2004). "Regulating Islamic financial institutions: The 
nature of the regulated." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3227. 
 
 
 
42 
capital market and the need to attract more foreign investment and capital means the 
Saudi market has to continue to explore the possibilities of more products and services 
based on the opportunities and potentials that Shari’ah presents as a way of 
harmonising the system especially with the constraints on usury, gambling and 
speculative trading and contracts.  
Globalisation of the financial market has brought about interconnectivity, enhanced 
competition and presented new challenges. The growth of the industry is however in 
different pace, those in the west have more products and services and have enormous 
capital and participants than their growing counterparts in countries like Saudi. The 
main challenge for Islamic countries such as Saudi is largely on the obligation to 
implement financial structural reform based on the principles of Shari’ah. Hence, the 
quest for diversification and innovation is also constrained by the need to abide by 
religious tenets. But studies have also shown the constant willingness of economists in 
the Islamic world to innovate products and services while drawing extents and limits 
from the prevailing provisions of the Shari’ah. The motivation to do this could be 
attributed to the variety of products and services and the volume of trade and 
investment emanating from western models. 
 
What is also evident is that, over the last two decades, there appears to be a growing 
interest in Islamic finance and capital markets, which allow the industry to grow 
especially in the gulf nations with Saudi leading the way. This has also given Islamic 
scholars the challenge of identifying different products and services and weighing their 
character and characteristic on the scale of permissibility under Shari’ah. But it must 
also be stressed that a number of these scholars see themselves more as advisors than 
guardians of practical business ethics. 
 
As new products and services emerge in Islamic countries, there is the ever-present 
ethical and religious underpinning that necessitates the avoidance of products and 
services involving interest, gambling and uncertainty. The greater challenge is that 
developing Shari’ah compliant products of all kinds may prove difficult in a rapidly 
expanding financial market proliferated with all kinds of products. Another challenge is 
the need to attract foreign investment in the midst of limited kinds of products. 
Moreover, the regulations for Shari’ah compliant products sometimes differ from 
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western provisions. These distinctions according to scholars are a reflection of certain 
moral obligations on ownership and transfer products and assets. But there are still 
many areas where the two converge, especially in terms of consent, in disallowing 
manipulation. It is also true that certain grey areas have emerged because of the 
emergence of new and complex products and services, which are often not readily clear 
to the individual. As much as some of these products remain complicated so is the 
question of their legitimacy under Shari’ah. Hence, there are instances where Islamic 
financial experts could not agree on the permissibility or otherwise of some of these 
products and services. As a result, the major point of discussion on these products had 
been the test to determine legality through the classical sources of Shari’ah. 
 
Other issues that have to be explored in order to create markets for products including 
the requirement of Shari’ah that real sector activities and real assets must back finances. 
Hence, there is the need to require the constant role of jurists and economists to find 
ways of consolidating and developing these ideas. Often through Ijtihad, many options 
have become possible that ensured products are restructured and made in a way that is 
permissible under the Shari’ah. However, as scholars such as Jabeen and Khan 
maintained, for the Islamic capital market to fulfil the principles of Shari’ah, it is 
evident that not only should the products be backed by real assets, their returns should 
also not be linked and benchmarked to the conventional money market instruments or 
LIBOR. 173  This clearly differentiates Shari’ah compliant finances with Western 
finances that have complex contracts such as the CDS. In this respect, Islamic banks 
have proven to be more stable and safer. This to a larger degree is a point of divergence 
between capital markets in the regimes like the UK and in Saudi. 
Although at a very nascent stage, the field of research is continuously moving towards 
exploring opportunities, that within Shari’ah principles, the market can be opened not 
only to equity but also to other products, with the exception of conventional debt based 
products that are clearly opposed under the Shari’ah. What also appears foremost to 
policy makers in Saudi is the resolve consolidate on increasing growth of the capital 
market and continue reforms that would bring in more investment into products and 
services that are both attractive and Shari’ah compliant.  
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Chapter Three 
Transformation of the Islamic Capital Market Economy: A conceptual perspective 
3.1 Introduction. 
Creating a financial market system that has the incentives and the variety of products to 
attract investors both at home and from foreign lands has been one of the economic 
objectives of Saudi Arabia. The main challenge however is that the principles of 
finances are mainly regulated by the rules of the Shari’ah. Yet, policy makers are 
constantly looking at ways to expand the market in a way that does not necessarily 
breach Shari’ah principles. They are also aware of the need to diversify the market 
away from the huge reliance on energy export to providing new ways of investment in 
capital market through the provision of different investment products and services.  
 
Islamic finance has a number of concepts that were designed in a way that replicates 
some of modern finances. And as the industries in the Islamic world were poised to 
reach out to international investors and markets, challenges arose as to how the system 
would adapt into the larger framework with different kinds of concepts that define the 
various products in other financial markets, while taking into context the custom (Urf) 
of Islamic finances and how the various aspects that define Sukuk can be harmonised. 
This saw the transformation of the concept of Sukuk to include bonds of different 
kinds. This chapter intends to look at these concepts and how they transformed to 
reflect and fulfil the quest of the financial experts of the Islamic world like Saudi. 
3.2 The concept of Islamic customs in finance (Urf) 
The concept of legal origin as earlier stated helps explain many of the political and 
economic structure of societies. In a society that is historically and predominantly of 
Islamic origin, jurisprudence is mainly a question of Islamic customs and regulations or 
deeply influenced by Shari’ah doctrines. Known commonly as the principle of Urf, 
custom,174 the Islamic custom suggests the peculiarity of human societies despite their 
common religious affinities, is one of the bases of Islamic juridical preferences. It also 
suggest that legal issues are not only acceptable because they are they are common to 
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any given societies, but also because they are endorsed by the divine injunctions.175 As 
one of legal methodological approaches to be considered in understanding of 
development and enforcement of laws in Islamic legal framework that covered all 
aspects of Muslims’ endeavours, it is, therefore, imperative to discern how Islam 
enforces law in regulating financial markets in ensuring their stability by deterring any 
abuses. Unlike the western financial transactions, business in Islamic perspective must 
conform to divine principles embedded in values whose objectives are fairness, equality 
and moral responsibility.176 Another significant principle to discern in the evolutionary 
nature of the Islamic legal system is the principle of public interest 177  as one of 
considerable factors that underline the law enforcement mechanism in Islamic legal 
system as well as the right of private ownership.178 
 
It is on these and similar other principles that Islamic laws are endorsed to permit or 
prohibit an act such as interest, speculation, etc., in Islamic financial transactions. The 
prohibition of interest and speculation in Islamic financial transactions is informed by 
prohibition on the exploitation of labour and poor risk management as such financial 
practices inflict damage to economic development and the growth of a society.179 To 
ensure fairness in financial activity, the Islamic financial system is structured on the 
basis that ensures profit and risks are shared reasonably. This principles of profit-loss-
sharing is central to Islamic finance, which also insist that regulators must monitor both 
products, services and the attitude of market participants to ensure fairness and stability 
in the market.180  
 
Having briefly considered the methodological approach of Islamic financial principles, 
the major task of this section is to examine the operation of financial markets in Islamic 
societies with particular reference to the Saudi Capital Market Authority and its law 
                                                
175  Auda, J (2008) Maqasid Al-Shari’ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A System Approach. 
London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, pp124 
176Finance (2012) ‘Business Ethics in Islamic Finance’. See, http://www.qfinance.com/business-
ethics-checklists/business-ethics-in-islamic-finance. 
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enforcement jurisdictions. This will also further trigger the discussion on Islamic 
financial products and services and the effectiveness of Islamic financial market 
regulatory model in coping with markets abuses. With such a mindset, the discussion 
will bring forth the different views of Islamic financial legal scholarship. In that, 
Islamic financial system scholars’ debate on regulation of Islamic financial markets is 
framed on formal and substantive issues pertaining to the law enforcement jurisdiction. 
The formal approach to regulating market entails that products and services providers 
are saddled with responsibility to regulate their financial activities rather than the 
regulators.181 However, the substantive approach suggests that regulators instead of 
products and services providers are to “seek to determine Shari’ah-compliance within 
the matrix of investor protection and market integrity.”182    
 
The law enforcement model under the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) is 
categorised as a ‘formal’ system within the context of the Global Islamic Finance 
Report  (GIFR),183 and ‘private’ in western scholars’ perspective. This is because, the 
CMA does not ‘scrutinise the Shari’ah credentials of a products or service.’184 Despite 
the Shari’ah Legal System being the basic source of its laws; there are no legal 
instruments such as legislative ruling or guiding principles such as the AAOIFI and 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) let alone a national Shari’ah Board in place.185 
The operation of Shari’ah compliant Islamic finance is evident from the four existing 
Islamic schools of jurisprudence. Some western banks are externally regulated by 
secular186 ruling legislation which allows each bank to adopt its own Shari’ah board 
internally.187  
 
Other issues to be considered as to Saudi financial system regulatory model include, 
understanding of the existing aspects of Saudi that in many ways resemble those of 
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western financial markets such as insurance, real estate market, etc. This resemblance is 
due to legal lacuna existing in the rapid legislative response to enact relevant regulatory 
laws in such sectors especially in insurance, real estate mortgage, and other services.188 
This has also raised the debate on Shifting the focus of the debate on whether bank-
based or market-based financial system regulation is the better framework to 
distinguish financial systems and to assess their performance and stability.189 Evidently, 
this debate was motivated by the realities of the Saudi stock market collapse of 2006 
and how the government responded badly to it with the weak response of Saudi 
authorities to the Saudi Stock Market collapse of 2006, the need for more proactive 
laws and regulations was necessary to avoid a recurrence and to assure investors of 
safety.190 
 
Critically assessing the causes of the collapse of the Saudi Stock Market and the 
response of the Ministry of Finance (Fiscal Authority) as well as Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), the event calls for analysing when public and private or a 
dual regulatory model is useful. The criteria to be used in support of each model could 
be defined by such theories of public interest and enforcement.191 Besides, the role of 
the government to ensure an enabling legal environment for effective regulation of 
financial markets and services needs to be highlighted as well.  
3.3. Islamic financial products: Sukuk and other instruments 
There are a number of financial instruments or contracts that existed in Islamic history 
that are permitted under the Shari’ah. Over time, some of these finances had been 
reconfigured to reflect or mimic such investments as bonds. The expansion of the 
Islamic finance over the last twenty years has seen the growth of the Saudi capital 
market. It has also contributed to the growth of other products and services across 
Muslim majority countries, especially in the gulf region. A number of product and 
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services were also introduced including Sukuk which is a Shari’ah compliant type of 
bonds. This was part of what was seen as an attempt by Saudi to harness the advantages 
of the growing global capital market. As of January 2015 the Tadawul lists 169 publicly 
traded companies. Some of these changes, as Zaher and Hassan argue, were influenced 
by factors that include the introduction of broad macroeconomic and structural reforms 
in financial systems, the liberalisation of capital movements, privatisation, the global 
integration of the markets, and the introduction of new innovative products.192 They 
however, maintained that a complete Islamic financial system with its identifiable 
instruments and markets is still very much at an early stage of evolution and still coping 
with numerous challenges relating to regulations and instruments.193 The major issue 
for Islamic jurists, especially regarding the transplant of western style financial 
instruments is the nature of interest, as well as the amount of risk that is mostly a result 
of uncertainty and sometimes lack of transparency. The problem of interests is one that 
leads to counterparty risk of the borrower being unable to pay, which results in increase 
in price until payment of interest is due and falls back again after payment of interest. 
What Islamic scholars identified are those contracts regarded traditionally as less risky, 
more transparent and simple, and ways in which their transformation will not contradict 
the principles of Shari’ah: 
 
(a).  Mudarabah and Musharakah  
Mudarabah is a contractual relationship executed between two parties, one supplying 
the capital (called rabb-ul-mal), and the other supplying the labour or skill in his 
capacity as an agent or a manager of the investment (called Mudarib). Each party shall 
be entitled to a share of the profit and the ratio upon which the profit is to be shared is 
explicitly stated and agreed at the beginning of the contract. Essentially, Mudarabah is a 
trust based financing agreement akin to some a Western- style limited liability 
partnership. Meaning that partners who contribute a set of capital to the partnership are 
only liable to the limit of their capital only.194 Mainly, this contract consists of one 
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party contributing capital while the other runs the business, and profit is distributed 
based on a negotiated percentage of ownership.195 In case of a loss, the lender earns no 
return on the investment and the agent receives no compensation for his or her effort.196  
Closely related to Mudarabah is Musharaka, which is a joint venture, whereby two 
parties i.e. the lender and the client contribute the capital for a business or project.197 
The capital is managed by both parties and profits shared based on pre-agreed ratios. In 
the event of loss, it is shared in proportion to equity participation of each of the parties.  
Some Islamic jurists pointed out that Musharaka is the purest type of Islamic finance. It 
is according to Zaher, closer to a traditional equity stake with rights of control.198 This 
resembles what in the UK is referred to as Joint ventures covered under the Partnership 
Act 1890 that refers to a relationship where two or more parties agree to work or 
collaborate together in a business venture.  
Although there are similarities between Mudarabah and Musharaka, there are some 
obvious differences, which include where the capital comes from i.e. in Musharaka 
capital comes from all the partners, while in Mudarabah, it comes from one of the 
parties.199 Moreover, unlike in Mudarabah, in Musharakah, all the parties engage in the 
management of the project.200 Likewise, the ideas of profit and loss sharing differ. 
Difference between Musharakah and Mudarabah have been summarised by scholars in 
the following points:201 
(i). The investment in Musharakah comes from all the partners, while in 
Mudarabah, investment is the sole responsibility of rabb-ul-mal.202 
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(ii).  In Musharakah, all the partners can participate in the management of the 
business and can work for it, while in Mudarabah, the rabb-ul-mal has no right 
to participate in the management which is carried out by the mudarib only. 
(iii). In Musharakah all the partners share the loss to the extent of the ratio of their 
investment while in Mudarabah the loss, if any, is suffered by the rabb-ul-mal 
only, because the Mudarib203 does not invest anything. His loss is restricted to 
the fact that his labour has gone in vain and his work has not brought any fruit 
to him. However, this principle is subject to a condition that the Mudarib has 
worked with due diligence which is normally required for the business of that 
type. If he has worked with negligence or has committed dishonesty, he shall be 
liable for the loss caused by his negligence or misconduct. (4) The liability of 
the partners in Musharakah is normally unlimited. Therefore, if the liabilities of 
the business exceed its assets and the business goes in liquidation, all the 
exceeding liabilities shall be borne pro rata by all the partners. However, if all 
the partners have agreed that no partner shall incur any debt during the course of 
business, then the exceeding liabilities shall be borne by that partner alone who 
has incurred a debt on the business in violation of the aforesaid condition. 
Contrary to this is the case of Mudarabah. Here the liability of Rabb-ul-mal is 
limited to his investment, unless he has permitted the Mudarib to incur debts on 
his behalf. 
(iv). In Musharakah, as soon as the partners mix up their capital in a joint pool, all 
the assets of the Musharakah become jointly owned by all of them according to 
the proportion of their respective investment. Therefore, each one of them can 
benefit from the appreciation in the value of the assets, even if profit has not 
accrued through sales. The case of Mudarabah is different. Here all the goods 
purchased by the mudarib are solely owned by the rabb-ul-mal, and the 
mudarib can earn his share in the profit only in case he sells the goods 
profitably. Therefore, he is not entitled to claim a share in the assets themselves, 
even if their value has increased. It is important to note that this relationship in 
Mudarabah resembles an agency relationship. 
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(b). Murabaha 
Murabaha is a kind of transaction, where the lender (intermediary) purchases a 
property, which is mostly a tangible asset. Here, the lender pays for the asset which is 
purchased by the lender at the request of a customer. As Zaher and Kabir described this 
model of contact, the lender then sells the property to the customer on a deferred sale 
basis with a mark-up reflecting the institution’s profit. The customer takes the 
responsibility of negotiating all of the key commercial terms with the seller of the asset. 
The intermediary buys the property with free and clear title to it. The intermediary and 
prospective buyer then agree upon a sale price that can be made through a series of 
instalments, or as a lump sum payment.  
 
It was also argued that a number of legal issues may be encountered in Murabaha 
transaction. 204  First is that Islamic financial institutions are not at liberty to earn 
excessive profit because if that happens, remedies may include a return of the 
‘‘excessive’’ portion of the profit to the client. Another legal issue is that customers 
may reject the goods for non-conformity with the quality or description. But this is 
often dealt with in a way that the customer acts as the lender’s agent in determining the 
goods prior to acceptance.205  Zaher identified another challenge where the lending 
institution “may be exposed to contractual and statutory liabilities such as warranties 
resulting from its ownership of the goods. These should be disclaimed to the extent 
possible or be limited by indemnities received from the customer.” 206 The risk is, 
however, not only to lending companies, purchasers, especially of immovable property. 
(c). Ijarah 
The term Ijarah was derived from the word Ajara which literally means to recompense, 
compensate or give a consideration and return.207 Ajr is a word that refers to a wage 
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given to a worker and Ujrah to rental payment.208 In its juristic usage, Ijarah primarily 
refers to both a rental as well as a hire contract that engages the services of persons. 
The permissibility of Ijarah is contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah.209 Whereas the 
Qur’an and Sunnah only refer to Ijarah as an employment contract, the companions of 
the Prophet practised Ijarah, in the sense of employment as well as rental of real 
property.210  
 
In modern context, Ijara is similar to a conventional operating lease, wherein an 
Islamic bank (lessor) leases the asset to a client (lessee) for an agreed lease payments 
for a specified period of time. This type of contract had been discussed by many 
scholars but always with some degree of unresolved issues in relation to permissibility 
under the Shari’ah.211 Ijarah features both debt and equity because in one way it is 
similar to an asset-backed loan, and on the other it features equity because the nature of 
estimation process of expected salvage value can be positive or negative.212   
Generally, Ijarah comes with no option of ownership for the lessee and the maintenance 
of the leased asset is the lessor’s responsibility. According to Al-Amine this type of 
contract has four main characteristics:213  
 
(i). First is that Ijarah is tradable and negotiable in the secondary market.  
 
(ii).  Ijarah bonds can be traded at prices determined by market forces. i.e. economic 
conditions of the financial market and opportunity cost and the price of real 
investment. The contract must also put into consideration issues relating to 
rental payment, changes in asset pricing and maintenance. The challenge here is 
that, maintenance cost and expenses are not predictable into the future. 
                                                
208 Ibid. 
209 Yusuf Ali, Qur’an English translation, 8: 77; 28: 26 and 65: 65-66. 
210 See for example, El-Gamal, M. A. (2007). Mutualization of Islamic banks. Handbook of Islamic 
Banking, 310. 
211 Warde, I. (2000) Islamic Finance In The Global Economy. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh. 
See also El-Gamal, M. A (2002). Islamic finance: Law, economic and practice, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. And also Ebrahim, M.S. and Joo, T.K. (2001), "Islamic banking in Brunei 
Darussalam”, International Journal of Social Economics, (28), 4, 314-337. 
212 Ebrahim, M.S. (2000), "Pricing asset backed Islamic financial instruments", International Journal of 
Theoretical and Applied Finance, (3) 1. 51-83. 
213 Al-Amine, M.B.M. (2001), "The Islamic bond market: Possibilities and challenges”, International 
Journal of Islamic Financial Services, (3), 1. 
 
 
54 
Therefore, the expected return on some forms of Ijarah cannot be completely 
fixed at the inception of the contract.  
(iii). Ijarah offers flexibility, which means that rules in securitization of the Ijarah 
contract is the key factor to solving any liquidity management problem. Hence, 
it provides the condition to be a successful security.  
 
Another form of Ijarah according to Al-amine is that which comes without any form of 
financial intermediaries to issue the instrument. Here, the ownership of the asset is 
transferred to sukuk holders214 while the issuer or borrower becomes the beneficiary of 
the Ijarah or the user of the asset.215 The general rule is that no premium is paid to the 
intermediary, but the issuer might take some contractual compensation from the 
transaction.216  
 
One of the most mentioned objections against Sukuk-Ijarah is in relation to the issues 
of guarantee. Generally, in issuance, a third party who is the originator of the Sukuk-
Ijarah will provide a guarantee for the principal capital of the Sukuk. This contention 
about guarantee arises when the originator (sovereign or corporate) benefits from the 
Sukuk proceeds, and goes further to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to issue 
the Sukuk while the originator steps aside only to provide a guarantee against any 
shortfall.217  
The first collective resolution regarding Guarantee in Sukuk was issued by the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy in its resolution 30(5/4) pertaining to Muqaradah Sukuk. The resolution 
states the following:  
"There is no Shari’ah objection to mention in the prospectus of the issue or in 
the document of Muqaradah Sukuk the promise of a third party, who is 
independent personally and in term of financial liability from the two parties to 
the contract, to volunteer an amount of money for no consideration to be 
allocated to make good a loss on a particular project. However, this is 
circumscribed with a condition that such a promise should be an obligation 
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independent from the Mudarabah contract. In other words, the third party 
performance of his obligation should not be a condition for the enforcement of 
the contract and the conditions and liabilities of the parties to the contract. As 
such, neither the bond holder nor the manager of the Muqaradah would be 
entitled to claim that they may fail to honour their obligations relating to their 
contracts because the volunteer failed to fulfil his promise and the performance 
of their obligations takes into consideration the promise from the volunteer."218  
While some scholars argue that if the third party guarantee is benevolent and given by a 
public entity such as the government for the sake of encouraging investment in the 
country, it is permissible, others hold an opposing view. For example, they contend that 
guaranteeing Ijarah may open the contract to vulnerability of usury. Also, where the 
third party is assumed to be benevolent, i.e. a government entity, it would still be 
impermissible because the concept of fairness to the populations is affected. Meaning, 
government treasury is wealth of all the members of the society and should not be 
subject of financial risk or investment of some individuals.219 
Part of the criticism is also in relation to interest rate as benchmark. Although the 
interest rate is only used for pricing, the close link between interest-based pricing and 
usury is a great concern to Shari’ah scholars.220 Vogel and Hayes for example pointed 
out that Islamic scholars do not recognise any difference between nominal and real 
rates of return.221 In trying to address this issue Mirakhor suggested a procedure that 
utilises a calculation of the cost of capital and investment without resort to a fixed and 
predetermined interest rate. 222  One of the major consequence of prohibiting riba 
(interest) of course is that equity financing becomes the main source of financial 
capital, making the financial system becomes one that is equity-based.  
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While there other conventional criticisms to Islamic leasing for being a complicated 
concept with a limited scope for business, the product has expanded over the years, 
becoming the most popular form of Islamic finance. 223  There are Western banks 
offering Islamic instruments, and the funds were raised from both Muslim and non-
Muslim investors.224 
 
(d). Istinsa 
Istinsa is a pre-delivery financing and leasing structured mode that is mainly used for to 
finance long-term mega projects i.e. the construction of a power plant.225 The financial 
institution could either own the project, charge the lessee project company certain 
amount of fee-based on profits, or sell the plant to the project company on a deferred 
basis with a profit mark-up which is similar to a Murabaha.226 There is however a 
distinction here with Murabaha, because in Istinsa contract, certain expenses that 
cannot easily be reflected in a sale and purchase agreement may be included in the fees 
payable to the financial institution by the project company.227 
(e). Takaful  
The Takaful is an older form of insurance under Islamic law. However, its 
contemporary development into modern institution first introduced in Sudan in the late 
1970s and later Saudi Arabia. In a Takaful contract, participants pay instalments into a 
fund and the bank acts as managing trustee.228 This is a form of Islamic insurance but it 
comes with a lot of controversy on whether it is allowed under the Shari’ah. 
Principally, insurance has always been a debated issue in Islamic financing.229 But 
unlike interest products, people have not always had an alternative recourse to 
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insurance when financial products based on trading and dealing require that the assets 
be insured.230 After years of research and debate, a model was developed which is seen 
by some scholars as permissible.231  This is in form of Takaful or mutual insurance, 
where participants are the owners of the fund and if any among them suffers a 
catastrophe or disaster, he or she would receive financial benefit from a fund to help 
meet that loss or damage.232  
But some Shari’ah scholars have raised concerns about the permissibility of Takaful.233 
The major areas of contention are the business models employed in the industry. First, 
they argue that standard insurance violates the prohibition of gharar (uncertainty) since 
the benefits to be paid depend on the outcome of future events which are unpredictable 
and uncertain at the time of entering into the contract.234  
The second is the issue raised by scholars such as Ismail was that insurance has a close 
similarity with gambling.235 In the sense that the amount insured is paid back to the 
insured only when certain events occur. And where the anticipated event does not 
occur, the insurance company keeps the premium. It is he argues, “like putting money 
in a pot and rolling the dice, the lucky winner takes the pot.”236  Yet, looking at 
insurance from a more comprehensive perspective, one may argue that it is modelled in 
a way to ensure that premiums are paid by parties and are sufficient to cover all claims 
and allow the insurer a margin for profit. Where claims exceed the premiums and costs 
of running the scheme, the premium is subsequently increased to cover anticipated 
future cost. As will be seen later, some Islamic scholars have come to the conclusion 
that Insurance is permissible under Islam. 
A third argument is that most insurance companies collect premium and reinvest them 
in businesses that engage in usury. Even though insurers have ethical policy in relation 
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to their investment and measures could be put in place to prevent reinvesting in 
products forbidden under Islamic law, Shari’ah scholars are wary of issues on long-
term insurance policies such as life insurance where the premium almost certainly is 
reinvested by the insurance company.237 For example, in 1995, Sheik Al-Azhar Al-
Sheikh Jad-al Haq Ali Jad al-Haq of Egypt declared all life insurance to be prohibited 
under Shari’ah.238 This position is clearly to avoid the potential of using investment, or 
premium to be reinvested in an unlawful investment contract for which the person 
paying the premium has no knowledge of. Yet, Prof. Mustafa Al-Zarqa, in his scholarly 
work on insurance arrives at a verdict of permissibility of all types of insurance, 
including life insurance.239 He points out that insurance inevitably involves an element 
of gharar, which means the sale of an “undefined” or unspecified product. However, he 
explains that it is rather marginal, and as such it is overlooked, as in other types of 
transactions involving marginal gharar.240 In conclusion, he stated that the insured 
should make sure that the insurance company invests in legitimate business. If the 
insurance company invests in any type of business forbidden in Islam, then taking out 
its policies becomes forbidden as a result. 241  Going by these one may argue that 
scholars are not unanimous on the position of insurance under Islamic law. Taking out 
the elements of gharar, and reinvestment of premium in a usury free venture, insurance 
may come within the permissible. Yet, in a world where companies and investments are 
becoming globally interconnected, such guarantee is very thin. 
 
 (f). Qard Hasan 
This is arguably the oldest form of financing referred commonly as "Benevolent Loan". 
Qard Hasan is a loan where the borrower is required to only repay the original amount 
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and nothing more.242 Although it is not common with commercial banks, it is among 
the oldest forms of Islamic financing. It has its roots in the principles of compassion 
and piety as embedded in the Holy Qur’an. The idea of Qard Hasan resides in the 
Islamic philosophy of alleviating financial hardship for people in difficult situations.243 
It is generally referred back to the provisions of the Qur’an “He who will give Allah 
Qard al Hasan, which Allah will double into his credit and multiply many times. 
Qur’an 2: 245. If you give Allah Qard al Hasan He will double it to your credit and he 
will grant you forgiveness. Qur’an 64:17. In another hadith reported by Abu Hurairah 
(R), the Prophet (s.a.s) said, "whoever relieves a believer from a difficulty in this world, 
Allah will relieve him from his difficulty and Allah will facilitate him in this world and 
world hereafter." 244   These according to some observers are contracts that do not 
present value to the lending institution. Hence, they are not very common.  
3.4 Alternative innovations in futures and bonds commodities 
The modern capital market has enjoyed a great deal of patronage of futures and 
derivatives.  The Islamic capital market however is not involved deeply in these trades 
as overwhelming opinions by Islamic jurists is that practices in futures markets 
contradict the principles of Shari’ah. Some scholars have since advocated for an 
alternative contract in bonds that is inclined to the principles of Al-salam contract. 
Although little has been done on how the structure of these contracts and the rights and 
privileges of investors can be defined, there are efforts put in place in this direction. 
Scholars such as Ayyash and Rodney have made attempts to cover this area.245 
The attempt was to introduce into the system the idea of bonds or futures to explore 
possible reform and replacements of the impermissible elements of commodity futures 
by having alternatives that can suit the Shari’ah principles. The bottom-line however is 
that any such product should not have the character of gharar (uncertainty) or be 
speculative in nature. In general, Islamic finance prohibits any transaction that has the 
characteristic of gambling or that which is embedded in uncertainty, but supports clear 
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and unambiguous trades.  The main argument under Islamic law is to keep all aspects 
of market transactions simple and clear in ways that are less prone to manipulation. 
This may be difficult to achieve with the nature of today’s futures that allow for 
sophisticated manipulations of the market.246    
 (a). The legitimacy of bonds 
A contract in bonds usually entails investment in different products and services. This 
means that such activities may include businesses that are into usury, gambling or even 
alcohol related. All of which are not permitted under the Shari’ah. Other examples 
include companies that are highly leveraged and have huge bank debt, requiring them 
to seek refinancing through issuing bonds.247  
Taking into context the principal idea behind conventional bonds, it is a way by which 
traders make capital gains as fixed-interest bond prices rise when variable market 
interest rates fall, and also receive interest when due. As Wilson maintains, this venture 
“is largely about exploiting interest rate developments and trading in paper that is 
usually unrelated to the value of any underlying asset.”248 Hence, it is regarded by 
Islamic jurists as a kind of business that entails riba, and also exploitative as it is not on 
corporeal property, but some paper estimations of risk and return. Therefore, it is 
forbidden under the Shari’ah. Muhammad Taqi Usmani, a prominent Islamic jurist 
emphasise the legitimacy of very Islamic finance lies in it being for funding trade or 
real estate. 249  Merely funding the purchase of financial securities would involve 
second-order financing which is similar to lending for futures. This subsequently 
becomes speculative and comes with increased uncertainty (gharar).  
In search of an alternative to the ever expanding world of futures, Islamic scholars first 
began exploring what is referred to as the concept of Al-salam contract. This means that 
a bond issued under Islamic finance has to be specifically earmarked and not declared 
and used for general unspecified purposes. 
The literal description of Al-salam refers to future sale, where a seller undertakes to 
supply a specific commodity to the buyer at a future time and the buyer advances 
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payment for the price of the goods. The earliest records of Al-salam contract were with 
Muslim farmers, who engaged in this type of contract to receive cash advances to deal 
with immediate needs pending the period of harvest. In general, the buyer makes 
payments that are mostly less than the amount that would have to be paid if the buyer is 
to buy the commodity at the time and not in the future. 
There are however certain conditions to Al-salam contract, which include an instant 
payment in full for the product. Secondly, this contract is only permissible for 
commodities that are standardised, and where the quality and quantity are measured 
exactly, commonly referred to as ‘fungibles’.250 Example of earlier contracts of Al-
salam include the purchase of grains such as wheat, rice etc. But modern scholars 
believe Al-salam can be used for commodities such as oil, iron ore or copper, or indeed 
even electricity supplies that can be measured in kilowatts.251 Other suggest that it can 
be used for contracts as simple as purchase of airline ticket.252 The strict conditions for 
Al-salam are similar to other contracts as it does not permit contracts that attract usury, 
uncertainty and gambling.  
Like many commodities in the capital market, there has been debate on the 
permissibility of exchanging the rights to commodities sold on the basis of Al-salam. 
On this, most Islamic scholars agree with the position of Ibn Taimiyyah, being one of 
the most prominent Islamic scholars of all time, that such exchanges are permissible on 
the condition that at the time of sale (selling the certificate), the price at which the 
certificate was sold is not higher that the agreed original.253 Scholars such as Homoud 
added that it is not permissible to resell the commodity covered by Al-salam contract 
before receiving it, but the recipient has the permission to resell the commodity by 
another contract parallel to the first one, which could be at any price that such buyers 
are willing to pay.254  
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The first ruling on the legitimacy of bonds under the Shari’ah was in 1988 when the 
Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on the request of Islamic 
economists. But before that period, Mudaraba certificates were first issued in Pakistan 
in 1980 under an ordinance and companies were allowed offer bond certificates to the 
public.255 The failure of these bonds was partly due to the country’s weak economy. 
The Jordanians and Bank Misr of Egypt have issued Mudaraba bonds but there were 
controversies with regards to the possibility of mixing funds and the guarantees of the 
bond principal, which essentially violates the Shari’ah principles.256  
In the ruling given by the Fiqh Academy, they stated that Islamic investment 
certificates can be issued subject to proper legal documentation: 
• That any collection of assets can be represented in a written note or bond. 
• That this bond or note can be sold at a market price provided that the composition of 
the group of assets represented by the security, consists of a majority of physical 
assets and financial rights, with only a minority being cash and interpersonal debts. 
This position by the Academy was influenced by the scholarly interpretation of the 
meaning of the provision of the Holy Qur’an in 2:282: 
“When ye deal with each other, in transactions involving future obligations in a 
fixed period of time, reduce them to writing. ...It is more just in the sight of 
God, more suitable as evidence and more convenient to prevent doubts among 
yourselves.” 
Hence, the idea of Islamic market products based on futures were brought into 
discourse. 
(i). Ijarah bonds  
Ijarah contract is generally a leasing agreement but unlike conventional lease, it has 
restricted principles mainly to guard the contract from uncertainties. Scholars suggest 
that since Ijarah contracts are for a predetermined future period, then it is suited to be 
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arranged as a bond and be covered by certificates. Ijarah as Rodney states represent the 
ownership of well-defined assets subject to a lease contract, tradable in secondary 
market at the prevailing price determined by market forces and the certificates or 
securities represent a proportionate ownership claim over a leased asset.257 Therefore 
the holder of the securities have ownership responsibilities that can only be terminated 
at the maturity of the securities, or at a point when they are sold to another party who 
then assumes the responsibilities. But unlike shareholders in conventional equity of a 
joint stock contracts holders of an Ijarah certificate are for a fixed period. The one 
advantage that an Ijarah bond presents is that it is less risky as the income stream is for 
a fixed regular amount, compared with equity investment, where the return can be 
subject to variation.258  
(ii). Istisna bonds 
Istisna is generally used as a means of financing mega projects where the financing 
body advances funds for the project and is repaid from the income or revenue derived 
from the project. Istisna is therefore a contract that can be traded through bonds. 
Alternatively referred to as the “Islamic project bond”, it developed into a particularly 
useful tool in the Islamic funding of the construction phase of a project.  It is often 
regarded as similar to a fixed-price ‘turnkey’ contract that enables investors to receive a 
return from the assets or project. Shari’ah scholars have permitted the use of such 
forward lease arrangement (known in some quotas as ijara mawsufah fal-dimmah). For 
example, The Qatar Real Estate Investment Company (QREIC) Sukuk offering in 2006 
has elements of Istisna in its structure, and was listed on the Euro MTF market of the 
Luxembourg Stock Exchange. The 2008 issue of a second sukuk by National Central 
Cooling Company (Tabreed) also has an Istisna and is listed on the London Stock 
Exchange.259 The most significant of course is the issue of Sukuk by HM Treasury in 
June 2014, which was the first country outside of the Islamic world to issue a Sukuk. 
The issue was up to £200 million and was 11.5 times oversubscribed while also priced 
                                                257 Ibid.	
258 Dusuki, A. W. (2010). Do equity-based Sukuk structures in Islamic capital markets manifest the 
objectives of Shari’ah? Journal of Financial Services Marketing, 15(3), 203-214. See also Wilson, R. 
(2013). The development of Islamic finance in the gulf cooperation council states. The Transformation of 
the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order, 146. 
259 Dubai International Financial Centre Sukuk Guidebook. See, also 
http://www.islamicbanker.com/education/Sukuk-al-Istisna 
 
 
64 
at the equivalent UK government bonds (Gilts).260 On what Istina connotes, Rodney 
states: 
“The public authority or private company commissioning the project provides 
details of the specifications and timing of the schemes. The financier then sets 
these out in the tender documents. Bids are subsequently invited from 
contractors who will specify how they intend to sell completed parts of the 
project over time and the amount of each payment instalment expected. These 
instalments will include an element of profit over the construction costs. As the 
financier is expecting a stream of payments over a specified period, certificates 
can be issued based on the income expected.”261  
3.4.1 The structure of Istisna bond. 
 
Source, Dubaï International Financial Centre (DIFC) 
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The DIFC also gave a possible refinement in respect of the Sukuk Al-istisna 
structure:262  
• If legal and/or registered title to a particular asset exists and (due to, by way of 
example, the prohibitive cost implications or tax implications of registering such 
a transfer of title) it becomes impossible to transfer that legal/registered title, it 
may be possible, depending on the asset type and the view taken by the relevant 
scholars of Shari’ah, to rely upon the concept of beneficial ownership in 
structuring a Sukuk al-istisna transaction. The Istisna agreement (in the structure 
discussed above) would document the transfer to the trustee of the beneficial 
ownership interest in the underlying asset, and such beneficial ownership 
interest would be sufficient to enable the trustee’s enter into a forward leasing 
arrangements. 
• Going by the view of some Shari’ah scholars who regard the Istisna 
arrangement as one that has to be entered into strictly between the purchaser and 
the contractor, the contractor has to be the person who will actually construct or 
manufacture the asset. Based on this approach, the Trustee would be required to 
have a relationship directly with the ultimate contractor/manufacturer and not 
the Originator. In order to avoid the difficulties of such an analysis, it may 
sometimes be necessary to re-characterise the Istisna arrangement as a 
procurement arrangement, whereby the Originator is obliged to procure the 
construction or manufacture and delivery of the underlying asset. The 
Originator thereby retains the direct contractual relationship with the ultimate 
contractor or manufacturer. 
It should be noted however that under this guideline and arrangement, deferred price 
certificates represent debt obligations and cannot be traded for cash at below face value 
in a secondary market. 263  Scholars however pointed out that, they can be used to 
purchase goods or services whose price is equal to the face value of the certificate and 
permission must be sought from the original debtor in the event the debt contract is to 
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be transferred from the financier to the supplier of goods and services.264 
(iii). Mudaraba and Musharaka bonds  
Other alternatives include the potential for the development of both Mudaraba and 
Musharaka bonds.265 By far, Mudaraba contract has been one of the most successful 
Islamic financing in terms of investment deposits with Islamic bank, where profits are 
calculated annually based of returns.266 Proponents are looking at the possibility having 
well developed Mudaraba bonds to be designated as notes and their returns will be 
variable rather than fixed.267 
It is suggested that holders of Mudaraba notes are not to have same rights and benefits 
as equity investors as they are only entitled to a profit share and there is no provision 
for capital gains based on the market valuation of the company.268 Although the value 
of their notes cannot be guaranteed, it is the shareholders rather than Mudaraba note 
holders who are more likely to suffer from capital losses in the of companies loss.269 
But where the company goes bankrupt, it is the note holder that would hold a ranking 
prior to be in a higher equity investors, who may lose all of their investment.270 
Musharaka, which is in form of partnership, has been a subject of bonds for years. For 
example, Sudan and Iran have launched Musharaka securities by issuing notes.271 But 
scholars argue that there is still much room for the development of these contracts 
which needs clearly defined rights and privileges of certificate holders in relation to 
their counterpart equity investors.272  
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3.5 Conclusion 
Many Islamic jurists are critical of a financial system that adopts or mimics Western-
style practices, especially those practices that encourage lending money at interest.273 
Yet, many others in the Islamic financial community view western financial models as 
an opportunity for strengthening the outreach and significance Islamic financial system 
to benefit from modern market innovations.274 Other scholars however insist that the 
Shari’ah model should be seen instead as an alternative to the ever fragile western 
model, and some of the less transparent and complex financial products and services.275 
To a certain degree, this contention has proved its legitimacy owing to the fact that the 
avoidance of complex and less transparent financial products that evolved over the 
years in western regimes have come with an equally high-risk investment causing the 
market to become vulnerable and forcing regulators to constantly monitor the market 
and review their regulatory framework. But scholars such as Bianchi argue that the 
dominant Muslim indictment of today's Islamic financial system is that “it has become 
addicted to legal formalism and contractual subterfuge”, losing sight of the higher goals 
and intentions that law and economics should promote.276  
 
It is also important to state that Islamic financial principle is one that often resist 
complex structures and products. This could be argued as an attribute of a system that 
insist on understanding form and substance, and also the deep emphasis on fairness 
over profit, and on what is deemed as an appropriate way of wealth distribution. These 
of course may not be the goal it may seem not in line with some of the goals and profit 
objectives of modern capitalist markets. It is also important to stress that, the presence 
of these complex products and the acute motivation on profit instead of fairness has 
seen many investors and economies of states suffering enormously from avoidable 
financial crash and crunch. Where international regulators demand greater honesty and 
disclosure, genuine Islamic financial regulators should not just comply, but promote the 
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idea against any convention that allows for people to be exploited through practices and 
regulations enforced by the system itself. 277 
 
For Islamic financial service, the challenges are enormous and so are the opportunities 
as it has always been a blend of business and religion working to balance changing 
circumstances. While the expansion of Islamic finance presents many specific 
challenges, the most crucial is the way Islamic financial scholars draw a paradigm that 
appeals to both Islamic and non-Islamic communities. This, may be a challenging task, 
yet, with a rising middle class? in both the Far Asia and the Middle East, there is the 
room for the mass market that can be exploited by Islamic financial institutions.278 
Evidently, new demand for Islamic financial services is springing from thousands of 
local communities across the world, forcing financial administrators, regulators, and 
jurists to improvise ideas and solutions that best suit these unique and changing 
circumstances.279 
 
If such ingenuity will become increasingly indispensable as Islamic finance grows, it is 
the ingenuity of Islamic financial scholars that would determine the extent to which this 
system will succeed in exploring and taking the opportunities of mass markets, 
especially in the emerging economies of Asia and Africa. Bianchi for instance points to 
how Islamic bankers who are spearheading the drive toward consumer finance are 
vigorously marketing their products and services to non-Muslims in pluralistic regions 
such as South and Southeast Asia.280 Inevitably, she said, “the already porous lines 
between Islamic and western banking will be redrawn countless times in many different 
environments." 281  In the midst of these overreaching changes and developments, 
Islamic financial service providers have found the opportunity keep up with the 
evolving practices and products in ways that do not breach the core principles 
embedded in Shari’ah while trying to conform with certain conditions imposed by 
transnational regulators through flexibility in the choice and structure of products and 
services.  As much as western bonds comparatively easy to price, the issue of interest 
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rates and inflation, the counterparty risk of the borrower being unable to pay in which 
case the interest will keep accumulating, is of great concern to Islamic jurists. For 
western style of equities, they are less transparent because there is less information 
about how the business is doing. However, it is important to also state that Shari’ah 
compliant asset-backed bonds may not be as transparent and may be subject to an 
element of market manipulation as equities are. All of these are challenges that future 
reforms of the Saudi Market will face. 
 
 
  
 
 
70 
Chapter Four 
Market Abuse: A theoretical perspective 
4.1 Introduction 
Theories and philosophical juxtaposition do not always define the dynamics of practical 
trajectories. This is even more so when it comes to the realities of a financial market 
where different products and services are traded in large numbers and various ways, by 
a large number of people across continents. Yet, the relevance of these theories in 
explaining many aspects of the market cannot be ignored. In the field of research into 
these dynamics, Easton once argues that whenever research is carried out, the 
researcher assumes the subject ontologically and the explanations epistemologically.282 
Therefore, a theoretical discourse becomes relevant in, at least, laying the foundation 
for what markets should or ought to be and in justifying or rejecting any concept.283 
Theories also dissect the challenging and complex structure of the market phenomena 
and reveals areas of convergence and divergence between philosophical principles and 
practical realities of the market. 
 
Like other aspects of the human society, the development of the market economy is a 
transition with different starting points in different parts of the world. Modern financial 
markets have seen a surge in regulatory regimes imposed by governments, which in a 
way counters some famous classical western thinking of economists such as Adam 
Smith, Thomas Malthus, and John Stuart Mill who supported the theory that markets 
function best without government interference. Contemporary development on the other 
hand has shown that governments have become more proactive in regulating markets, 
making regulatory agencies become key components of markets all over the world.  
 
While these conventional western theories discuss the different complex relationships 
between markets, individuals and the government, Islamic market philosophy postulates 
a unique nexus of contracts among the individual and the society based on divine laws. 
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Arguably, the most fundamental underpinning of market in the Islamic world had been 
based on the basic kinds of trade and finances. But as markets continue to become more 
innovative, regimes influenced by Islamic principles such as Saudi were constrained to 
expand their products and services in order to compete and benefit from the 
opportunities in the global market. These are complex choices as there is the inherent 
need to maintain the tenets of Shari’ah in both finances and transactions. This has also 
brought the challenge of trying to build a legal framework that serves the priorities of 
this expansion. Most economic activities in regimes influenced by Islamic law are 
organised around this conception.  
 
A major distinguishing factor between the two philosophies is that Islamic system does 
not often separate the sacred and the profane.284 In many instances, these theories tend 
to suggest that manipulation of the market or abuse of privileged position or 
information to make gains is illegitimate. At the same time, some of these theories, 
especially that posited by Henry Manne were of the argument that not all acts that 
seemed manipulative or entail misuse of information for personal gain can be 
categorised as wrong. 285  They cautioned against a blanket judgement of these 
phenomena. Essentially, Manne being one of the earliest proponents of insider trading 
suggests that, insider trading in fact increases the efficiency of the market. This of 
course does not go down with the some of the right based and level playing field 
theories. These scholars advocate fairness in the market, but ‘fairness’ on its own may 
often be subjective term.286  
 
Over time, the arguments against market abuse have come to dominate market structure 
and regulations, that today, the global market has almost unanimously converged on the 
notion that market abuse is an unacceptable behaviour and a punishable conduct. Hence, 
this chapter intends to discuss these aspects in light of conventional western theories 
and also from the perspective of theoretical principles of Islam. Essentially, the chapter 
would attempt to discuss the theoretical support as well as opposition to regulating 
markets and market abuse. 
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4.2 Different strands of arguments about market abuse 
There are philosophical, moral, religious and economic arguments on market abuse. 
While most argument reject market abuse in any form, there are also arguments on why 
some form of market abuse such as insider trading do contribute to the efficiency of the 
market. 287  Also, as the argument against market abuse looks overwhelming tilted 
towards the notion that it is illegitimate or, at least, unethical, some scholars argue that 
some forms of insider trading are perfectly legal.288 Despite this difference in opinion, 
most literature is overwhelmingly tilted towards the notion that insider dealings and 
manipulations of trades are both unethical and morally wrong. 289 But then, there had 
been a series of historical debates among scholars in philosophy, law and economics as 
to whether such as an act ought to be penalised at all, especially where there is not clear 
victim. But the majority insists that market abuse is immoral and unethical and 
therefore should be punishable.290 Those who have a contradicting view insist that using 
things like insider information for self-benefit at the expense of others is inherently 
unethical.291 Adding to this old debate, McGee observes, “not all insider trading is 
unethical and some studies have concluded that certain kinds of insider trading are 
actually beneficial to the greater investment community”.292  
 
4.2.1 Utilitarian approach 
The scholarly discourse about market abuse from the context of utilitarian theory was 
largely the origin of other sub-theories such as the right-based approach and the famous 
socio-economic view on when an action or omission is good if the result is ‘the greatest 
good for the greatest number’.293 Following this classical juxtaposition, other scholars 
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such as McGee also based their argument on whether the gains of a particular action 
exceed the loss.294 This also relates us back to the question on whether such and act 
increases efficiency in the system or not. In all of these philosophical arguments, the 
notion is that if the benefit overrides the loss then the action may not necessarily be 
termed as a bad one.295 Yet, it is important to look at this proposition alongside other 
situations in which the case is purely that of market abuse causing unwarranted and 
unjustified lose to others as a result of manipulation or fraudulent behaviour. Also 
argued McGee, the utilitarian position may also have to consider whether there was a 
breach of fiduciary duty in which case market abuse or insider trading may still be 
unacceptable even if it meets the utility test.296 Hence, in market abuse, the utilitarian 
argument is one that considers aspects beyond the simple argument of good and bad. 
 
The main distinguishing factor between the classical economic theory of markets and 
theories on market abuse and insider trading, is that, in classical theory, it is often 
impossible to precisely determine what is meant by gains and losses.297 But in market 
abuse situations, what constitute a loss is often in very clear terms. Another point raised 
by Rothbard is that, classical utilitarianism does not clearly give a cogent comparative 
analysis of interpersonal utilities, as different individuals place different values on 
things.298Instead, it is focused on the society. Essentially, the theory was not premised 
on the concept of individual violations of rights. Instead, what matters is whether the 
good outweighs the bad, meaning the end is what justifies the means.299 The critic to 
this is when one looks at the fact that in market situations, the effect could sometimes 
be on an individual investor and not necessarily a whole group or class of market 
participants. 
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There are schools that see insider trading from a very different perspective from the 
familiar argument of it being a bad aspect of market. In a study, Repullo attempts to 
show how insider trading was beneficial to some shareholders.300 The problem here is 
that, both Manne and Rupello did not deny the fact that insider trading actually harms 
other category of investors. For example, Manne suggested that it does not have any 
significant effect on long-term investors. But then, one must also note that not all 
market participants are long-term investors. Again, Rupello’s study also confirms that 
insider trading is beneficial to some shareholders, but that does not necessarily mean 
that it is harmless to other investors or to the financial system at large. 
 
4.2.2 The rights-based approach 
One of the theoretical polemics of market abuse, especially with regards to insider 
trading is the right-based argument which focuses on whether by acting in a particular 
way or using a particular information to make gains in the market is bound to violates 
another persons rights? On this, even some of the leading scholars that see insider 
trading as beneficial still agree that when an act violates another person’s right, then 
such as act should be considered wrong.301 In general, conventional western theories on 
markets and economics have both the mixture of utilitarian and rights-based approach. 
Laws and regulatory frameworks on the other hand, are largely focused on the 
protection of rights and investments. But laws could sometimes be a combination of 
two competing principles, i.e. to make the market more efficient, competitive, and 
profitable while at the same time protecting the investor. These competing philosophies 
often apply more to conventional system than Islamic ones due to the different complex 
products and services that could be volatile in terms of risk versus reward.302  
 
Another aspect of the right-based theory is that it does not try to answer questions 
regarding the ethics of non-rights-violating behaviour, as it often relates to what some 
scholar’s refer to as victimless crimes.303 The same might be said about market abuse, 
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which some earlier scholars may suggest is a victimless crime.304 Essentially, Henry 
Manne’s arguments for insider trading, which by far is seen as an abuse of market is 
that, it is a form of executive compensation for entrepreneurial efforts. 305  He also 
maintains that insider trading increases efficiency, which means it should be permitted. 
But scholars such as Salbu criticise this assertion on the grounds that giving some 
exclusively powerful members or entities within the market community access to 
information which can be used for personal benefit against all other market participants 
makes the market inefficient, it also makes the market an uneven playing field.306 This 
philosophy of Salbu defines what modern market regulatory bodies envisage.307  With 
the shifting dynamics of markets and the concern over risk, most of the old philosophies 
have been ignored by legislators. Instead, what is obvious with contemporary markets is 
the enormous amount of rules and monitoring by governments to ensure that investors 
are protected from unfair market behaviour. Governments are also interested in a safe 
market environment that has the prospect of attracting more investors and not pushing 
them away due to unfair lack of fairness and transparency.   
 
The Pigourian theory for instance sees a market from a point distinct from classical 
economics and other theorists that often conceive economics as a science of wealth 
accumulation.308 Instead, he portrays it as a science of analysing effects of alternative 
policies, spelling out their consequences for the size, distribution, and stability of the 
national dividends.309 Although capital market is a convergence of both private and 
public, modern market comes with a strong government interference largely to protect 
the market in the interest o9f both the investor and the public. This often far-reaching 
government interference is mainly driven by the common idea that as custodians of 
public trust, government must ensure that the market is regulated and participants are 
protected from unfair market behaviour.310 Avgouleas is a proponent of this argument, 
maintaining that governments should be allowed to regulate markets because left alone, 
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markets cannot regulate themselves.311 However, he made reference to the extent of 
regulation that is logical and cautioned against stringent legislation. Many empirical 
studies he argues have shown that the modern capital market may often demand certain 
degree of free hand to function efficiently.312 He gave example with short sales, which 
he says have proven beneficial because when they were banned in the US and the UK 
in 2008, it did not yield any benefits. Instead, it had adverse effects on liquidity. The 
best way he argues is to go with rules of disclosure such as the ones in the International 
Organisation of Securities Regulators IOSCO.313  
 
The IOSCO has made a series of recommendations to regulators in to address the 
challenges posed by the significant technological developments in financial markets by 
ensuring that they do not impact negatively on market integrity and efficiency.314 This 
recommendation calls on regulators to require that trading venue operators provide fair, 
transparent and non-discriminatory access to their markets and to associated products 
and services; to ensure that trading venues put suitable trading control mechanisms 
(such as trading halts, volatility interruptions, limit-up limit-down controls, etc.) to deal 
with volatile market conditions; all order flow of trading participants to be subject to 
appropriate controls, including automated pre-trade controls; assess the impact of 
technological developments in the market and regulate them to ensure integrity and 
efficiency and; to ensure that they monitor for novel forms or variations of market 
abuse that may arise as a result of technological developments and take action as 
necessary.315 
 
There are however polemics on the economic arguments and the argument over fairness. 
While some scholars opined in dealing with the structure and behaviour of market 
participants and entities, that fairness and integrity should prevail even beyond 
economic arguments, while other suggest that economic arguments are superior to 
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moral arguments.316 While these schools disagree on which of the arguments trumps the 
other, they were unanimous on the idea that market abuse or insider dealing is a 
negative aspect in financial markets.  
 
4.2.3 Level playing field theory 
The level playing field argument is among the most prominent in market theory. It has 
essentially influenced the many institutional changes and regulations seen across 
regions. Advocates of fair market from both conventional and Islamic regimes have 
advanced this argument and demanded that markets be regulated so that every 
participant can have a fair and level playing ground. The level playing field argument 
according to Lawson suggests that that buying and selling is unethical when the 
information is asymmetric.317  However, looking at the way information is shared in the 
market and in the real world, it is almost all the times asymmetric, as some people have 
more information than others, and some get information quicker and faster than 
others.318 
 
The level playing field argument has relevance in financial markets. It has been 
consistently used to justify the idea that all market participants must be protected from 
unfair deals for which information is either not fully given to them; used against them 
or certain aspects that may have effect on their investment is hidden from them. This is 
contrary to previous theories such as the ‘Comparative advantage’ notion of Ricardo 
(1871), who believes that it is unfair for individuals who have worked hard to make a 
system operate to have equal advantages with those that do not.  
 
One of the major challenges of the level playing field theory is whether it is possible to 
ever have a level playing field in the realm of contemporary market with all its 
asymmetric information and the cumbersome nature of the regions and information’s 
that drive liquidity. Lekkas for example argues that players in the market are not all 
equal, which is why it is not always possible to have a level playing field.319 Essentially, 
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this argument stresses that some market participants have more privileges and better 
information than others. But then, he further argues that, unrestricted, market 
participants are bound to engage in shady manipulation and greed that in the end affects 
the fabric of fairness that markets ought to have.320 He made reference to the famous 
philosophy of Voltaire ``one's liberty must be constrained at the point where it 
interferes with the liberty of another''. Hence, any conduct by insiders to use 
information fraudulently for personal benefit at the expense of others should be 
regarded as a violation.321 Where the person happens to be of professional or trust 
position, it should be seen as a breach of fiduciary duty. Yet, there are studies that 
support insider dealing such as Cornell and Surri,322 and Chakravarty and McConnell 
who argue that insider trading should actually be seen as some form of compensation to 
company professionals, and that it promotes efficiency.323 For market manipulation, it is 
generally seen as an unfair and unjustifiable conduct, often synonymous to cheating. 
 
While the level playing field is largely based on public interest for regulating financial 
markets, Djanko et al., oppose this idea, emphasising that despite the disadvantages that 
free market often presents, it is still more efficient that one which is tightly regulated by 
governments.324  Other critics argue that the government does not always necessary 
works for the benefit of the society but to benefit itself. Stigler for example argues that 
the State, with its powers to compel or prohibit, has the potential to be a resource or 
threat to every industry in the society.325 Another argument by Djanko et al., is that 
some regulations have enormous effects on the industry for example cases of heavy 
taxation of products.326 Paradoxically, this relationship also creates incentives where the 
state and the industry through regulatory frameworks become close in in relationship 
that it create situations where those who committed offences may not be adequately 
penalised. Despite these however, the regime of international market regulations has 
expanded over the years developing series of principles that regulate markets across 
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countries. The IOSCO for example, developed a number of principles that guide the 
regulations of securities, protection of investors, transparency and fairness in 
markets.327 Essentially, the IOSCO emphasises on international cooperation to ensure a 
better regulation of the markets, on domestic as well as on the international level, in 
order to maintain just and efficient markets. It also emphasises on exchange information 
and to establish standards and an effective surveillance of international securities 
transaction, while maintaining mutual assistance to ensure the integrity of the markets 
by a rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against 
offences.328 These propositions were seen as necessary to maintain efficiency in the 
market and to protect investors. Hence, governments have consistently enacted 
legislation and reviewed existing ones and maintained an international network of 
watchdogs. 
 
Yet, as McGee argues, using the level playing field argument alone is insufficient to 
discredit insider trading. His argument was that, to debunk insider trading and punish 
those found to use privileged information for their gains, other justification must be 
found.329 As McGee states: 
 
“One party to the transaction often knows more about the value of the item 
being sold than does the other party. A knowledgeable antique collector knows 
more about the value of certain objects than does the owner of the property that 
is offering it for sale in a week-end yard sale. Acquisition and merger specialists 
know more about the underlying value of a company’s shares than does the 
average uninformed shareholder. Executives of a company often know more 
about the value of their company’s stock than do non-employees.”330 
 
The possession of better information says McGee could be justified just as “forcing the 
insiders to give their property rights in information to outsiders just because the 
outsiders do not yet possess the information would be inherently unfair to the 
                                                
327 Sommer Jr, A. A. (1996). IOSCO: its mission and achievement. Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus., 17, 15. 
328 Ibid. 
329 McGee, R. W. (2010). Analyzing insider trading from the perspectives of utilitarian ethics and rights 
theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 91(1), 65-82. 
330 Ibid, p76. 
 
 
80 
insiders.”331 But he went further to stress that, even as this could be true of minority of 
situations, it may not be justified in all cases.332 It is therefore not justified to penalise 
these categories of persons because of their privileged knowledge which they may use 
in trading the financial market. However, some scholars still argue that even though 
trades cannot be free, they must be fair, and whatever that means.333  
 
4.2.4 Fiduciary duty argument 
Moore believes that the fiduciary duty argument is the strongest argument that can be 
put forth to outlaw market abuse emanating from officials.334 The underlying premise of 
the fiduciary duty argument is that officers and directors have some fiduciary duty to 
their shareholders, which requires them to fully disclose any and all significant 
information that shareholders could benefit from knowing.335 The argument is good as 
far as it goes, but it has been criticised for being incomplete. The strongest criticism is 
that the fiduciary duty argument often applies only to officer and to outsiders or 
employees who have no fiduciary duty to shareholders. Other criticisms were on 
situations where it applies exclusively to insider trading. Especially the notion that any 
damage or loss caused to shareholders as a result of the act of employees or officials of 
a company through insider trading cannot be brought under the fiduciary duty argument. 
In the case of market manipulation which covers any transaction or behaviour which is 
likely to mislead other market participants in terms of price of commodity or otherwise, 
it is generally regarded as a criminal act.336  
 
Strudler and Orts for instance brought up the debate over situations where companies 
allows their staff or directors to trade on certain privileged information.337 Further, court 
decisions have held that it also exists for non employees and outsiders.  
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In the Faccenda Chicken case, the court held that the employee has a duty not to use 
information gained in employment to detriment of employer’s business.338 A similar 
case was the American case of O’Hagan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
defendant acted unethically, despite the fact that he an outside who was only involved 
as a partner in a law firm involved in a company merger. 339  And he used the 
information available to him to trade in shares. The court held that the simple reason 
that the defendant is an outsider and not an insider in the company does not exonerate 
him from the liability of inappropriate market behaviour. It is also important to note that 
in this case nothing suggest that the defendant made any misrepresentation but he was 
still found guilty by the court for breaching fiduciary duty. Strudler and Orts criticise 
the opinion of the court as stretching the concept of fraud “beyond any easily 
identifiable limit.’’340 The argument was that the definition of fraud was stretched by 
including an outsider who did not utter any misleading statements with the intent to 
defraud has been criticised as going too far.341  
 
Other scholars also criticised this extension of the definition of fraudulent market 
behaviour, which they said should be limited to insiders and not outsiders. The problem 
with this argument of course is the fact that, when an outsider is by virtue of his 
profession or employment privy to insider information, then using such information to 
make gains similar to ones that insiders could make may not appeal to the proponents of 
market fairness.  Langevoort also raised a question of whether there is a fiduciary duty 
to individuals who have stock options.342 The position of some scholars to this question 
is that the relationship between employees and the corporation is based on contract and 
therefore involves no other obligation than to deliver according to the terms of the 
contract.343  
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4.2.5 Fairness vs. fraud argument  
Strudler and Orts maintain that the concept of fairness in the market is mainly a 
phenomenon that suggest how an act is morally unjustifiable is in respect of how it 
infringe the rights of persons affected by it, “and not merely the social welfare or the 
utility that the act produces.”344 The fairness argument is closely related to the moral 
and the level playing field arguments. It is to the extent that any act that confers an 
unfair advantage on one party against the other in trade is illegitimate and unacceptable. 
A transaction is therefore only fair if when all parties have fair access to the market and 
the information necessary to allow them understand both risk and reward thereby 
making inform decisions i.e., the transaction is fair if the system would not allow one 
group to take unfair advantage of the other.345 
 
In one of US’s Supreme Court decision, Justice Blackmun of the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that insider trading is inherently unfair.346 Although the definition of 
fairness could often be subjective, contemporary laws of market across the world have 
made attempts to specify in clear terms what may amount to unfair and illegal market 
practice. Mainly, these acts are categorised under the regime of market abuse and are 
often punishable with sanctions. Some of the main reasons for drafting and redrafting 
market regulatory laws include the determination to make the market as fair to every 
participant as possible. As many products and services continue to emerge so are 
regulators enacting new provisions to check situations where people would take 
advantage of the products or services to manipulate or abuse the market by making 
unfair gains. What these categories of people or institutions do is to engage in some 
form of clandestine unethical market practices that often shift the risk in against the 
unsuspecting and vulnerable investor.347 Hence, contemporary regulatory framework 
insist on fairness among all market participants and punish any act that was done to 
unfairly benefit from the vulnerability of other market participants. 
 
The fraud argument on the other hand is that which denounces acts of making false 
pretence with the view and securing a practical result. It also includes cases where 
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parties are fed with with false or misleading information about market products or 
services.348 The general theory is that while the law protects all parties, there is also the 
implied contract that all market participants should act in good faith. Although good 
faith may mean the willingness to ensure equal and sincere engagement with fellow 
traders, it is mostly defined as no more than the absence of bad faith. This absence of 
bad faith in business relationship has been used for centuries as a principal requirement 
in commercial transactions and in commercial laws. 
4.3. Islamic theory 
Like in western scholarship, there exist Islamic philosophical theories on finances that 
are based on theological command laid down. Most of these are derived from the 
Qur’an and the Hadith. But as markets continue to be developed by new, sometimes 
complex products and innovations, these theories and rules are revisited to 
accommodate these emerging aspects. The core philosophies that guide markets 
regulations in Islamic world were those that emphasis on fair dealings based on the 
tenets of Shari’ah. The position of the Shari’ah on finance and markets is as stated: 
“Deal not unjustly, and you shall not be dealt with unjustly” Qur’an 2:279.349 “Eat not 
up each other’s property by unfair and dishonest means” Qur’an 4:29. “Give full 
measure and full weight in justice, and wrong not people in respect of their goods” 
Qur’an 11:85.350 Hence, most theories regarding market in regimes that are influenced 
by Islamic doctrines tend to place emphasis on these as justification for regulation of 
market abuse. The main principles of the Saudi market regulation is to a larger extent 
built upon the concept of business ethics that are ingrained in the teachings of the 
Qur'an and the practice of Prophet Muhammad and ought to be a usual element of the 
Muslim way of conducting commercial transactions.351  A fundamental principle of 
Shari’ah preaches that the sole purpose of man’s existence is to seek the pleasure of his 
Creator. Thus, this perspective on life requires constant determination at all times trying 
to conduct oneself in a manner, which will please his Creator and to earn sustenance 
from Halal. Although the general idea of halal is mostly seen from the perspective of 
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food, the general concept encompasses all wealth and income. Insider trading is 
therefore seen to have no place in an Islamic stock market. One of the fundamentals of 
Shari’ah is accountability of the source of income, where such source involves immoral 
and illegal transactions, then the wealth is generally regarded as illegal.352 
 
4.3.1 Duty of the State in regulating market 
Islamic principles generally allow for the state to interfere in all public affairs, 
including market transactions. This principle is contained in Qur’an, 43:24-32 that says, 
“We have allocated among them their livelihood in the worldly life, and have raised 
some of them over others in ranks, so that some of them may put some others to 
work.” 353  This verse according Qazi shows that, while allocation of wealth is a 
prerogative of Allah the creator,354 Allah also makes the forces of demand and supply 
as part of market organisation and allows for authorities to intervene in ensuring 
stability. In relation to state intervention, Jabir, one of the companions of Prophet 
Muhammad (s.a.w) 355  narrated that states that Islamic philosophy supports a free 
market in which market players determine how they want to deal with each other.356  
 
But despite this emphasis on free market, Islam does not allow market participants’ to 
invest in Riba (usury), Alcohol etc.357 Usmani went further to identify three exceptions 
to this principles. They are as he mentioned the religious, the state and the moral 
restrictions. 358  The religious restriction he says is one that clearly disallows any 
transaction in any kind of product or services that is prohibited under Islam. The State 
restriction he says is one that places emphasis on allowing the market to run its natural 
course driven by the forces of demand and supply, which is what Islam dictates. But 
where their natural forces are distorted due to corrupt or unethical behaviour in the 
market, then the state has to interfere. The third principle is the one that puts morality 
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as part of religious obligation. This includes morality and sincere conduct in market 
relationship. Morality he says is not separate from religion and they “should compete 
with each other in adding value to the collective welfare and satisfaction of needs of 
consumers rather than in maximising their profits.” 359  The unanimous position of 
Islamic jurist is that Shari’ah recognises the importance of allowing the market to 
determine price based on demand and supply forces.360 It is, according to both Shafi’i 
and Hambali School of jurisprudence, impermissible for the state to impose prices 
because such act may amount to injustice.361 But Islam still has regulations that permit 
the state to regulate price of commodities when it clearly appears that the sellers have 
substantially inflated the prices to an exponential excess of what it should be.362  
 
The Maliki School even went further to suggest “it is not necessary for the 
permissibility of price intervention that price is substantially increased by the sellers. A 
nominal increase in price in inflationary period is enough to give the regulator the 
latitude to intervene in price.”363 While the restriction on the seller to sell according to 
his wish is a violation of his or her rights to sell their assets for a mutually agreed price, 
such violation is tolerated in order to avoid economic imbalance from the whole 
society.364 In general, intervention of the regulator to fix the prices is not a preferred act 
in normal circumstances but it is allowed to the extent that it becomes necessary to 
stabilise the market and overall economy.  
 
4.3.2 Principles on dishonesty in dealings and abuse of market 
Islamic perspectives on market abuse are largely centred on the morality, fairness and 
fiduciary duty narrative. In the sense that, it requires parties to be conscious of their 
responsibilities towards each other, and to deal with each other with fairness and 
honesty. Not to trick and not to defraud. The Shari’ah, which is the dominant prism 
through which the Saudi financial market regulations was conceptualised regard market 
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abuse as an immoral and illegal conduct and a breach of trust.365 This is because, any 
person with insider information or with a professional and legal authority to such 
information is primarily regarded as someone in the position of trustee. Likewise, any 
transaction between parties is seen as one that should be governed by the ‘Fiqh al 
Muamalat’ i.e., the principle of honesty in all human dealings. Essentially, Shari’ah law 
regards any earning through these means as dubious and therefore not permissible. The 
principle goes to state that, any earnings through such means of dubious act is so grave 
that a person’s prayer and supplication may not be accepted. 366   Therefore, any 
fraudulent behaviour, trick, misrepresentation or misuse of such information for self-
gain is a moral wrong under Shari’ah and a crime under the regulations of the Saudi 
capital market.  
 
This strict prohibition by Islam on the money, which has been earned in a way, which is 
illegal also prohibits the possession and use of such money that though may be legal but 
has been obtained illegally. Therefore, the prohibition principally starts with the way in 
which it is obtained.367 The majority of Islamic jurists are of the consensus that such 
gain, whether in stocks, bonds or other products is not permissible.  
4.4 Conclusion 
Acts that amount to market abuse are difficult and sometimes complex to debate.  These 
are issues that come with enormous polemics in theory and that cannot always be 
addressed. Perhaps there are theories that say some form of market abuse, can in fact be 
beneficial to the market system, this notion suggests that not all acts of insider trading 
are violations of rights. That in some cases, they may simply be an exercise of a 
property right. However, what is popular among contemporary scholars and 
professionals is that for markets to be safe and prosperous, regulations must be put in 
place to protect all parties. While it is true that in many instances of market abuse, there 
are people that profit, such profits and gains often come at the expense of others who 
lose money unfairly. Hence, the overwhelming theories, both of western conventional 
thoughts and Islamic jurisprudence tend to suggest that for markets to flourish, they 
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have to be devoid of abuses and manipulations. It also has to be transparent enough for 
investors to understand their risk and reward in a way that allows them to make 
informed choices, and have the confidence that they would not be cheated or 
manipulated by others. Without such regulation on how information is used or abused, 
markets would certainly become vulnerable to unethical and prejudicial conducts that 
would result in other benefitting fraudulently at the expense of others or be used by 
those who have privileged information against others.  
 
These notions of fairness in the market and transparency in service delivery are widely 
covered in western and Islamic scholarship. However, there are some philosophies in 
Islamic principles that distinguish it from conventional western theory. The theory of 
market activities in Islamic principles entails a philosophy of fair playing based on 
Islamic principles rather than level playing field. Essentially, it suggests that the idea of 
engaging in transactions of pleasing the creator through fairness to other parties, 
whereas in conventional western thoughts, the quality of one’s behaviour is perceived 
as unjust only in relation to the other. Islamic philosophical thoughts connote both 
moral and social values, which include fairness and balance.  
 
Alongside what may be contained in theory, scholars have made reference to how 
market abuse is unhealthy for both the market and the general economy. Hence, there is 
the constant requirement that regimes should make adequate laws to ensure that those 
responsible for abusing the market are punished. Over time, institutions and 
governments have become increasingly involved in making laws to prohibit market 
abuse. The general opinion of these institutions resonates in theories that suggest, 
where two parties in the market bear a condition that allows one to profit from 
manipulative and illegal conducts causing others to lose is unfair, illegitimate and 
unacceptable. Yet, there is also the isolated argument of ‘victimless crime’, meaning 
that not all forms of market abuse have a direct victim. This argument does not appeal 
to most many scholars and commentators who hold strongly to the notion that, any act 
of manipulating the market to make unlawful gains also results in direct or indirect loss 
to some other regular market participants, and therefore it is wrong and impermissible.  
 
One of the significant challenges, and one that would always exist is the difficulty of 
predicting or identifying every case of market abuse. There is in fact no law or definite 
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regulatory framework that can effectively deter professionals and insiders from 
somewhat using certain privileged information to make gains. 368  Hence, the level 
playing field argument has become common in justifying a number of economic 
regulations, including prohibitions on market abuse.369 Institutions have continued to 
emerge to interfere in the markets through rules to prevent one party trading in a market 
through manipulative and fraudulent ways or using information not available to the 
other leading to an imperfect market. These institutions often act as watchdogs, 
enforcers and also as warranties of quality or value in situations where asymmetric 
information might potentially be present. 
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Chapter five 
Legal framework for financial market regulation, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Kingdom 
 
5.1 Introduction  
To achieve a strong, transparent financial market that also attracts the confidence of 
investors and protects against abuse, regimes have continued to draft new legislation or 
review existing ones. Modern markets that are becoming saturated with all kinds of 
product and services which require even more regulation. But not all markets are the 
same; they differ both in size and the kinds of products they offer. In the UK, the 
system is that which regulates one of the largest financial markets in the world. Hence, 
it involves different bodies and an enormous amount of legislation on different kinds of 
products. Moreover, it is a financial market that has traded in stocks for centuries. 
Therefore, it has laws that may sometimes differ from those in emerging markets such 
as Saudi Arabia.  
 
Despite differences in some aspects, both the Saudi and UK laws on financial market 
have similarities in terms of their approach to issues relating to market manipulation 
and insider trading. They both have strict legislation on these behaviours, which are 
considered by both regimes as market abuse. But the way they are dealt with can differ. 
This chapter intends to look at how financial regulations were built in both jurisdictions 
by reflecting at the transition of legal framework that led to what is now applicable in 
both jurisdictions. The chapter will also attempt to focus on areas that deal with issues 
relating to market abuse. It would also attempt to determine areas of convergence and 
the areas of differences between the laws.   
 
5.2 Structuring of the Saudi Arabian financial market  
Saudi Arabia’s capital market traces its roots back to the mid-1930s.370 However for 
most of its formative era, many scholars and observers opined that the financial market 
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is mostly unorganised and very informal in nature.371 At that stage of inception, the 
members of the monarchy largely dominated the financial system of the Kingdom. 
Their total monopoly over economic policy and all aspects of governance along with 
the huge amount of oil revenue continued to dominate the economic system of the 
Kingdom giving no incentive to consider diversification.372 Principally, since the Saudi 
capital market came into place around the 1930s, the main source of revenue had 
continued to be the export of oil and therefore, very little attention was given to other 
sectors that are capable of bringing revenue to the country. Research by Aljazira group 
shows how Saudi originally did not consider the financial industry as a viable 
alternative mode of capital,373 to Shari’ah finances.  
 
The turning point was the in the beginning of the 1980s ‘Oil Glut’, which was as a 
result of slowing economic activity in industrialised nations that reduced the demand 
for oil and affected prices. This prompted the debate on the need to diversify the 
economy.374 In the quest to achieve this, the rulers of Saudi resorted first to specialised 
credit institutions such as Saudi Industrial Development Bank (SIDB). Although this 
was an approach different from the prior reliance on an oil boom, it still became clear 
that there is the need to develop beyond just credit from a single institution. 
 
The renaissance of what was termed as the fifth development plan started gathering 
momentum in 1984 and the Saudi industrial market saw the beginning of a new era of 
reform and change.375 The emphasis was to create an economy that was based on 
industry and not only reliant on oil. This saw the first attempt to have the private sector 
as part of the economic drive.376  But this also came with the challenge of putting 
significant capitalisation if the goal of industrialisation set was to be achieved. The first 
point of access to finance was the SIDB, but that alone proved insufficient.  
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This challenge, according to research Aljazira group, highlighted the need for effective 
utilisation of domestic savings to be adequately mobilised through capital markets, that 
later prompted the creation of a Committee to pave a new ground that would enable 
trading in the stock market.377 The concept however did not do much to develop the 
industry, neither were finances or infrastructure developed. 378  Hence, there was a 
record of very slow performance that continued from 1984 until 1997 when the 
Kingdom formally began allowing foreign investment in its domestic stocks. With an 
estimated worth of $530 billion in 2015, it is now among the largest markets in the 
middle east and by opening its stocks to foreign companies, international firms have 
been able, from June 2015 to buy stocks in the country's exchange i.e., the Tadawul All 
Share Index.379 This is seen as a new opening that allows for direct investment for 
mutual funds and Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) to add some Saudi stocks to their 
holdings, especially in emerging market funds. These ETFs which could be described 
as equity swap is essentially a marketable security that tracks an index, a commodity, 
bonds, or a basket of assets. Despite the opening for foreign investors however, the 
Saudi market is still at a formative stage compared to other advanced financial markets 
such as the UK.380   
 
The active market liberalisation phase that began in 2003 has tremendously benefited 
the capital market by ensuring high volume of market capitalisation and value of traded 
commodities. Scholars see the issuance of Royal Decree number M/3 of July 2003 as a 
turning point in the capital market, bringing in new constitutive law of the securities 
industry, and particularly the CML.381 This body of rules came in at a time when the 
need for diversification is at its peak.382 What became obvious to most investors is that 
the new laws will regulate, and standardise issues pertinent to the development of the 
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capital market.383 The new legislations cover issues relating to registration, listing and 
operation of stocks, securities and public offers. 384 
 
Research however shows that The Saudi capital market is still among the least open 
markets in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and among those with limited foreign 
participation. One of the earliest efforts made to boost the market for foreign 
investment came via The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Regulation, Royal Decree No. 
M/30 of 2nd Jumada Thani 1424 Hijra (31st July 2003). The Decree opens the way for 
foreigners to buy shares listed in the Saudi market through what is called a swap 
agreement.385 But even as at 2008, a research  by Aljazira suggest that the value of 
trade by foreign investors only stands at 3.8 percent compared to other GCC countries 
that have foreign investment reaching up to 40 percent.386   
 
This chapter focuses on the Saudi authority quest to develop and diversified its 
financial system and securities laws. In particular, it explains the role of the regulating 
authorities’ i.e. the CMA and the structure as well as the nature and their functions as 
laid down by the statutes and legislations i.e. the CML, which governs the entire 
conduct and activities of all capital market participants in the Kingdom.  
 
5.2.1 The Capital Market Law (CML) 
The year 2003 was a good year for the International stock markets and that was the year 
Saudi saw the opportunity to enact a Decree that would usher in a new era in its own 
financial industry. The King then issued a far-reaching Royal Decree number M/3 that 
saw the establishment of the CML. 387  As Gouda argues, the idea of consumer 
protection is not new to the Saudi Kingdom, but the enactment of a comprehensive law 
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to regulate many aspects of the financial market is a big stride in the bid for a more 
coherent regulatory framework that protects investments among capital market 
participants.388 The aim of this was to redefine and standardise securities regulation and 
consumer protection in an emerging market.389 Principally, the CML is mainly a statute 
that guarantees consumer protection. This however is an upward development from 
other previous laws such as the Saudi Law against Deception in Trade of 1984,390 and 
the advertisement regulations law of 1992.391 Other laws enacted to consolidate the 
CML include the 2004 Competition Law of 2004. 392  Other laws and regulations 
include, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Rules,393 Merger and 
Acquisition Regulations,394  Real Estate Investment Funds Regulations,395  Corporate 
Governance Regulations, 396  Investment Funds Regulations, Offers of Securities 
Regulations, 397  Listing Rules, 398  Securities Business Regulations, 399  Authorized 
Persons Regulations, 400  and Market Conduct Regulations. 401  These are also called 
implementing rules because, in their entirety, they are structured as a framework or a 
mechanism for the enforcement and the implementation of the constitutive law, the 
Capital Market Law. 
 
Although securities are among the main aspects covered by the CML, it is important to 
state that the statute did not give a comprehensive definition of securities.402 Instead, it 
gives a broader and multifactorial description of securities by identifying them 
alongside certain schemes and transactions. The Law specifically says the term 
“Securities” shall mean:  
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a. Convertible and tradeable shares of companies; 
b. Tradeable debt instruments issued by companies, the government, public 
institutions or public organisations; 
c. Investment units issued by investment funds;  
d. Any instruments representing profit participation rights, any rights in the 
distribution of assets; or either or the foregoing;  
e. Any other rights or instruments which the Board determines should be 
included or treated as Securities if the Board believes that this would further 
the safety of the market or the protection of investors. The Board can 
exercise its power to exempt from the definition of Securities rights or 
instruments that otherwise would be treated as Securities under paragraphs 
(a, b, c, d) of this Article if it believes that it is not necessary to treat them as 
Securities, based on the requirements of the safety of the market and the 
protection of investors 
 
Referring to this provision, Gouda pointed out that it is technically a broad explanation 
of what securities connote, which may “not mean a lot for a person sitting on a bench 
because actually there is no disagreement on all the types of securities listed in these 
subsections. Rather, the disagreement is on what has not been mentioned.”403 Similarly, 
looking at the definition as compared to the UK, especially what is found the RAO,404 
Saudi legislations made no specific reference to aspects such as derivative contracts, 
futures, options and contracts for differences. The CML provides a short definition of 
securities and give broader discretion to the CMA and the CRSD to either “define the 
term security, and to exclude from, or include in the definition what it sees fit.”405  
 
The challenge to this according to Gouda is that there is no standard or well-defined test 
as to what may constitute a security.  The only implied point of reference is Article 
2(e), which states: “based on the requirements of the safety of the market and the 
protection of investors the Board has the power to include or exclude from the 
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definition what it believes to be or not to be a security.”406 This is a clear distinction 
from the UK regime. 
 
The statute also failed to “point to any type of test the judge should deploy to make the 
call. However, if we considered the test for determining whether an instrument is a 
security as safety of the market.”407 This indeed is a challenge to the Saudi market and 
especially to investors who take interest on every aspect of the regulatory framework. 
Moreover, the fact that the law explicitly gives the authorities i.e. CMA the discretion 
to define, in their own terms what should or should not be regarded as security also 
opens up the challenge on the need for caution and transparency on how such discretion 
is used in the market and how is it affects companies.408 
 
As the main regulatory legislation for capital market activities, the CML provides for 
both private and public offering.409 This however came after the 2008 amendment to 
the rules regulating offers of securities in the Saudi capital market.410 The pre 2008 
regulation was one that restricts the issuance of securities in the Saudi market to only 
joint companies. The provision, which allowed for these new types of offer of both 
private and public securities, is contained in the new amendment. Under this 
amendment in the CML, a private offering, termed ‘private placement’ is made either to 
some specified group of persons or to the government.411 Public offering on the other 
hand is one that entails offers to the public at large, where the CMA supervises every 
aspect. 
 
5.2.2 General framework of the CML 
Although the CML is the framework that is meant to regulate the entire securities 
market in Saudi, it is primarily conceptualised to deal with public offering of securities. 
The CML is seen by many scholars as the pioneer initiative of the Saudi authorities to 
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design a standardised capital market regulation in line with international practices.412 
This legislation or regulation contains details on market safety for investors, rules 
compelling disclosure, prospectus and those against market manipulation and insider 
trading.413 For example, before making any public offer, the CML requires disclosure 
by companies to ensure optimum transparency in the market and ensure that individual 
or organisations wanting to invest have accurate information about the nature of the 
securities and other relevant information necessary for making informed decisions.414 
Another safeguard to investors is the requirement by the CML that all companies listed 
in the Saudi stock market submit periodical updates to the Capital Market Authority on 
the state of their finances and managerial situations or changes. 415  This helps the 
Authority to figure out and reject any public offering that does not qualify under the 
provisions of the CML. The intent of this provision is to give all investors the assurance 
that only good securities would be allowed into the public market.416  
 
Secondly, the periodic checks ensure that those who have already subscribed to active 
or listed securities are protected as well and assured of the safety of their investment.417 
Gouda argues that all these measures put in place through the CML were meant to serve 
some important market values. One of the foremost reasons is to do with investor 
confidence. In the sense that, those who intend to subscribe to newly offered securities 
would have the assurance of making the right decisions and the confidence that the 
Market Authorities will safeguard their interest and investment against any 
unscrupulous market behaviour. Moreover, this gives them the chance to make an 
informed decision and in the meantime, makes them feel that the Authority is there for 
them and is guarding them against any unscrupulous business offers. This relates to the 
issues of information asymmetry that was discussed in previous chapters, particularly in 
chapter four. 
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It is important however to state that an ‘offer’ as defined under the CML is distinct 
from the common idea of offer found in contract law. The definition given under the 
CML encompasses not just the “expression or statement to be bound if accepted by the 
offeree, it is rather broader than that. It is broad because traditional offers are governed 
by time and they must be specific.”418 This essentially indicates, “the offeree must 
decline or accept the offer and what has been offered while the parties are still in the 
muglis al-akad.” 419  Specifically, Article 1 of the CML defines offer to mean the 
issuing of securities; inviting the public to subscribe therefore or the direct or indirect 
marketing thereof; or any statement, announcement or communication that has the 
effect of selling, issuing or offering securities. The provision however did not include 
preliminary negotiations or contracts entered into with or among underwriters.420 
 
5.2.3 Regulations under the CML 
While the CML provides the law that regulates every aspect of the Saudi financial 
market, it has provided strict provision against market abuse. The law has also made 
significant progress in establishing its supervision credentials. As a law that guarantees 
Saudi being a party to the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), it has also enhanced the areas of information sharing with other regulators 
around the world. 
 
(a) Regulation on market abuse  
The CML defines any intentional act by an agent with a view to create a false or 
misleading impression as to the market, the prices or the value of any security is an 
abuse of the market.421 Article 49 of the law states further that any act that creates 
misleading impression over prices or the value of any security thereby inducing third 
parties to buy, sell, or subscribe for such security or to refrain from doing so is deemed 
an act of market manipulation. Manipulation of the price of a security is a frequent 
phenomenon in the Saudi market where transactions in securities do not always involve 
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the true transfer of ownership.422 This according to Baamir occurs mainly because the 
CMA is not always proactive in its disciplinary actions against violators. He further 
gave instances of how this occurs which includes practices where an investor sells 
securities from one fund and at the same time, buys an equivalent amount from another 
fund that was managed by him or her, giving the impression that there is an active trade 
on that particular share and increase in the price of that particular security.423 Similar 
situations can be traced to for example the case of Georgiakis424 who engaged in what 
is commonly termed as ‘painting the tape’, which involves an artificial way of 
augmenting trading volume that will today be regarded as market manipulation under 
MAD 2.425 
 
Insider information on the other hand was defined under Article 50 of the CML in a 
way that is somewhat similar to the provisions of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act (FSMA) 2000. Essentially, the general idea about insider information under both 
Saudi and UK laws is that they refer to any information obtained by the insider and 
which is not available to the general public, has not been disclosed.426 The idea behind 
prohibition is because of the extent of effect such information have on other market 
participants, as its release and availability could have a material effect on the price or 
value of a Security related to such information. This is while the insider is aware that 
such information is not generally available and that, if it were available, it would have a 
material effect on the price or value of such security.427 Insiders often benefit from this 
at the expense of other, which also affects the credibility and transparency needed for a 
market to be fair to all participants. 
 
Like other regulatory frameworks in other jurisdictions, the CML was largely meant to 
create a safe investment environment and ensure adherence to the standards of 
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transparency and legality. 428  To achieve this, the CML mandates all financial 
institutions to disclose information to their investors and the public on their activities. It 
also requires the companies to make public the managerial personnel of the company 
i.e. those individuals that are in charge of the activities of the company as well as the 
major shareholders of the company.429 This in essence is to protect the investor and 
make clear to the investor and the public what the company stands for in terms of 
strength, so that parties wishing to participate in the company would do so based on 
information that is readily available.430 The prospectus must also disclose and describe 
clearly ”the securities to be issued, as well as privileges, rights, and preferences of the 
issuer’s other securities, if any, as well as the issuer’s financial position.” Specifically, 
Parts 4, 5, and 6 of the Saudi Listing Rules mandates companies to make disclosure of 
all the information necessary for a transparent market activity.431 For example, Article 
12a of the Listing Rules of the SSE provides that the prospectus of a company must at 
all times contain every necessary information that is required for an investor to assess 
the strength of the company. This includes information on “assets and liabilities, 
financial position, management, and prospects of the issuer and of its profits and 
losses… as well as information covering aspects such as “the obligations, rights, 
powers, and privileges attached to the relevant securities as well as an overview of the 
risk factors and the future of the issuer and its business.”432 
 
The case of a misleading or false content in the prospectus, senior officers, underwriters 
and issuers bear the liability. 433  The manner in which this action begins is via a 
complaint by the alleged victim, which shall be investigated by the authority, and a case 
would be opened against the company before the CRSD. The CML further provides 
that, where such complaint is filed with the Authorities, the investor who filed such 
complaint has to wait for ninety days for the bureaucratic procedure to be concluded, 
after which the complainant is informed that he can file his case to the CRSD.434 When 
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a case is before the CRSD, evidence can be obtained without warrant.435 Hence, this 
affects the civil rights granted to criminal suspects under Section 3-4 of the Criminal 
Procedure law of 24/08/1422H.436 Therefore, in a way, this provision of the CML is 
seen to violate some fundamental aspects of the justice system. Yet, proponents are of 
the view that the procedure is effective in ensuring expeditious and successful 
prosecution that in the last decade, this process have continued to apply in cases before 
the CRSD. Importantly, this brings the challenge of the overlap of regulatory and 
criminal inquiries. The EU case of Grande Stevens437 for instance raised these question, 
specifically concerning the nature of administrative sanctions and issues of due process 
and even double jeopardy in cases of insider trading and market manipulation.438 
 
To further guard investors, the CML clearly states that where the company gives out 
wrong or misleading information about its products or activities, the unsuspecting 
investor has the right to claim damages against the company by seeking a remedy 
through the CML established CRSD. Principally, the case of a misleading statement 
can be brought forward as a complaint by the victim, which will then become a subject 
of investigation by the authority and a case may be opened against the company before 
the CRSD. The CML further provides that, where such complaint is filed to the 
Authorities, the investor who filed such complaint has to wait for ninety days for the 
bureaucratic procedure to be concluded, after which the complainant is informed that he 
can file his case to the CRSD.439  
 
The CMA also engage itself in scrutinising the prospectus to ascertain whether it is 
accurate or not. The only responsibility it discharges is to simply review the 
completeness of the prospectus. However, Article 55(a) states that where the company 
omits any important information from the prospectus and that results in loss or damage 
to the investor, then as such the investor reserves the right to seek for damages Under 
                                                
435 ibid 
436 Gouda, B. A. (2012). Saudi Securities Law: Regulation of the Tadawul Stock Market, Issuers, and 
Securities Professionals under the Saudi Capital Market Law of 2003. The. Ann. Surv. International and 
Comp. L., 18, 115. 
437 Grande Stevens  v  Italy (App No.18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10,18668/10) (2014) ECHR 4 March 
2014. 
438 Ventoruzzo, M. (2014). Do Market Abuse Rules Violate Human Rights? The Grande Stevens v. Italy 
Case. The Grande Stevens v. Italy Case (October 2014). European Corporate Governance Institute 
(ECGI)-Law Working Paper, (269). 
439 Article 25-26 CML 
 
 
101 
Article 55(a). The investor however is cannot bring similar damages against the 
CMA.440 
 
Like most laws in arbitration and civil justice, the CML has also provided a period of 
limitation on suits by investors against companies. In particular, the law deals with 
issues arising from the violation of CML sanctioned disclosure of information and other 
issues covered under the CML,441 i.e., unfair or manipulative practices. According to 
the CML, the period within which a case should be filed is 5 years.442 For actions 
arising from violations of regulations, action must be brought within one year in which 
the claimant is expected to be aware of the damage or loss.443  The CML does not 
provide for an extension of time beyond five years in which to bring an action. Some 
scholars however point out that the absence of an extension beyond five years could be 
a problem in some circumstances.444 Providing a lengthier period according to Gouda is 
significant to alleviate certain occurrences that are peculiar to the capital market.445 
Explaining this paradox, he states, if the investor/victim does not discover the crime 
within the five year period, then his or her right to file a suit is forever forfeited. Again 
it is important to note the legitimacy of Gouda’s argument in the sense that this kind of 
situation could happen where the crime is designed in a way that the victim may not 
discover it at an early stage.446 Yet, limitation periods are not only peculiar to Saudi, 
they also exist in Western jurisdictions but in a different way. This also raises a point of 
comparison with the laws in the In England under the Limitation Act 2000 which 
provides for six years and also the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 
which gives a limitation of five years. Both laws provide that the periods run from the 
moment the crime was discovered. 
 
He further gave examples with securities that mature after more than five years. In the 
event of such investment, it is unlikely for the investor to discover any fault within the 
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stipulated 5 years. Moreover, he pointed out to the familiar situations where financial 
administrators cook their books and it becomes hard for an ordinary investor to realise 
the ill done until after years of the incident.447 What is shown here is that, the limitation 
period contained in the CML exposes some investors to unwarranted risk. Principally, 
since some securities take long to mature, and looking at other instances in financial 
markets around the world where certain irregularities only come to the knowledge of 
investors or regulators years after they have been perpetrated, it is important to review 
this law regarding limitation as to when an investor can bring an action against any act 
that defraud or manipulated the market. Moreover, it is logical to argue that, 
irrespective of how old a crime is, the question of statute of limitation should be based 
on many factors including the legitimacy that the investor is naturally unlikely to know 
of the incident at the most appropriate time. For example, in March 2015 Carney, the 
Governor of the Bank of England stated that the Bank of England missed as many as 50 
instances of suspected market abuse.448 Even though it is not the duty of the bank to 
trace cases of market abuse, this statement sends a significant message about cases of 
abuse that are not always readily discoverable, some may be discovered within a short 
time, others can go on for a longer period of time before they are discovered. Hence, 
the limitation period on market abuse cases may sometimes prove problematic, 
especially when there is a clear case of market abuse but victims are barred by law to 
bring an action due to lapse of time. 
 
The prohibition of market manipulation and insider trading set out in the CML 
essentially corresponds to most common international standards of financial market 
ethics and regulations such as the IOSCO449 Manual on Investigating and Prosecuting 
Market Manipulation 2000. International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO). 
 
IOSCO. This according to Baamir has contributed tremendously in creating a new 
phase based on global standards within the Saudi market and reduced the potential for 
                                                447	Ibid.	448	See, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/industries/banking/article4370849.ece. Accessed on 10th 
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market abuse and manipulation.450 It is important to state that, one of the aspects that 
the CML takes seriously in its provisions is the issue of market manipulation and the 
sanctions for it. This concern was out of the fear that without investor confidence, the 
aspiration for a new market in the Arab world may not be actualised. Any situation that 
is capable of making the market vulnerable to manipulative activities must be checked 
and avoided.451 
 
The CML for instance deals with the subject of market manipulation in its definition of 
the offence, stating that it is a violation to act or engage in any act which creates a false 
or misleading impression as to the market; the prices or the value of any security for the 
purpose of creating that impression; or thereby inducing third parties to buy, sell, or 
subscribe for such security or to refrain from doing so; or to induce them to exercise, or 
refrain from exercising, any rights conferred by such security.  
 
The need for improved regulatory framework against market abuse became of utmost 
importance because of the growing need to diversify the market and make it safe and 
attractive. It is also significant to check the growing unethical behaviour of market 
participants who sell securities from one fund and buying the same amount from 
another that was managed by them at the same moment.452 This manipulative strategy 
once became common among participants, and they used it to give the public the 
impression that the company is active in trading and the shares been dubiously 
exchanged and converted are valuable. Aside earlier reasons discussed, this practice 
becomes possible because of factors such as the “absence of Market Makers in the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) and by the lack of knowledge and experience by the 
majority of small investors.”453  
 
Taher also showed the effect of this was the way it allowed the market to be 
proliferated with speculators.454 For example, findings show that shares prices of 70 
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companies out of 81 listed companies traded in the market were overvalued.455 Such 
practices often harm the ability to raise local funds in the future as small investors who 
lost their investment might not be able to subscribe widely in further IPOs, and such 
practices have already created some sorts of social crises within the society, especially 
for small speculators.456 Again, even if these small investors have the funds, they may 
be unwilling to commit further to the market because of the perception that the market 
is not safe. 
 
The regulation under the CML also requires the prospectus of a company to contain a 
sufficient summary of the bylaws, financial information about the issuer, its group as 
well as its management.457 Added to this is the requirement to include comprehensive 
information relating to all new issues,  voting rights, dividends, “rights of redemption 
or repurchase, or the right to surplus assets on liquidation, winding up or otherwise, all 
other significant information regarding the rights of a shareholder.”458  
 
Moreover, the provisions of the CML has gone further to grant the CMA the powers to 
request a company to add other information to its prospectus or to demand the company 
to shoulder additional obligations, especially in industries that involve mining and 
insurance.459  This additional and sometimes continuing obligations are imposed in 
circumstances where it becomes clear that the company needs to take such steps if the 
original objectives of information disclosure is to be achieved. Especially where such 
obligation is necessary to maintain an orderly market and also protect the rights of 
participants. For example, Part 6 of the SSE Listing Rules clearly provided for these 
and Article 25 goes further to indicate how these kinds of responsibilities arise.460 The 
legal requirement is companies to notify the public and authorities of any major 
changes. The provision in the SSE listing rule also states that where in the opinion of 
any issuer, disclosure of any matter required by these Rules would be unduly 
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detrimental to the issuer, the issuer may apply for a waiver. However such waiver is 
subject to the condition that the omission of such information is not likely to mislead 
investors on the essential knowledge needed to assess the securities.461 Although the 
provision of the SSE did not give comprehensive and specific details on the grounds 
upon which such waiver would be justifiable, its counterpart the CML has provided 
such detail showing specifically that such exemption do not include business sensitivity 
or an exemption on the entire contract.462 This perhaps shows that the CML is designed 
to minimise the granting of exceptions to this general rule and is specific on the details. 
This could be attributed largely to the size of the market as the Saudi market is not one 
that expects different complex circumstances, it is easier to have a clear position on 
exceptions.  
 
(b). Regulations on Initial and continuous Disclosure 
The idea of disclosure of relevant information to the public is an important principle 
under the CML. All companies engaged in the capital market must abide by this and 
other regulations as stipulated in the regulations. As Gouda pointed out, making 
available to investors sufficient information on offering company’s financial status, its 
affiliates, directors, securities issued, and shareholders cannot be avoided by any of the 
companies.463 Moreover, giving reliable information is a responsibility the company 
must adhere to because any damage or court action for misleading information can be 
successfully brought against the company 
 
As stated earlier, the document to be filed for disclosure and listing which must contain 
all relevant information is the ‘prospectus’, which is the communication, written or by 
radio or television or the internet, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale 
of any security.464 Once it is prepared, the law requires that it should be distributed 
among potential investors and be made available online via the CMA’s website.465 
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While a substantive definition of a prospectus was not given by the CML, a portion of 
the Glossary of Terms defines it as the document required by companies when making 
offers of securities in accordance with the Capital Market Law. 
 
Fundamentally, no public offer can be made unless a prospectus had been duly filed 
with the CMA and all the requirements have been fulfilled. Once the authorities 
approve the prospectus, the company then goes ahead to register all its securities with 
the CMA. This is then followed by a public offer. The announcement or publicity of 
such an offer must contain at least a summary of the prospectus, as these are necessary 
information for any investor wishing to invest in the company.466 Most significantly is 
that an approval of the prospectus by the CMA is a necessary ingredient for the 
publication of the prospectus to the public and the offer of securities. Where the CMA, 
for any reason refuses to approve a prospectus, then the company is not allowed to 
publish the information or to make an offer to the public of its security.467 
 
On the aspect of perpetual disclosure of changes in a company, the CML has made an 
additional provision for another form of disclosure called the continuous disclosure. 
Bearing the name, this type of disclosure is mainly about the reports and publicity that a 
company must make in the event of any important changes or alterations in the 
administrative, shareholder, financial or product structure of the company.468 Pursuant 
to this requirement all listed companies must disclose all relevant information through 
annual or quarterly submission and disclosure of fiscal statements, changes in capital 
that might affect the company, changes in the board of directors, senior executives or 
even change in address etc.469 
 
(c). Regulation on dispute and violations. 
According to the standards of the CML, investors who suffer damage in their 
investment can only bring an action before the judicial bodies designated by the 
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CMA.470 Essentially, no suit can be instituted before any civil court in the Kingdom. 
Similarly, disputes on securities between participants cannot be instituted before 
conventional courts.471 Moreover, no case tried by the CRSD can be appealed before 
conventional courts. As Gouda pointed out, this means once the case has reached the 
Appeal Panel from the CRSD, it has exhausted all the available remedies under the 
Saudi system. At this point, the case becomes, more or less, akin to a res judicata case 
in the common law system.472  
 
(d). Regulation on jurisdictional boundaries 
The CML applies to markets in the Saudi Kingdom; hence the geographical jurisdiction 
is Saudi Arabia. The provisions of the CML specifically states that the law does not 
apply to securities or dispute thereof emanating from outside the Saudi territory even if 
trading in such a market originates within the Kingdom.473 But the law allows the CML 
to assume jurisdiction in respect to violations for foreign law that took place in a 
foreign country. Essentially, what this means is that, where foreign laws are violated by 
any individual or group and the same individual or group carries out business within the 
Kingdom, the CMA has a form of penalty which involves the suspension of the licence 
of such violators for twelve months.474 But for such suspension to take place, the CMA 
must be notified of the violation by the foreign regulator as provided by the law.475 
However, the argument by scholars is the inclusion in the provision of the CML that 
such notification by a foreign regulator must be a ‘formal’ notification. The term 
‘formal’ is somewhat subject of debate, as it is not clear whether, for the purpose of the 
CML, a judgment against a violation of  foreign laws constitutes a formal notice. From 
the face of the statute however, the answer is no. If not, the publication of such a 
judgment in legal reports or the media may still be a notice, but it does not constitute a 
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notice as specified under the statute.476 The insistence on formal notice may sometimes 
defeat the purpose of the statute, which was originally meant to check bad practices and 
ensure the safety of the markets. Hence, authorities should not be tied to the idea of 
‘formal notice’. Instead, they should have the leverage to act on any credible 
information and should not actually matter where it is coming from in as much as it is 
relevant and credible. 
 
This notwithstanding, what the law clearly states is that in certain circumstances, 
violations outside the borders of the Kingdom can still be treated and sanctioned by 
invoking provisions of the CML. Most importantly is that, with the growing demand 
for fair market practices, regulators around the world share information on potential bad 
practices and violations.  
 
(e). Regulation on exclusion of instrument 
Primarily, the CML did not clearly define what constitutes a security; hence, the 
questions of discretion by the CMA and those of jurisprudence come into play. Yet, 
Article 3 of the CML clearly specified some instruments that are not subject to 
securities regulation. The instruments include order notes, bills of exchange, insurance 
policies, checks, documentary credit and commercial instruments that are exclusive 
traded among banks.477 Although insurance policies are regarded under the CML as not 
part of securities, this does not include insurance company stock and other products 
such as insurance bonds that are sold in the market.  Therefore the exemption is mainly 
is an exemption in transaction not an exemption in securities that are readily sold in the 
market.478 Perhaps, some may argue that this does not cover all instruments. But Gouda 
argues that some of these instruments were excluded because these instruments are 
often given as securities for short-term maturity transactions in which a party pays 
some kind of consideration for the unconditional promise of the other party to pay.479 
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5.3 Framework of UK Market laws 
In discussing financial markets of regimes such as the UK, especially the development 
and nature of market laws, one has to admit the size of the market, the enormous 
amount of products and service and how this often results in constant reviews of laws 
and regulations. It is also relevant to understand that the UK is directly affected by EU 
legislations. Being a member of the continental bloc, regulations of the EU 
automatically form part of UK laws. Directives like the MAD are example of these 
legislations. 
 
Primarily, the history of stocks related transactions in England dates back to the times 
around the 15th century. Although the early history of stocks in England suggest that 
there was no government regulation evidence suggest that market participants have, 
since early times, devised a means to regulate the trade and ensure that fraud and risk 
and kept at the minimal.480 A more developed stock exchange was one that was created 
by 18th century brokers London Stock Exchange.481  This is far different from the 
history of stocks and other products of the financial market that are relatively new to 
Saudi market. In particular, the UK has continued to be among the dominant financial 
centres of the world and still occupies one of the largest capital exchanges.  
 
Centuries after stocks have begun trading in London, and well after the industry has 
developed to include other kinds of services, the need came for a regulatory regime that 
would ensure safety and guarantee transparency and good behaviour among market 
participants. There was recommendation in the 1970’s for a law in relation to insider 
dealing, which was given effect in 1980 and a law was passed in 1985 called 
Companies Act of 1985 and some amendments that later followed ushered in a 
reviewed version of the law called the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 
1985.482 The law was so limited in scope that in 1986 a review came about that gave the 
government more powers of enforcement.483 The main article under the Act was to 
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disallow person with insider information over markets from trading until such 
information is within public domain.484 Although not many convictions were obtained 
under this law, it was still a clear legislation that made insider trading a punishable 
offence.485  
 
Later, the provisions in the 1985 Act were repealed and replaced by the Criminal 
Justice Act (CJA) 1993, as a way to ensure compliance with Insider dealing directive of 
the EU. Later developments include the promulgation of FSMA 2000. Taking these 
transitions of enactments and reviews into context, it is clear that the question of insider 
trading and acts that are deemed as manipulative of the financial market are not new.  
 
 
5.3.1 The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993 
The CJA 1993 has a wider scope that expanded the definition of insider trading and the 
authorities of regulators. The CJA came into force to replace the Companies Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985. Under Part V of the CJA, the law described three types of 
acts that constitute insider dealings. This includes: CJA 1993, Part V, s.52(1) and (2). 
a. The act of dealing directly on the basis of insider information. 
b. Any act that encourages and allows another person to be involved in price 
manipulation of securities based on insider information. 
c. The act of unlawful disclosure of insider information to others 
 
Through the provisions of the CJA 1993, like those of the Criminal Justice Act 1980 
and 1985, insider trading is considered a crime. One of the major challenges to this 
enactment was that it also requires the crime to be dealt with through the same 
procedure as other crimes, i.e., using the principle of burden of proof contained in 
criminal laws, which necessitates that for any allegation, the proof must be beyond 
reasonable doubt. Since this added legislation, it has continued to come under intense 
criticism because it places an enormous task on the prosecution to prove cases and 
obtain conviction. Some observers and commentators labelled it as a law that is utterly 
                                                
484 ibid 
485 Alexander, K., Linklater, L., and Bazley, S. (2009). Market Abuse and Insider Dealing. Bloomsbury 
Professional.	
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unenforceable.486 Furthermore, the law does not provide a civil remedy, which in itself 
could be termed as a setback since only a criminal liability can be pursued. However, 
the provisions of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 can be invoked to confiscate and 
retrieve the proceeds obtained through insider trading  
 
The result of this legal inadequacy led to further calls for a regime of regulation that 
would cover the investor more appropriately or at least to find a legislation that would 
complement the loopholes of the CJA. After years of debate through what could be the 
best approach to both the interest of the market and those of the investors, the FSMA 
2000, which was principally meant to compliment the CJA 1993. This new legislation 
is wider in scope that it remedied some of the deficits of the CJA. It also extends 
liability to unauthorised persons in addition to those persons who are authorised.487 A 
common point of criticism for this legislation is that the market abuse regime operates 
on the principle of the regular user test, unlike other principles covering other forms of 
illegal conduct, the test is objective and does not require subjective elements. 488 
Although this has eliminated the problems of proof under the CJA 1993, the idea of 
strict liability on the other hand has attracted some degree of criticism, because of how 
difficult it is for the law to have the most needed deterrent effect when people commit 
an offence unintentionally or without knowing. The principle has also failed to put into 
consideration that there may be different levels of regular users depending on their 
knowledge and sophistication. 
 
 
5.3.2 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) 
In a general, the FSMA defines market abuse as behaviour (whether by one person or 
by two or more persons jointly or in concert) which, amongst others, occurs in relation 
to qualifying investments admitted to trading on a prescribed market, and which falls 
within one of the following types of behaviour: insider dealing, improper disclosure, 
misuse of information, manipulating transactions, manipulating devices, false 
                                                
486 Dine, J. (2001). Company Law, 4th Ed, Palgrave, Basingstoke. See also, Mackie v HMA [1994] JC 
132 
487 Rider, Alexander and Linklater (2002). Market abuse and Insider dealing. Butterworths, London . 
488 Swan, E. (2004) Market Abuse: a new duty of fairness 25(3) Company Lawyer, 67- 68. See also, 
Winterflood Securities Ltd & Ors v Financial Services Authority [2009] UKFSM FSM066. 
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dissemination and distortion and misleading behaviour.489  Specifically, s118 FSMA 
sets out the kinds of behaviour that qualify as market abuse which include using 
information not generally available to the public to manipulate the market, or creating a 
false or misleading impression to investors, or even the use of specific actions to distort 
the market. 
 
What this essentially means is that market abuse is a situation where a regular user of 
the market is put at an unreasonable disadvantage through the use of information not 
readily available to other market participants, deliberately misleading them impression 
on either products or services or distorting some aspects of the market.490 It is however 
important to stress that the FSMA insists on determining whether such behaviour falls 
below the expected market standard. The index commonly referred in this context is 
that FSMA ‘regular user test’, which describes a regular user as a “reasonable person 
who regularly deals on the market in investments of the type in question”.491 This also 
takes into account other variables such as changing market conditions etc.492  This 
flexibility suggests that in practice the test is more subjective that it creates uncertainty 
on what can be best described as reasonable and acceptable behaviour since these are 
aspects that vary from one person to another.  
 
Essentially, there is the notion that previous legislation was becoming insufficient in 
addressing many of the types of activity that may constitute the abuse of market and 
harm the interest of investors. Hence, the FSMA came with broader powers for 
regulators to deal with offences under the Financial Service Authority (FSA)493 listing 
rules especially those involving disclosure and prospectus.494 In relation to the laws that 
require the company to give investors sufficient information on company’s status, as 
contained in section 397 of the FSMA now replaced by section 89-90 of the FSAct, the 
laws in the UK are similar to those of Saudi that demands for a full disclosure to 
investors of company’s financial status, its affiliate, directors, securities issued and all 
                                                
489 See, The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations. 
490 Swan, E. J., & Virgo, J. (2010). Market abuse regulation. Oxford University Press. 
491 s118(10) FSMA. 
492 Rider, A., and Linklater, L. (2002). Market abuse and Insider dealing. Butterworths, London p36. 
493 The Financial Services Authority (FSA) was the body responsible for the regulation of UK’s financial 
services industry from 2001 until 2013 when it was succeeded by the and 2013.  Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA). 
494 Sections 401 and 402 of FSMA 2000. 
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relevant information that affects the choice of investment and the status of the 
company. The legal requirement for disclosure through the provisions of the UK 
Disclosure and Transparency Rules,495 especially in Chapters 4-6. This according to the 
UK Listing Authority is to make securities markets work well by mandating the FCA to 
monitor market disclosures by issuers by enforcing compliance as well as reviewing 
and approving prospectuses. The MAD 496  for example, sets out rules to ensure 
disclosure of dealings in shares by directors and senior management in order to prevent 
insider trading.  Any act that avoids or distorts this information is a liability both in the 
UK and in Saudi. 
 
The FSMA was therefore conceptualised in a way that these inherent lacuna would be 
addressed.497 For example, a significant part of the FSMA 2000 is that it provides the 
FSA with powers to impose civil penalties, which is an important aspect left out by the 
previous laws.  Similarly, the standard of proof and evidence required under the 
previous law has made conviction almost impossible and there is therefore the need to 
review this flaw in order to make the market more secure. 
 
It is important to note that there are other aspects of market abuse covered by the CJA 
that were subsequently adopted in the FSMA. For example, the CJA 1993 has 
provisions on ‘tippee liability’ that was also adopted into s118 of the FSMA is the 
‘tippee liability’. This refers to situations where insiders encourage others to engage in 
market abuse and indirectly benefiting from the illegality.498 The regulation provides 
that where it is established that such an act occurred and both parties, the giver and 
receiver of the information do so willingly with the full knowledge and willingness to 
commit market abuse, then they are deemed culpable.499 
 
In reference to market abuse, it is covered as a civil offence under s118 of FSMA. 
Principally, the Act refers to insider dealing constitutes market abuse where an insider 
deals, or tries to deal, based on inside information. The indicators of market abuse, 
                                                
495 This is especially contained in Chapters 4-6. 
496 Council Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation. 
497 Filby, M. (2003). Part VIII Financial Services and Markets Act: Filling Insider Dealing’s Regulatory 
Gaps. See also, Barnes, P. (2009). Stock market efficiency, insider dealing and market abuse: the UK 
experience. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 5(1-2), 38-50. 
498 S.123 FSMA 2000	
499 Ibid. 
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according to the FSMA include, situations where insiders improperly disclose 
information or where information that is not generally available was used or disclosed 
to affects an investor’s decision about the terms on which to deal.500 Secondly, is any 
act of placing orders to trade are done with view to give a false or misleading 
impression of the supply of, or demand for, one or more investments, raising the price 
of the investment to an abnormal or artificial level. Thirdly, the regulation also 
disallows the manipulation of devices where orders are placed for trading which 
employs fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance.501 Lastly, the 
statute considers any act of distortion and misleading behaviour that gives a false or 
misleading impression of either the supply of, or demand for, an investment; or 
behaviour that otherwise distorts the market in an investment as an offence of market 
abuse.  
 
Essentially, insider dealing has been a criminal offence since earlier provisions of the 
UK market regulations i.e. 1980s. The coming into force of Part V of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1993 and later the FSMA 2000, broadened the topic and the idea of process 
and penalties. According to the Act, an individual who possess inside information is 
deemed to have committed the criminal offence of insider dealing where such 
information is in the first place price sensitive in relation to shares. Second, where the 
individual trades or encourages others to trade in the shares or pass such information to 
others. Lastly, where such trades occur in a regulated market or through a broker.502 
The CJA for example identifies two insider dealing offences, the “dealing” and 
‘‘tipping-off’’ offence. The dealing offence is committed by an individual who possess 
inside information and deals in specified circumstances in price-affected securities in 
relation to the information.503 While the tipping-off offence occurs by disclosing such 
                                                
500 Section 118, FSMA 2000, See also Barnes, P. (2011). Insider dealing and market abuse: The UK’s 
record on enforcement. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 39(3), 174-189. 
501 Cumming, D. J., Zhan, F., & Aitken, M. J. (2013). Exchange Trading Rules, Surveillance, and Insider 
Trading. Surveillance, and Insider Trading. 
. 
502Sec 118 FSMA 2000. 
503See Slaughter and May. (2011). Market abuse and the definition of inside information. See, 
http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/1522219/market-abuse-and-the-definition-of-inside-
information.pdf 
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information or persuading others to deal in particular securities and in specified 
circumstance.504 
 
As the existing criminal and regulatory sanctions concerning insider dealing also appear 
to have certain lapses in addressing all known forms of abusive market behaviour, the 
FSMA which came into force in 2001 introduced a statutory prohibition on market 
abuse to supplement the criminal offence of insider dealing and market manipulation.505 
This represented an attempt to further close loopholes to the existing law. Effective 
policing of the UK market under the old regime proved difficult due to the high 
criminal law standard of proof. In addition, the regime considered three types of market 
abuse: misuse of non-public material information, the creation of false or misleading 
market impressions and market distortions.506 And no behaviour was considered market 
abuse unless it was considered contrary to the standards of a hypothetical “regular user”. 
 
In general, the practicality and essence of market regulations is also such that it is 
meant to serve all investors by ensuring market efficiency and investor confidence 
against Market abuse. Hence, there is always the requirement to maintain transparency 
and integrity based on level playing field for all participants.507 It should also ensure 
that information asymmetry is minimised. Though it is difficult to imagine absolute 
equality among investors in their influence and access to information on the securities, 
regulations and watchdogs try as much to ensure that it is reduced to the most minimal 
level. To further ensure this aspect of transparency at regional level, the EU has issued 
a directive i.e., the Transparency Directive Amending Directive (TDAD) 
(2013/50/EU).508 The Directives sets out obligations relating to the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are 
admitted to trading on a regulated market.509 
 
                                                
504CJA 1993, See also Slaughter and May. (2011). Market abuse and the definition of inside information 
available at http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/1522219/market-abuse-and-the-definition-of-
inside-information.pdf  
505 Sec 118 FSMA 2000. 
506 Ibid.	
507 McGee, R. W. (2008). Applying Ethics to Insider Trading. Journal of Business Ethics, 77, 205-217. 
508 See, http://www.globaldisclosures.com/Latest-News/3158.  
509 Ibid. 
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Some scholars observed that insider dealing has the potential of causing instability in 
the market.510 The aftermath of using insider information is the way in which it creates 
significant lack of confidence among potential investors, lessen foreign direct 
investment into the host market and therefore lessens economic the host markets 
opportunity to tap from the utility that financial investments present to the community.  
It is therefore justifiable how nations have risen to confront unregulated market 
practices and to attempt in putting measures that would maintain sanity, confidence and 
a transparent playing ground for market participants. 511 
 
The question however arises as to what are the essential characteristics of insider 
dealing which distinguish it from acceptable market behaviour.512 In the decision in 
Spector’s case,513 the Court (Third Chamber) ruled that a person in possession of inside 
information, who used that information within the meaning of that provision commits 
an offence but without prejudice to the rights of the defence and, in particular, to the 
right to be able to rebut that presumption. The question whether that person has 
infringed the law in relation to insider dealing must be analysed in the light of the 
purpose of that directive, which is to protect the integrity of the financial markets and to 
enhance investor confidence, which is based, in particular, on the assurance that 
investors will be placed on an equal footing and protected from the misuse of inside 
information.  
 
This question has raised significant debate regarding the possession and use of inside 
information. It is also to the effect that there followed a rebuttable presumption of use 
from mere possession, and also on the relevance of information and how lethal it is to 
other market participants. Moreover, it also raises questions on the specificity or the 
precise nature of such information. This was the position of the tribunal in trying to 
answer some of the complex questions in the Massey case. Although Massey argued 
                                                
510 Ribstein, L. E. (2002). Market vs. regulatory responses to corporate fraud: A critique of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. J. Corp. L., 28, 1. See also, Alexander, K., Linklater, L., & Bazley, S. (2009). Market 
Abuse and Insider Dealing. Bloomsbury Professional. 
511 Dignam, A., and Lowry, J. (2006). Company Law .4th Edn., Oxford University Press. 
512 Jesper-Lau, H. (2009). What constitutes insider dealing?–The Advocate General’s opinion in Case C-
45/08, Spector Photo Group. International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, Forthcoming. 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499093 
513 Case C-45/08, Spector Photo Group NV, Chris Van Raemdonck v. Commissie voor het Bank-, 
Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA), Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of 
23 December 2009, nyr.	
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that the public is well aware of the information about Eicom’s desire to sell its shares at 
a discounted rate, the tribunal distinguished the offer to Mr. Massey as “in line with 
but not the same as” the publicly available information, meaning that knowing more of 
the same type of information which is publicly available could make it “inside”. 
Another question raised was whether the information was precise under s118C(5)(b)?, 
this the tribunal said it was precise and that if the public knew of such precise 
information, it could have affected the share price. 514  These are some of the 
complications when it comes to proving the different kinds of facts when it comes to 
market abuse. As Titcomb asserts in the famous ‘Operation Tabernula’,515 he says it is a 
crime that is notoriously hard to spot, and very difficult to prove.516 “No one piece of 
evidence is ever likely to be a smoking gun; instead, investigators have to trawl through 
thousands of ‘suspicious transactions’ – trades from shortly before a market-moving 
event that one could have profited from – and hope a pattern emerges.”517 
 
5.4 MAD and MAD II 
A major distinction between regulations in Saudi and the UK is that financial products 
and service in the UK are governed by EU laws as well domestic legislation. As a 
matter of comparison to the regional aspects of the GCC and the effect of Saudi, the EU 
has an integrated market policy that is quite different to that of the GCC. Hence, the 
market system in the UK is not only a matter for the frontiers of the UK but also one 
that is affected by EU legislations. The pioneer regulation conceptualised for the Union 
was the MAD, which was meant to deal with market abuse and to also harmonise the 
rules of market at the European regime. Preamble 12 to MAD elaborates this position 
stating that, “The objective of legislation against insider dealing is the same as that of 
legislation against market manipulation: to ensure the integrity of Community financial 
markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets”.518  
                                                514	David	Massey	v	The	Financial	Service	Authority	[2011]	All	ER	(D)	95	(Feb)		(FIN/2009/0024).		See	also,	https://www.kingsleynapley.co.uk/news-and-events/blogs/regulatory-and-professional-discipline-blog/the-regulator-insider-trading-knowing-where-to-draw-the-line	515	Operation	Terbaluna	is	one	of	UK’s	biggest	insider	trading	investigations.	
516 See, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/11483111/Operation-Tabernula-The-story-
of-the-biggest-insider-trading-investigation-in-UK-history.html.  
517 Ibid.	
518 Ferrarini, G. A. (2004). The European Market Abuse Directive. Common Market Law Review, 41(3), 
711-741. 
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One of the significant aspect for instance is the EU Directive that emphasis on 
appropriate administrative measures to be taken by member states to ensure 
administrative sanctions are imposed for non-compliance with prohibitions set out in 
the Directive, and to ensure that these measures are effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’.519  
 
What is obvious about the contemporary development in market regulations in EU 
member states is that the law is becoming predominantly European-based, and EU 
directives are increasingly becoming the primary source of the law for many member 
states. This is evident in the establishment of the MAR, which the European 
Commission says was due to the uneven implementation of MAD 1. What is also 
evident is that the scope of European laws on market regulations are becoming wider 
and more stringent, beyond insider trading and market manipulation, to include aspects 
of ad hoc publicity.520 This development according to Siems is in line with international 
developments such as the IOSCO. A close observation of the Directives clearly shows 
that at the first level, the MAD 2003/6/EC consist of the main legal framework while 
the second level i.e. Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, and the 
Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 are mainly on the technical aspects of the Directives. 
The final level is the one that deals with compliance.521  
 
Essentially, this transnational legislation was conceptualised to regulate the markets 
across a region that share political, economic and geographical ties. It is also meant to 
promote and safeguard competition in a competitive global market that is increasingly 
becoming proliferated with different kinds of products and service traded in different 
kinds of platforms and technology. 
  
                                                
519 MAD 2003, Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003. See also, Dejmek, P. (2008). 
EU Internal Market for Financial Services-A Look at the First Regulatory Responses to the Financial 
Crisis and a View to the Future, The. Colum. J. Eur. L., 15, 455. See also, Wymeersch, E. (2010). The 
institutional reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System, an interim report. Ghent Univ. 
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520 For example, Directive 2001/34/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 May 2001 on 
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securities, Art 81. 
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What succeeded MAD was the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR), and the Directive on 
Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse (CSMAD)522 which are together referred to as 
MAD II. These two instruments of the European Union are meant to define the future 
of market abuse across as they become applicable to all EU member nations in July 
2016. MAD II came into force in July 2014 as a successor to MAD. This new law 
covers what was in MAD, and also expanded the area of regulation to regulate new 
products. It is also meant to regulate emerging market practices such as emission 
allowance trading, high frequency and algorithmic trading.523 But the UK has issued a 
statement saying it would not subscribe to this legislation in relation to justice and 
home affairs matters such as criminalisation of Market Abuse. The reason given by the 
UK is that it already has regulatory rules that have exceeded those of the CSMAD.524 
Yet, it is important to note that despite its opting out, UK is obliged to follow MAR, 
which will come into effect in July 2016 and will supersede the provisions of Section 
118 of the FSMA and the provisions of the FCA Handbook MAR block.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
Market liberalisation has come with not only the difficult choice of compelling market 
participants to abide by some form of strict regulations imposed by governments, that is 
largely argued to be crucial in maintaining transparency and ensuring ethical 
engagements between investors and companies. Evidently, leading markets like the UK 
have detailed laws and have gone through a great deal of reforms than markets in 
emerging regimes such as Saudi Arabia. The enormity of laws and bodies responsible 
for markets are also different. These differences are largely a reflection of the size and 
dynamics of products and services available.  
 
Tracing the root of the development of financial markets and their regulatory laws, the 
Saudi market regime is one that came in the l930s, but it was until 1984 when was 
                                                
522 In 2014 the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) and the Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Market 
Abuse Directives (CSMAD) were published, with each having an implementation date of 3 July 2016. 
MAR applies directly in each EU member state without requiring states to produce laws that implement 
MAR's provisions. CSMAD requires each Member State to implement legislation to ensure that market 
abuse is a criminal offence which can be effectively punished. 
523 Alexander, K., & Maly, V. (2015). The new EU market abuse regime and the derivatives markets. 
Law and Financial Markets Review, 1-8. 
524 Moloney, N. (2010). EU financial market regulation after the global financial crisis: “more Europe” or 
more risks?. Common Market Law Review, 47(5), 1317-1383.	
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termed as the fifth development plan started gathering momentum and saw a new phase 
in the development of capital market in the kingdom. A major reform for the 
development and diversification plan was the establishment through Royal Decree 
Number M/3 of July 2003 of the CML. This was a giant leap for the Saudi capital 
market that brought in a new constitutive law for the securities industry. Although the 
Saudi capital market may seem to be among the least open markets in the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC) and among those with limited foreign participation, the body 
of rules contained in the CML exposed Saudi’s desire for diversification. What became 
obvious to most investors is the emergence of new laws that will regulate registration, 
listing and operation of stocks, securities and public offers.  The provisions of the CML 
is an upward development from other previous laws such as the Saudi Law against 
Deception in Trade of 1984, the advertisement regulations law of 1992, Merger and 
Acquisition Regulations, Real Estate Investment Funds Regulations. 
 
Like most regulatory frameworks in other jurisdiction, the CML was largely meant to 
create a safe investment environment and ensure adherence to the standards of 
transparency and legality. Hence, it enacts provisions that outlaw any intentional act in 
the market that creates false or misleading impression on values of products and 
services, referring to such acts as market abuse. It also go further to states that insider 
trading through information obtained by an insider that is not available to the general 
public, and used to take advantage of the market and make gains is punishable under the 
law. These provisions are quite similar to what is contained under the UK laws, 
particularly the FSMA.  
 
Regulations under the Saudi regime also cover aspects of both private and public 
offering as in the UK. But the CML, unlike the laws in the UK, did not provide a 
comprehensive definition of ‘securities’. Instead, it gives a broader description of 
securities by identifying them alongside other schemes in the financial market.  
However, both regimes emphasis on transparency and disclosure and refuse any act that 
amounts to manipulating the market. But at the same time, the Saudi rules allow 
authorities to waive certain disclosure requirements. The Saudi regime also does not 
allow for legal suits to be instituted before any civil court in the Kingdom. This is a 
clear departure from the UK laws that allows for both criminal and civil actions for 
conviction and restitution respectively. In Saudi however, disputes on securities 
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between participants cannot be instituted before conventional courts, remedies can only 
be sought through the Committee for the CRSD and appeals lie only with the CRSD 
Appeal Panel. The CML also contains statutes of limitation i.e. for issues arising from 
the violation of CML sanctioned disclosure of information, there is a limit as to the time 
allowed for investors to bring an action.  
 
Another aspect that differentiates the two regimes is that the UK has different bodies 
that have a stake in the financial market, ranging from ensuring transparency to 
watching the behaviour of banks and insurance companies and indeed the nature and 
types of products in the market. The Saudi on the other hand has only the CML and on 
the other hand the SAMA (which deals with banking laws). Another important aspect 
that differentiates market laws in the two jurisdictions is the influence that other 
regional legislations have on domestic ones. In the UK, markets are also affected by EU 
laws, but in Saudi, the market rules are not affected by other prevailing or concurrent 
laws. 
 
In the end this part was able to show evidence that both regimes have commonalities on 
what constitute market abuse but differ in the way different strands of market abuse are 
regulated. For example, evidence shows that all aspect of investigation and sentencing 
are dealt with by subsidiaries of the CMA (which is a body established under the CML), 
including criminal aspects of the financial market. This is distinguishable from the 
concept in the UK where regular courts have jurisdiction over criminal offences relating 
to the financial market and the civil and criminal aspects of market abuse are dealt with 
often differently. The chapter also shows that the size of the two markets plays a 
significant role in the way these laws and regulations are reviewed and enforced. There 
are also dynamics in the character of the market such as the presence of complex 
products and services that needed certain kinds of regulations. Moreover, the chapter 
has shown that geographical legal developments such as the EU laws have effect on the 
UK while the Saudi regimes remains autonomous from any such supranational 
legislation.  
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Chapter Six 
The Nature and Trajectories of Regulatory Authorities: Saudi Arabia and the UK 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In general, regulatory bodies both in Saudi Arabia, the UK and other parts of the world 
are meant to compel transparency, ensure effective and ethical competition and to 
prohibit market abuse. The nature of regulations and enforcement to ensure the 
protection of both the suppliers of finance, the consumers of products and those that 
want return for their investment has been an important part of the debate on financial 
markets. Essentially, the interests of all these parties demands the concerted effort of 
institutions and experts to watch the market and draw formidable framework, especially 
in a world that is becoming saturated with all kinds of financial products and 
technological innovations that are increasingly making markets become even more 
interconnected across different frontiers. While the Saudi system has not witnessed so 
much reformation in terms of agencies and institutions, the UK market has gone 
through a great deal of challenges and changes, including the splitting of responsibility 
between different institutions. 
 
What is obvious about market regulatory agencies is that their effectiveness enhances 
confidence in the market and their ineffectiveness results in not only lack of confidence 
but also the proliferation of unethical market behaviour, which increases uncertainty 
and illegality. Many scholars argue that greater protection leads sustainable market 
growth as against weaker regulation, which may lead to collapse. As a result, there 
appears to be consensus across many regimes that the best strategy for avoiding market 
abuse is by putting in place extensive regulations on existing market products and 
services and to also ensure enforcement and penalty for bad behaviour.   
 
This chapter intends to examine the structure of the Saudi and UK regulatory 
institutions, their transition from past to the present and the challenges and 
contingencies of overseeing the market and ensuring the safety of investments against 
abuse and manipulation.  
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6.2 The Capital Market Authority (CMA) 
Until 2001, trading on the Saudi stock exchange suffered from absence of a formal 
trading, clearing and settlement platform. The years after 2001 saw some concerted 
effort in developing the prerequisite infrastructure for a modern market. Many 
observers regarded the establishment in 2003 of the CMA as Saudi’s independent 
market regulator as a turning point in capital market activities in the Kingdom.525 The 
CMA replaced the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), which was the body that 
was responsible for regulating and monitoring activities in the Saudi market, but that 
which many see as weak and inefficient.526 The establishment of the CMA proved to be 
a giant leap from the SAMA. The move to establish a new framework through CMA is 
undoubtedly a phenomenal move towards redefining and standardising the Saudi 
capital market, i.e. it is a conspicuous departure from the previous history of weak legal 
and regulatory framework. Historically, Saudi market has never had an adequate and 
robust regulatory system. According to research by Aljazira, the establishment of the 
Saudi stock Market (or Tadawul) in October 2001 brought in better infrastructure as 
well as the “much needed physical market place for trading, clearing and settlement of 
capital market transactions.”527  
 
 Essentially, the provisions of the CML have empowered the CMA to issue regulations 
to protect the interest of investors in the Saudi market. Since it began operation, the 
CMA has continued to issue rules that deal with some of the most important aspects of 
the market. The emergence of a more overarching regulatory authority became a factor 
that opened up a new era in the activity of markets in the Kingdom. The body continued 
to develop regulations that deal with investors’ protection and market ethics. The CMA 
has since continued to develop in line with its functions to regulate and develop the 
Saudi Arabian Capital Market by issuing the required rules and regulations for the 
successful implementation of the provisions of CML. The objectives are to create an 
appropriate investment environment, boost confidence, and reinforce transparency and 
disclosure standards in all listed companies, as well as protecting investors and dealers 
                                                525	The	Financing	Role	of	the	Saudi	Capital	Market	Promising	Prospects.	Aljazira	group	Research	
Department	Economic	Reports	(2010)	526	Al-Suhaibani,	M.,	and	Kryzanowski,	L.	(2001,	April).	Limit	vs.	market	order	trading	on	the	Saudi	Stock	Market.	In	EFMA	2001	Lugano	Meetings.	527	The	Financing	Role	of	the	Saudi	Capital	Market	Promising	Prospects.	Aljazira	group	Research	
Department	Economic	Reports	(2010)	
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from illegal acts in the market.528 Within the scope of its’ responsibilities, the CMA 
regulates various issues of corporate governance, market conduct, mergers and 
acquisitions, and laws that facilitate introduction and application of financing tools such 
as IPOs, Sukuks and mutual funds.529 This went on without must progress until 2007, 
when the Council of Ministers converted the main Saudi Stock market into a state-
owned joint stock company.530 The move was aimed at strengthening the capital market 
regulatory framework by providing more autonomy in the market.  A general overview 
of the duties of the CMA indicates that the CMA is responsible for: 
 
Regulating and monitoring issuance of, and trading in securities, authorising 
market intermediaries, enforcing corporate governance, transparency and other 
norms, promoting education of investors and issuers, developing procedures that 
mitigate risks associated with securities transactions, reviewing interim and 
annual financial statements of listed companies and monitoring their publication 
on the Tadawul website.531 
 
In the quest to have a coherent and efficient institutional character, the CMA was 
divided into different departments.532 The departments include: Market Supervision; 
Corporate Finance; Authorization and Inspection; Research and Investor Awareness 
and the Department for General Administration and Enforcement.533 Research however 
shows that the development of a strong regulatory framework in Saudi is relatively 
slower that what has been obtained in other emerging market, especially in the Gulf and 
Asia pacific.534  
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6.2.1 Structure of the CMA 
The CMA is the most powerful regulatory body in the Saudi market with its powers 
contained in the provisions of the CML.535 The administrative structure of the CMA 
consist of a board of commissioners, appointed by a Royal Decree for a five year term 
(renewable ones), and who are directly answerable to the prime minister of the 
Kingdom. 536   In the administrative structure, there are five main departments and 
twenty-eight sub-departments. The main departments/offices are office of the chairman, 
office of the general secretary, legal affairs, public relations, and the internal audit 
office. 537  The sub-departments include: regulatory, investigation, administration, 
research, and supervision.538 
 
In general, the CMA is responsible for all the laws governing the Saudi capital market. 
As part of its effort to achieve this objective, the CMA, through the provisions of the 
CML, created a joint stock company under which is the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE), 
the only institution, authorised under the law to carry out trades in securities. 539  
Moreover, the CMA has the role of investigation and adjudication, making it the police 
and the judge of the capital market.540 The only limitation to the powers and activities 
of the CMA are those prescribed under Article 4 of the CML, which states clearly that 
the CML cannot engage in lending any funds, acquiring, owning or issuing any 
Securities or; have any special interest in profiting from the market through any kind of 
project.541 
 
6.2.2 Role of the CMA  
(a). Regulatory 
Since its establishment, the CMA has issued ten statutes that regulate all the relevant 
issues for market participants and their relationship with the authorities.542 The direct 
role that the CMA plays is pivotal to the daily functioning of the market. In the quest to 
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ensure that these objectives are achieved, the CMA serves as an administrator, dispute 
resolution institution and a legislative body. Part of the numerous role played by the 
CMA, especially those powers as provided under the Article 5 of the CML which 
include making daily market activity reports and bringing legal proceedings before the 
CRSD against any party violating the regulations of the CML.543 It also has powers to 
receive investors’ complaints and follow up on the implementation of the decision of 
the CRSD and to also investigates issues referred to it by a competent department 
relating to violations of the CML. The powers of the CRSD as provided under the CML 
include the powers to investigate and settle complaints and suits, including the powers 
to issue subpoenas and decisions, as well as impose sanctions and order the 
presentation of evidence and documents.544 CRSD also has the right to issue a decision 
awarding damages and request to revert to the original status, or issue another decision 
as appropriate that would guarantee the rights of the aggrieved. 
 
The CMA also regulates the sale of securities through laws laid down by the CML. 
These transaction falls under that Listing Rules and Offers of Securities Regulations.545 
The CMA ensure that all securities to be sold be a company were duly offered to the 
public in accordance with the guiding regulations of the CML. Essentially, these offers 
are regulated and done in two ways. The first is the primary offer or primary 
distribution, which is done mainly through an underwriting agreement between an 
issuer and broker or dealer. 546  The second one is the secondary offering, which 
“happens when the seller is not the issuer, but a shareholder or group of shareholders 
that sells a previously issued stock. The proceeds of the sale are not used to raise 
capital; they go to the selling shareholder.”547 In all of these offerings, the CMA plays a 
central role in ensuring that the rules of the market are followed, and emphasises on the 
principles of transparency and fairness. 
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Another important regulatory role of the CMA is that which gives rise to damages 
under the disclosure rule. The law allows investors to institute actions a where they 
were misled by a company based on the information contained in a prospectus.548 The 
pursuance of a safe and transparent market for securities has made the CMA to explore 
necessary areas for reforms that will develop the market further. Since it was 
established, and especially from the beginning of 2004, the CMA had continued to 
issue several regulations to protect and safeguard the market and its participants. In 
2006 for example, regulations relating to real estate investment and corporate 
governance were issued.549 
(b). Publicity and public awareness. 
Another important role played by the CMA is in ensuring that it reaches out to the 
public with all the important information regarding the Saudi market. This includes the 
role of ensuring that all companies make their information public through both annual 
and periodic reports. 550  Other publicity roles include investor relations through 
responding to inquiries from the public. But scholars have raised a very serious 
observation, particularly regarding decisions by the CRSD, which are not open to the 
public.551 The CMA and CRSD are seen by some critics as not adhering to the principle 
of openness when it comes to independent research or inquiries regarding decisions 
made or taken, “despite the fact that the CRSD has disposed of hundreds of cases no 
one outside the circle of litigants or the judges themselves knows how things go inside 
the judges’ chamber.” 552  This lack of transparency as to what or how the CRSD 
adjudicates and finalise disputes is a challenge to the concept of a free and open 
market.553 Jurisprudentially, the public, who have an interest in the market, also have a 
legitimate interest to know how disputes and violations are being adjudicated. Since 
these cases are not dealt with in open courts, then the CMA should consider provisions 
that will either make these decisions public or compel the CRSD to answer any 
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inquiries into how the case was settled. As a matter of comparison and 
recommendation, the CMA through the CRSD or in another form may as well explore 
the possibilities of publishing semi-anonymized accounts similar to to the Financial 
Ombudsman Service in the UK.  The current practice of releasing a brief detail of the 
outcome of their decision to media or on website without giving a thorough detail about 
the entire case is far less than the standards of transparency required in the event of 
controversial and unethical market behaviour.  For example, in February 2010, a 
decision of the CRSD was published simply stating that, under its resolution, and due to 
several violations of the Capital Market Law and its Implementing Regulations, the 
CMA Board of Commissioners issued a decision to revoke the license granted to Ernst 
and Young Saudi Arabia Consulting Limited based on the Capital Market Law.554 
Scholars, argue that this kind of lack of transparency had to be addressed in order to 
promote public confidence in the market and in the way the CRSD conducts its 
duties.555 
(c) Swap agreements as means of attracting foreign investment. 
Opening the Saudi market for foreign participation is a landmark development for the 
Kingdom. Although the market capitalisation as of July 2007 was around 480.3 billion 
dollars, it was lacking in lack of foreign participation.556 Tadawul was largely closed to 
foreign capital as foreign investors were only allowed to invest in the stock market 
through the Saudi mutual funds.557  This some observers ascribe to the Kingdom’s 
apprehension to past events that destabilised East Asian economies in the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis i.e. the outflow of ‘hot’ money. Yet, the fact that Saudi wants to open its 
market to the world became a reason to start devising ways through which foreign 
investors could be wooed into the domestic market. 558  In trying to attract foreign 
investors and create certain products similar to the ones in western markets, the CMA, 
in August 2008, issued a resolution to introduce a model, which saw the 
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implementation of a new law allowing foreign investors to buy shares listed in the 
Saudi market by entering ‘swap agreements’. 559  Essentially, under this new law, 
licenced Saudi investors, were allowed to enter into a special kind of agreement and 
arrangement in which a Saudi investor retains legal ownership of the shares while 
transferring economic benefits to foreign investors.560  
 
As discovered in research by the Aljazira group, the foreign investor pays the full 
investment amount at the outset to authorised licensed intermediaries, who, in turn, 
would purchase the shares of a particular company, “at the end of the specified period, 
the authorized person would sell the shares and transfer the proceeds plus the economic 
benefit or losses. Other benefits, such as the right to receive dividends, are also 
transferred to foreign investors.”561 These arrangements according Alzahrani et al., give 
the foreign investors the right to benefit from the equity, but not to enjoy voting right or 
any other rights as the dealers retain legal ownership of the shares.562 But this limitation 
of rights is seen by some commentators as a downside to the long term goals of the 
Saudi capital market. 
 
Among the various types of swap agreements, equity swap is seen as the most 
advantageous in the Saudi market. It is a special type of swap that was first allowed to 
be explored by Morgan Stanley Saud Arabia.563 The bank entered an equity swap with 
foreign investors. Later other banks such as HSBC were authorised to engage in this 
type of contracts. Commenting on how this is important to the Saudi market, Aljazira 
research states: 
 
It is likely to provide foreign investors a platform to access the Saudi stock 
market, the largest bourse in the Arab world in terms of market capitalization. 
The swap agreement would send a strong signal highlighting the Kingdom’s 
openness to foreign investments and motivate foreign investors to enter the 
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Saudi stock market. Foreign investors are also expected to be encouraged by the 
decision to impose no tax liability on capital gains.564 
 
Because of the advantages that the swap agreement poses, it has increased over the 
years. This according to Aljazira research is evident of relative growth of swap 
purchases, which increased from 45 million dollars in 2008 to 275 million dollars in 
2010.565 Indicators seem to suggest that the Saudi market is still growing especially in 
the areas of banking and finance and insurance. See the table below: 
 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchange Interview Report April 2013.566 
Some of the obvious advantages of a swap agreement is that it would “increase the 
depth and market efficiency as both short term and long term agreements would allow 
greater role to institutional investors in the Saudi capital market which is currently 
dominated by retail investors.”567 It would also encourage international broking and 
investment houses to have more interest in the Saudi market.568 Moreover, because the 
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current law under the CML only allows foreign investors to hold shares in the Saudi 
market for a maximum of four years, recourse to swap purchases has become a viable 
alternative for foreign investors.  
 
When one takes into account the nature of these kinds of financial products and 
services and how they are traded in the UK and other western markets, it is evident that 
despite the sources of regulation and insistence on transparency in the market, a number 
of these finances present inherent challenges if they are to be traded in Saudi market. 
Examples of these include options, futures, and contracts for differences (swaps) which 
on the standard of Shari’ah will be considered as lacking transparency. Although in 
electronic based transactions there are immediate reporting on the executable bid and 
offer, the complete nature of these transactions is often not disclosed.569 As Duffie, 
Gârleanu, and Pedersen, argue, some limit-order-book markets allow “icebergs,” 
components of a limit order that have undisclosed quantities, that allows those 
submitting icebergs to reduce inference by market participants which could potentially 
worsen the order submitter’s ultimate average execution price.570 They also stated that 
financial institutions could allocate orders to off-exchange “dark pools,” where they are 
crossed at prices that were recently executed on exchanges; as individual trades in dark 
pools are not normally disclosed.571 Often, they are subject to high frequency traders’ 
manipulation of prices particularly where large block of shares are being traded. In 
relation to OTCs, it is common to find buyers and sellers negotiating privately, mostly 
with limited knowledge of current available prices from other parties. Scholars pointed 
out that the opaqueness of the OTC market created by intermediating brokers and 
dealers often puts investors in the dark about the most attractive available terms and 
even about whom to contact for attractive terms. 
 
To minimise this risk, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) agreed in 
2009 that all standardised OTC derivative contracts must be cleared via central 
counterparties until the end of 2012. Fulfilling this G-20 commitment of 2009, the 
regulation which came into force on 16 August 2012 is directly applicable in Member 
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States. EMIR sets out to increase stability within and achieve effective regulatory 
oversight of the OTC derivative markets uses a three-stage approach to achieve 
regulatory oversight of OTC derivatives by introducing greater transparency, reducing 
counterparty credit risk as well as operational risk. In August 2015, ESMA published 
four reports on how the EMIR has been functioning and providing input to the 
European Commission’s EMIR Review. These reforms were in response to how these 
types of transactions have previously affected the financial market.   
 
No doubt, the recent reform proposals on market regulation at the international (G20), 
US and EU level have brought important initiatives to improve transparency, regulating 
over the counter trade, installing position limits and strengthening regulatory 
authorities.572 However, the presence of broad exemptions especially those involving 
commercial traders and position limits have only marginally solved the problems. This 
according to Staritz and Küblböck is because, any regulatory framework that is meant 
to address the underlying problems must be pro-active on the risks of failure and adopts 
regulations that take into account the multiple and interrelated roles of financial and 
large commercial traders that are often engaged in speculative derivative.573 Taking 
these into context, it is evident that in comparison to the Saudi market and its strict 
regulations on speculative trading and transparency regime, it presents a more secure 
alternative to investors. Although, big trading companies in the UK are bound to make 
enormous profit from speculative trades and OTCs, it also creates a regime that is risky 
to the market and full of uncertainty that may also cause enormous loss. Speculative 
trading also increases the potential for insider trading.574 
 
6.3 The UK regime. 
The market regime in the UK has both similarities and differences with that of Saudi. 
While the substantive goals are the same, especially when it comes to dealing with 
market abuse, the structure of the institutions are different. One major distinction is that 
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since the abolition of the FSA, there was a split in function with FCA dealing with the 
micro-prudential and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) dealing with the 
macro–prudential in regards regulatory role in the UK. This is while Saudi still 
maintains the CMA as the sole regulator for markets and even for the role of attracting 
foreign investments to the kingdom.  The UK on the other hand has a regime that is 
susceptible to changes, especially at a time when the regional legislations of the EU are 
becoming increasingly relevant. For example, the arrangement that came at the wake of 
the split of the FSA where the remainder of the FSA’s functions were transferred to the 
PRA, which in terms of the FSAct 2012 appears to be an independent macro-prudential 
regulator, but in fact is a body corporate and a subsidiary of the BoE. This restores 
many of the functions of the BoE that were lost not by the Banking Act 2009, but the 
Bank of England Act 1997 that transferred its regulatory functions to the FSA.575  
 
6.3.1 From the FSA to FCA 
The size and scale of monetary and investment institutions in the UK suggests how the 
financial markets is characterised by the need for constant, sometimes overarching 
reforms to deal with the challenges of a market that is one of world’s largest. To 
accommodate the growth as well as innovations and emerging products and services, 
market regulators, investors and consumers are constantly driving new ideas and 
reforms.576 The case in Saudi Arabia is different, largely due to the size of the market, 
the resolve to give the financial industry more attention and the fact that it is still at its 
formative stage compared to the UK.577 Market regulatory bodies have been in the UK 
financial system for decades, but the global financial crisis of 2007/2008 brought to the 
fore some critical questions that led to one of the defining moments of the powers and 
effectiveness of these bodies.578 The law was subsequently reviewed based on many 
proposals, recommendations and criticisms.  
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Although now succeeded by the FCA, the FSA operated as a quasi-judicial body 
responsible for the regulation of the UK’s financial industry from 2001 and 2013. It 
was an independent, non-governmental body that regulates the financial services 
industry in the UK, including most financial services markets, exchanges and firms. 
Granted statutory powers in the UK by The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
the FSA sets standards to which such organisations must comply and can take action 
against them should they fail to meet required standards. The statutory roles for the 
FSA were to maintain market confidence, check financial crimes, and promote 
consumer protection and public awareness.  
 
The FSA was also subject to political and public accountability, and must report on 
how well these objectives have been met annually, subject to scrutiny by parliamentary 
committees. Its objectives govern how the FSA carries out its general function of 
making rules, dispensing guidance and advice, and determining general policies and 
principles.579 The FSA was also legally accountable, and must interpret its objectives 
correctly and consider them properly, or be liable to judicial review. Over time, new 
legislation emerged giving the FSA even broader powers. In 2000 for instance, the 
responsibility for Listing Authority from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) was also 
brought under FSMA and by law under the authority of the FSA.580 These of course 
includes to the responsibility to act against market abuse. Extending the role of the FSA 
again in 2004 with an added role of dealing with issues relating to regulations on 
mortgage and insurance, which was an extension required to transpose the insurance 
mediation directive. Hence, the FSA became the major institution that deals with most 
financial institutions in the UK. 
What also became obvious was how the enormous amount of responsibilities vested on 
the FSA to oversee most aspects of one of world’s largest financial markets revealed 
some challenges and contingencies. This cumbersome task appeared to have 
contributed to the inability of the FSA to be effective in combating cases of market 
abuse happening in the system.581 For example in March 2010, Hector Sants, then chief 
executive of the FSA agrees that market abuse in the UK has reached an "unacceptably 
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high level", and therefore the need to come up more proactive measures to combat 
market manipulation and insider dealings was recognised.582 This, however, was not a 
surprise in the sense that, the approach of the FSA then was to institute regulatory 
proceedings which may lead to fines and other sanctions leading ultimately to the 
withdrawal of authorisation.583 The standard of proof in insider dealing was also a civil 
standard for regulation under section 118 of the FSMA, rather than criminal standards 
under the CJA 1993.  
Revisiting the transition of what was later to become what is now known as the FCA, 
one also needs to look at the events that necessitated reforms in the financial regulatory 
system that began since 1985. Earlier, under the Financial Services Act 1986, the 
Securities and Investments Board Limited (SIB) was the board with the role of 
overseeing the market. The SIB continued as the body that was responsible for market 
regulations until the merger of banking supervision and investment services regulation, 
when the SIB was given a new name as the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in 
1997.584 This development saw the subsequent consolidation of its role and duties. 
 
The FCA, which came into force in 2013 created a new regulatory framework for 
financial services and abolished the FSA. It is worthy to note that the establishment of 
FCA and PRA has systematically led to a decentralised system of regulation. A 
tripartite system has emerged that include the PRA, the FCA and the Financial Policy 
Committee (FPC).585 The FPC is mainly a committee of the Court of the Bank of 
England charged with the responsibility for the protection of the stability of the 
financial system, or macro-prudential regulation. 586  In relation to market abuse 
however, the PRA and the FCA are the most relevant bodies. The PRA for example, is 
a subsidiary of the Bank of England that is shouldered with the role of ensuring that 
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risks in the financial system are checked by ensuring also the effectiveness of regulated 
companies.587 
 
By law, the FCA is an independent regulator that has regulatory powers over many 
institutions, especially over market by regulating the conduct of insurance and 
investment companies, and those of agent and companies on banking to the extent that 
they are not subject to PRA regulations.588 According to Baber the FCA also has a 
broader interventionist approach over the financial market than the previous regulatory 
regime under the FSA.589  In discussing the need to have more robust and effective 
financial system regime in the UK as distinct from the Saudi regime calls for 
consideration of certain key elements one has to put into consideration. The first is that 
the UK market is more than ten times the size of the Saudi market in terms of both 
products and services. Therefore, the need for stricter and broader market regulations 
will naturally differ. The second element is that which has to do with the events of 2007 
financial crisis that largely hit the bigger economies but has little impact in the 
economies of countries like Saudi whose economic base is largely dependent on oil 
extraction.590 Hence, the events that influenced the need for more robust regulations, 
culminating in the establishment of FCA and other regulatory bodies did not exist in 
Saudi Arabia. Essentially, this suggests that the dynamics that prompt policy decisions 
across financial markets differ according to the existing and inherent trajectories of 
different regimes. 
 
The FCA is a company limited by guarantee, tasked with the role of ensuring corporate 
governance of financial the market. The FSMA provides that the FCA has an obligation 
to uphold the principles of good corporate governance. The body constitutes of Board 
with members comprising: a Chair and a Chief Executive appointed by HM Treasury 
(Treasury); the Bank of England Deputy Governor for prudential regulation; two non-
                                                
587 Grosse, R. (2012). Bank regulation, governance and the crisis: a behavioral finance view. Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance, 20 (1), 4-25. 
588 Valitov, S. M., and Nigmetzyanov, A. A. (2014). Modern principles of financial services markets 
regulation as a response to the financial and economic crisis of 2008. Mediterranean Journal of Social 
Sciences, 5(24), 285 
589 Baber, G. (2013). A critical examination of the legislative response in banking and financial 
regulation to issues related to misconduct in the context of the crisis of 2007-2009. Journal of Financial 
Crime, 20 (2), 237-252. 
590 Turner, A. (2009). The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis (Vol. 7). 
London: Financial Services Authority. 	
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executive members who are appointed jointly by the Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills and the Treasury, and at least one other member appointed by the 
Treasury. The majority of the Board members are Non-Executive Directors (NEDs). 
The FSMA requires that the FCA to have a consistent measure that ensures 
accountability in the financial system including the need to report annually on the effort 
made in ensuring regulation of the market. Part of this includes the task of consulting 
consumers on the extent to which the activities of the FCA, including its policies has 
impacted on consumer and the market in general.  
 
Through the Code of Conduct and the Corporate Responsibility Policy and the board, 
the FCA was charged with wider role and responsibilities that include ensuring 
transparency, integrity and to avoid insider trading and other forms of market abuse. 591 
These are very important tasks that have to be met to ensure the safety of the market. 
Under the FCA's Disclosure and Transparency Rules for instance, issuers are required 
to provide formal notification to the market of any information that would be likely to 
have a significant effect on share price if used as a basis for investment decisions.592 
Apart from the need for disclosure being a universal standard in financial market, 
Moore and Walker-Arnott argue further that the UK corporate governance as a system 
imposes a great deal of priority to the disclosure practice, which the requirement for 
companies to keep  “constant company-relevant data streams as a basis for stock 
allocation decisions and associated professional communications.” 593  All of these 
events suggest of strain associated with regulating one of world’s most largest financial 
industries.594 A situation that is far from the Saudi which trades around 100million 
pounds daily.595 
Market abuse is not only prohibited but is also triable by the FCA. The system is 
designed for a matter to be investigated by the FCA, which is then taken to the 
Regulatory Decisions Committee (RDC).596 The RDC like the Saudi CRSD, does not 
hear matter in public. However, if parties are dissatisfied with decision of the RDC, 
                                                
591 Authority, F. C. (2013). The FCA’s approach to advancing its objectives. 
592 DTR 2.2. See also, Moore, M. T., and Walker‐Arnott, E. (2014). A Fresh Look at Stock Market 
Short-termism. Journal of Law and Society, 41(3), 416-445 
593 Moore, M. T., & Walker‐Arnott, E. (2014). A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short‐termism. Journal 
of Law and Society, 41(3), 416-445. 
594 See, http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/statistics/daily-trading/daily-trading.html 
595 See, http://www.tadawul.com.sa/Resources/Reports/DetailedDaily_en.html 596	See,	http://www.fca.org.uk/about/structure/committees#RegulatoryDecisionsCommittee	
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they can take the matter to the Upper Tribunal, which re-hears case from scratch, in an 
open court. This is dissimilar to the system in Saudi where the parties do not have the 
right to appeal to any specified tribunal or court. This leads to the argument that, unlike 
Saudi, the system of proceeding in the UK gives the opportunity form a transparent 
hearing of a case where the parties are dissatisfied with the decision of the committee. 
It also reveals how the system in the UK has the potential of protecting the standards of 
process rights in litigation and appeal, which is underpinned by Article 6 of the ECHR 
that provides for the right to a fair trial. Another aspect that separates the Saudi system 
from the UK in terms of regulatory authority over institutions is that banks and 
insurance companies in Saudi are regulated by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
(SAMA), which is not related to the CML or the CMA. Investors in Saudi may 
ordinarily feel challenged when it comes to access to justice. Yet, the argument of 
regulators, as would be discussed in the subsequent chapter is that the system was 
designed in this manner to serve as a catalyst to investor confidence rather than a 
bottleneck. 
The FCA is designed to be a self-standing body that regulates the conduct of business 
by all regulated firms, including those prudentially regulated by the PRA.597 In the 
effort to tackle unethical behaviour in the market, one of the important powers of the 
FCA is the right to order for a prompt amendment or withdrawal of misleading 
marketing material.598 Also, where the collective investment scheme which complies 
with the Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) 
directive is a unit trust, approval must be sought and obtained from the FCA prior to 
marketing the product to the public.599 In general, the FSA was central to almost all 
aspects of within the financial market from the conduct of business among companies 
to aspects that relate to practices regarding efficiency, innovation, domestic and 
international character of markets, competition etc.  
 
The goal of protecting the consumer and the market and to ensure effective competition 
in an ever-changing market, the UK has continued to introduce new policies that 
                                                
597 Ibid. 
598 Section 118 (5) of the FCA. Also see, Brandt, P. (2013). Changing of the guard. International 
Financial Law Review, 32, 41. 599	Section	242	FSMA.	
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involved establishing new bodies. This is by far distinct from the Saudi financial 
market regime, which has seldom gone through any phenomenal reform since the 
Tadawul. By the introduction of the FSA 2012, the UK adopted a new provision that 
established the Financial Strategy Committee (FSC) and the Financial Policy 
Committee (FPC) of the Bank of England. The FPC is primarily tasked with 
responsibility in relation to the achievement by the Bank on identification, monitoring, 
and taking of action to remove or reduce, systemic risks with a view to protecting and 
enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system.600 The PRA is also one other 
example of such bodies. It has the role of promoting the safety and soundness of firms, 
especially for insurers, to contribute to the securing of an appropriate degree of 
protection for policyholders, and to facilitate effective competition.601 
 
6.4 Conclusion  
The development of the Saudi capital market was an attempt to diversify what is 
originally a mono-economy that is dependent on oil. What mainly began in 2001 was 
an effort by the Kingdom to develop an infrastructure for financial capital that would 
boost investment. The most important part of this was to establish a body capable of 
watching the market and ensuring transparency and ethical behaviour. This policy 
decision came through establishment of the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 2003, 
which is probably the most important milestone in the drive to ensure a strong, 
sustainable and safe market for investors. Hence, the Saudi market was not only 
liberalised but also attracted a great deal of investor interest from both domestic and 
international investors. From the period the CMA took up, the market began to show 
signs of growth with number of listed companies increasing from 76 in 2001 to 139 in 
2010. Investment has also increased exponentially from SAR 924.5 billion in 2008 to 
SAR 1.2 trillion in 2009.  
 
Part of the initial regulatory proposals and actions that helped shaped the market 
include the abolishing of unregulated brokerage activities and introducing a standard 
                                                
600 Section 9 (c) FSA 2012. See also Tucker, P., Hall, S., and Pattani, A. (2013). Macro-prudential policy 
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form of IPOs, which saw a great interest from investors. For instance, the market 
recorded unprecedented sales in the IPO of Saudi telecom in 2003, which saw an initial 
sale of over 2.7 billion dollars. Perhaps with some fluctuations, especially between 
2004 and 2008, the capital raised through IPOs had continued to surge in the Saudi 
market. Part of the achievement of this diversification is that it became a protective 
edge for the Saudi economy. For example, while global economy was shrinking by up 
to 1.4 percent in 2009, the Saudi economy actually expanded by around 0.15 percent. 
Similarly, the IMF forecast the Saudi economy as one of the fastest growing in the gulf 
region. This had to some extent put the Kingdom in the league of potentially strongest 
economies in the gulf, other factors such as derivatives and credit products are seen as 
instruments that need to be further increased in the market.  
 
In the long-term, there are obvious plans attributed to the optimism that the Kingdom 
has on diversifying its economy and the capital market. Especially with the fluctuating 
nature and uncertainty in the price of crude, the issue of diversification is now entering 
a new and most critical phase. There is more need to reduce the dependency on oil 
revenue and focus on financial and other investment opportunities. There is also an 
obvious rise in real estate investment across the GCC and the Saudi economy appears 
to show a great deal of interest in the real estate investment. But it is also important to 
note that, this research has identified the reluctance of the Saudi market to accept some 
of the trading ideas of western markets which are believed to lack the kind of 
transparency the Saudi does not, at least for now, seemed to be ready to compromise. 
We have seen for example the idea of OTCs and speculative trading that are inherent in 
the UK and which the Saudi financial market does not engage. To the CMA, the 
concept of buyers negotiating privately with limited knowledge of other crucial market 
variables offends the idea of transparency and is by far opposite of Islamic finance 
which still has relevance in the Saudi financial market. Admittedly, even the financial 
markets across Europe have identified that these kinds of trades pose some degree of 
risk on investors and have worked towards proposing reforms. Yet, it is observed that 
the reforms are still not as far-reaching because of the broad exemptions especially 
those involving commercial traders and position limits and indeed the failure to take 
pro-active measures on risks of failure as a result of the speculations common with 
large commercial traders that are often engaged in speculative derivative.  
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Like the Saudi, the UK’s FCA an independent agency responsible for protecting 
investors, policing the markets and promoting competition. But beyond that, the UK 
also has the PRA, which is an arm of the Bank of England. The overriding objective of 
these bodies is to maintain confidence in the financial market and to ensure legality in 
trading and investment. Like the CML, the FCA also has powers to impose sentences 
i.e. fines on individuals or groups found in violation of market laws such as the 
intentional attempts in or succeeds in any manipulative or deceptive acts or practices in 
connection with any transactions in the market. Also prosecutable under this law is any 
direct or indirect, attempt to execute an order or execute a trade in a security for the 
purpose of creating a false or misleading impression of trading activity or interest in 
purchase. It is however important to note that unlike in the Saudi which has a simple 
definition of securities and restrictions, the broader definition of securities in the UK 
deflates the ability to have them fully regulated. Essentially, this broader 
contextualization of products and services, especially in bigger market such as the UK 
market is more complex, as much as it differs from what is needed to guide and govern 
emerging markets like Saudi. Hence, the various challenges faced by the UK financial 
market including the financial crisis of 2007 has had tremendous impact on how the 
regulatory bodies were restructured. The Saudi market however was not deeply affected 
and being at a formative stage, not much goes on with regards to reviewing market 
regulatory framework. The centre of regulation has therefore been the CMA which the 
UK has continuously split the various roles and have also continued to introduce new 
bodies.  
 
 
Chapter Seven 
Enforcement and Penal Regime in the UK and Saudi 
7.1 Introduction 
To ensure approved behaviour in the market, some degree of enforcement and penal 
mechanisms are necessary. These penal regimes are arguably the primary mechanisms 
that assure investors of the authority’s readiness to safeguard against violations. It also 
ensures most of the theoretical underpinnings of creating a level playing field for all 
market participants and to reiterate the essence and consequence of fiduciary 
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responsibilities that includes the to act in good faith in the interests of beneficiaries and 
balance the conflicting interests of different beneficiaries and to also ensure prudence in 
terms of care and diligence in the discharge of duty.  
 
But beyond these aspects that cover ordinary, companies and regulators, the existence 
of clear penalties for illegal behaviour also ensures that national and regional 
economies are safe from the danger of unscrupulous market conducts. The quest for a 
coherent enforcement and penal framework is therefore a necessary tool for the 
maintenance of a sustainable and investor friendly market atmosphere, which all 
markets aspire to achieve. Almost all the reforms seen in both the UK and Saudi were 
geared towards ensuring this level and safe playing field. Nonetheless, the structure of 
these enforcements and the nature of penalties differ, mainly due to the dynamics of the 
market as well as the distinct priorities and goals that different regimes pursue. It also 
include other realities such as the size of the markets, the expansive or narrow character 
of investment companies as well as the goals that define what the state aims to achieve 
both domestically and internationally.  
 
This chapter intends to look at the nature of penal regimes in Saudi and the UK and 
how the enforcement of these penalties are designed and structured. Furthermore, the 
chapter would attempt to interrogate some of the differences between in the way two 
regimes and try to explain why these dissimilarities exist.  
7.2 Structure of penal regime for market abuse in the United Kingdom 
Enforcing penalties for violations of market laws is a priority to regulatory agencies. In 
fact, they are one of the chief responsibilities of these institutions.  The UK has gone 
through a number of far-reaching reforms over the years that includes the current 
FSMA regime, which spells out penalties for the offence of market abuse. These laws 
have both civil penalties that run parallel with the criminal responsibilities.602 Some 
scholars maintained that the idea of having both civil and criminal penal regimes is 
because the previous regulatory regimes had proven ineffective in many respects, 
including inadequate enforcement because of regulatory fragmentation, and a heavy 
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reliance on criminal law sanctions in the punishment of market abuse.603 Although, it 
has to be stated that in 2002 there were no criminal sanctions in the UK.  
 
Although theories suggest the good and the bad of regulatory authorities, what is 
evident is the consensus that markets in contemporary intertwined financial world need 
more regulations and watchdogs than any time in history. The establishment of a 
measure such as the MAD is a further confirmation that market abuses are becoming 
sophisticated, borderless and complex and therefore the need to have multijurisdictional 
and dynamic approach on how to deal with them. Recent incidents have also revealed 
how economies around the world are so interrelated that the effect of one would go a 
long way in affecting others. These legal regimes are therefore crucial in safeguarding 
not only municipal or regional market integrity and transparency, but also the safety of 
the global economy 
 
While the CJA 1993 criminalises insider dealing, section 118 of FSMA deals with any 
of the seven types of behaviour mentioned earlier, and provided only regulatory 
penalties.604 Other aspects described in the UK laws which has similarities with the 
Saudi legislations include the offences of misleading statement and engaging in a 
deceptive manner of action for the intention of incite others to exercise or desist from 
exercising rights in relation to investments. These are offences under Sec 397 FSMA 
that has now been replaced by Sec 89-91 of the FSA 2012. The major difference 
between the two jurisdictions however is that, while the UK has different laws that 
govern aspects of the market, the Saudi financial market laws deal with both civil and 
criminal aspects through the same legislation i.e. the CML and of course through the 
same bodies the CRSD.  
 
7.2.1 Nature of criminal sanction for market abuse in the United Kingdom 
Insider trading has been a criminal offence in the UK for over 30 years. The Companies 
Act 1980 and the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 originally 
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proscribed insider dealing in the financial markets.605 Apart from insider dealing, these 
Acts also sanction other types of financial market abuses. But the nature and effect of 
these offences require that the enforcement of penalty also take into account a way of 
dealing with some in a civil process. Hence, these obvious gaps of the old regime paved 
way for the FSMA, which introduced a new civil regime to market abuse, identifying 
three forms of behaviour under section 118 FSMA i.e., those relating to misusing 
information, misleading the market and distorting the market.606  
The FSMA 2000 is one of the most significant legislations made regarding UK’s 
financial market. It brought in some important reforms that allows for regulators to deal 
with market abuse through other forms of regulatory penalties, instead of the previous 
approach of strict criminal law sanctions.607 Although the exercise of powers under 
section 123 of FSMA 2000, the FCA can impose a penalty or make a public statement 
or take disciplinary actions a laid down under section 205. They may also take other 
regulatory actions such as ‘restitution order’, asking the offenders to surrender their ill-
gotten gains to those injured by their violation, provided that the offence has some 
specific victims that can be identified.608 The idea of restitution is one form of penalty 
that is common with most regimes including Saudi. 
While section 52 of CJA 1993 spells out criminal sanctions for insider dealing it is 
important to note that corporations are excluded from this provision.609 Hence, it relates 
primarily to individuals found guilty of insider dealing, and can be convicted under the 
provisions of the CJA.610 In the prosecution of individuals, the law also makes clear 
certain conditions that must be met. Essentially, it states that the person must be in 
possession of such insider information and must have used it to either trade in securities 
on a regulated market, or if it is an OTC transaction through a professional intermediary 
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i.e., lawyers and accountants, or must himself be a professional intermediary, or .611 
The person may also be liable if he or she encourages another to deal in securities 
relating to insider information. Avgouleas however argues that, being that criminal 
regime for insider dealing is based on Part V of CJA 1993 its operation also resulted in 
overlap and asymmetry between the criminal and administrative regimes, creating 
ample scope for confusion both in terms of market players’ compliance and in the 
context of regulatory enforcement.612 
On misleading statement and dishonest concealment, which are a breaches attracting 
penalty as provided under Sec 89-92 of the FSAct 2012, there is a requirement that the 
statement, promise, or forecast was made dishonestly. The test of dishonesty was 
clearly laid down where the Court of Appeal held that the test for dishonesty is that 
which is defined by reference to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest 
people.613 Regarding the way by which to measure what may constitute recklessness, it 
was in case law developed under section 13 of the Prevention of Fraud Act 1958, which 
was later repealed and replaced by FSAct 1986 and the FSMA 2000.  Earlier views on 
this aspect of the market were echoed by the likes of Paull J., who termed 
‘recklessness’ should be used within its ordinary meaning in English, i.e., ‘a rash 
statement or promise made heedless of whether the person making it has any real facts 
on which to base it’.614 This position was also supported by the Court of Appeal.615 
The sanction for misleading statement, dishonest concealment under section S 89-91 of 
the FSAct 2012 includes summary convictions and other sanctions contained in Sec 92 
of the FSAct 2012 which states that on conviction on indictment, the offender may go 
for a prison term not exceeding 7 years or a fine, or both.616 There is however an 
exception to this that may exonerate the accused. Despite the fact that some observers 
believe the regulatory bodies should pursue more criminal sanctions as a form of 
deterrence,617 there are certain rules of criminal procedure in the UK that make such 
                                                
611 Section 59 of the CJA 1993 defines professional intermediaries to include brokers and market makers 
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prosecutions less appealing than civil litigation. For example, to convict a corporate 
body, the prosecution must establish not only the act but also the state of the mind of 
the company’s agent (as companies can be vicariously liable for the act of its 
employee). This rule has come to be identified as the ‘directing mind’ doctrine. These 
are not situation that is not common with the Saudi market, where the regulators are 
still perceived as the principal bodies with the primary role of monitoring the 
companies and its agents. The concept of fiduciary duty is central to financial market 
regulations. Another aspect of the penal regime in the UK is that it is still possible for 
people punished for manipulation under Sec 89-91 of the FSAct 2012 or for insider 
dealing under Part V of CJA 1993 to be held liable the common law for the offence of 
conspiracy to defraud. Although this may not be always be the case as exemplified in 
the case of Tom Hayes in relation to the manipulation of then LIBOR benchmark, 
where the jury found other defendants not guilty of conspiracy to defraud.618 
As much as price sensitivity is central in issues surrounding insider trading, it may 
sometimes be difficult to measure this element. How this is conceptualised according to 
Avgouleas is that the information regarded as insider information must be information, 
which may affect an issuer’s business prospects, and if published, would have an 
impact on the market price of the issuer’s securities. It is not enough when the 
information only contains aspects that relates to securities and their issuers in general 
and abstract terms.619 
However, like stated there is the complexity of overlap of criminal and civil sanctions. 
A clear example is Sec 89-91 of the FSAct 2012, which sets out the offence of making 
misleading statements, while the courts have successively ruled on the criminality of 
these acts. This offence carries many characteristics that it makes the distinction 
between civil and criminal very narrow. Even a simple definition of misleading 
statement can be multifaceted. It could mean a situation where an individual makes a 
false or deceptive forecast. Similarly, the law finds it as an offence where an individual 
                                                
618 R v Hayes [2015] EWCA Crim 1944. Commenting on the case, Director of the SFO David Green 
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dishonestly makes reckless deceptive promise or forecast, or where an act was done 
recklessly and causes harm on another person. 
 
Again, taking into in to context the same provision of Sec 89-90 of the FSAct 2012, 
clearly describes what constitutes misleading statements as statements, promises or 
forecasts that are misleading, false or deceptive. The provision went on to say that the 
person become culpable if they make the statement, promise or forecast or conceals the 
facts for the purpose of inducing, or is reckless as to whether it may induce, another 
person, whether or not the person to whom the statement, promise or forecast is 
made.620 A close look at the sections reveals that apart from deliberately concealing 
information or giving a wrong one, the only occasion that would result in criminal 
liability is when the information given is wrong and done in a reckless manner. Now 
the technicalities lead to issues surrounding ‘wrong information given recklessly’. 
Again, even where a criminal action becomes not feasible due to insufficient grounds, 
the civil penalties may still be imposed.621 This expansive and complex legal provision 
is absent in the Saudi regime. In Saudi, where such events occur, the CRSD may decide 
as it deem fit to issue a warning or suspend the licence of the company for such period 
it deem necessary. Even though the reference here is in the context of acts in market 
abuse, they also have legal precedents in criminal law. 
 
But looking at past developments, one may argue that the distinction on the burden of 
proof for criminal and civil cases for market offences was narrow. For example, in the 
case of Engels,622 a three part test was set out to determine whether proceedings are 
civil or criminal in nature. In the case of Davidson, it was held that “penalties for civil 
market abuse were, at least for the purposes of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, criminal in nature. 623  However, it is now clear that the FSMT in 
Davidson were wrong and the matter is correctly stated by the Upper Tribunal where it 
held that in civil procedure, the civil standards of balance of probability applies.624 The 
consequence was that whilst the burden of proof might still be the civil/balance of 
                                                
620 Ibid. 
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622 Engels v Netherlands, ECHR 3, 5100/71 [1976] 1 EHRR 647. 
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probabilities, it had to be applied in a way which was consistent with the seriousness of 
the matters to be proved.” Hence, the question regarding burden of proof in criminal 
and civil litigation for market abuse cases is a topic that is generating new debate.  
 
What is evident in general penal regime in the UK is that regulators have often avoided 
criminal litigation for obvious reasons. One of the primary reasons is that procedural 
aspects relating to criminal litigation in the UK comes with all the conventional aspects 
of criminal trial including the burden of proof required for establishing criminal 
liability.625 These high standards placed for the proof of criminal act has made the FCA 
reluctant many times to pursue criminal trial. Hence, civil litigations often become the 
most preferred form of enforcement of penalties. Another important aspect is that 
where parties cooperate with the regulators, there is the likelihood that the FCA will 
resort to fines in civil action and refuse to pursue any criminal action. Records however 
show that as of March 2016, the FCA has secured 27 convictions for insider trading.626 
Moreover, parts of the FSMA also raised certain concerns about the compatibility of 
these enforcement provisions with the ECHR. A recent example is the ECtHR decision 
in the case of Grande Stevens and others v Italy,627 which raised the debate on the 
concepts of a right to a fair trial and the double jeopardy rule. Prior to this judgement, it 
is accepted that where both administrative and criminal enforcement proceedings were 
available for the same conduct, both could be pursued. They have also been left often to 
national legislatures or courts. But by this new precedent, the ECtHR states that, where 
both criminal sanctions and sanctions formally classified as "administrative" are 
applied, the latter will not necessarily be immune from challenge under Article 4 of the 
Protocol.  These are among the concerns that raise the question on whether the FSA’s 
disciplinary and enforcement powers were compatible with the general principles and 
specific provisions of the ECtHR. The reason for this concern is because of the far 
reaching implication of the decision of the ECtHR and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, 
which state that no one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same member state for an offence for which a 
person had already been acquitted or convicted in accordance with the laws of that 
                                                
625 See for example the case of Kenneth George Carver FCA final Notice, 30th March 2015. See, 
https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-notices/2015/kenneth-george-carver.  
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627 Grande Stevens and Others v Italy (application nos 18640/10, 18647/10, 18663/10 and 18698/10)  	
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state. The court in Grande Stevens found a violation of Article 4 notwithstanding the 
fact that only one of the proceedings in the case before them was recognized in Italy as 
"criminal" in nature.628 
 
The criminal offences that includes manufacturing deceptive information or engaging 
in a path of misleading behaviour and insider dealing carries punishment of a maximum 
of seven years’ incarceration or an unlimited fine as penalty. The penal regime for civil 
offences on other hand emphasizes on higher monetary penalties to be imposed. The 
regulatory authority can compel a financial penalty or make a public statement about 
the behaviour. An example of the weight of civil penalty was clearly demonstrated 
when the UK imposed a record £6.1million for an offence of market abuse after 
revealing a scheme to manipulate the share price of India's branch of Reliance 
Industries on the London Stock Exchange”.629 In addition, the regulatory authority 
could also submit an application for an injunction restraining market abuse or an order 
for compensation.630  
7.2.2 Nature of civil responsibility in the UK 
While the general proposition for criminal cases, including those in financial market is 
based on the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the civil proceedings maintain 
the proposition of the ‘balance of probability’. The way in which the FSA would use 
enforcement powers and, in particular, how it imposes civil fines has initially raised 
enormous concerns. For example, the promulgation of the Code of Market Conduct 
COMAC was marked by a great deal of controversy that led to the drafting of detailed 
rules to counter some of the criticism.631 This is another characteristic of a market that 
is as large as the UK, as opposed to market such as Saudi. The FCA has to provide a 
                                                628	Ibid.	
629 FCA issued the fine for failing to act with due skill, care and diligence in the period leading up to the 
illegal manipulation of the closing price of securities traded on London Stock Exchange by 
Rameshkumar Goenka, The full report was contained in the FCA document available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-notices/2011/fsa-final-notice-2011-rameshkumar-
satyanarayan-goenka.  
630 Ibid.  
631 Avgouleas, E. (2005). The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis. Oxford University Press. 
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voluminous rulebook, which also created a complex web of overlapping regulatory 
rules whose construction often requires enormous expert advice.632 
What is evident, however, is that in numerous instances, the FCA has enforced 
penalties accruing to millions of pounds on parties found guilty of market abuse. 
Despite the fact that this may look somewhat like success in dealing with offenders, 
some critics argue that the regulatory focus on risk-based approach to enforcement is 
not enough deterrence as violators may commit such acts again, owing to the fact that 
they suffer less criminal penalty.  But as stated earlier, there is a reason why the 
regulators pursue the civil route. It is easier. Unlike the provisions of section 397 
FSMA now contained in Sections 89-91 FSAct 2012, the requirement to support a civil 
litigation for market abuse for example under the MAD does not require that the 
offence was committed knowingly or recklessly, it suffices if the offence was 
established. This includes many aspects of the market violations from tipping off, to 
dissemination of information likely to affecting transaction rather than for legitimate 
reasons etc.   
Although the MAD was meant to ensure a common standard of market behaviour 
across EU member states, it was also found to be lacking in some way triggering 
several reviews such as the MAD II. As Gottlieb (2014) argues, MAD was perceived to 
have a number of shortcomings, which were highlighted following the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2008.  MAD II is intended to address these shortcomings by (i) 
broadening the scope of the market abuse rules to capture new markets, especially the 
spot commodities markets and multilateral trading facilities and updating the market 
abuse regime to reflect developments such as high frequency trading (ii) harmonizing 
the application of market abuse rules, exemptions and sanctions across the EU; and (iii) 
strengthening administrative sanctions for market abuse and introducing criminal 
sanctions.633  
Another important characteristic worthy of note is the presence of some quasi-judicial 
remedies that the FSA may use pre-emptively to avert market abuse or its continuation. 
                                                
632 Ferran, E., and Goodhart, C. (Eds.). (2001). Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the 21st 
Century. Bloomsbury Publishing. The writers referred to FSA policy statement where it was observed 
that the FSA’s development of overlapping regimes has left many loose ends, which could spell 
damaging uncertainty to firms and individuals alike if not tied up one way or another.	
633 Gootlieb, C. (2014) MAD II Adopted by European Parliament and Council. Alert Memorandum 
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This includes injunction, which the FSA may request from a High Court to prevent a 
company from committing or continuing an act that amounts to market abuse.634 In 
August 2015 for example, penalties were under Sec 381 of the FSMA 2000 concerning 
a type of market manipulation known as ‘layering’ or ‘spoofing’ of the stock market, 
which is essentially to create an artificial small price movements and take advantage of 
it.635 This type of action against companies may occur when an investigation reveals 
that the company’s behaviour may amount to market abuse and if the court is satisfied, 
there is reasonable ground to suggest that market abuse is likely, and then the injunction 
would be granted. This type of injunction is also available when the need arises to 
prevent a person from disposing assets he acquired through acts deemed as market 
abuse.636  This according to Avgouleas, is done to remedy the effects of the relevant 
abusive behaviour.637 Again, there is a disparity here with what is applicable in Saudi, 
being that to obtain these injunctions, regulators have to approach a regular court. In 
Saudi Arabia, however, these powers are still centralised and are within the prerogative 
of the regulatory bodies. 
 
Another distinct features in the UK, which are in contrast with regulations and 
enforcement under the Saudi laws is that they also apply to certain behaviours beyond 
companies that trade in securities, the regime also applies to other kinds of trades. For 
example, the largest fine to date in respect of market abuse was the fine against Shell 
for overstating the volume of its oil reserve.638 The logic of the FSA then was that the 
shares of Shell Corporation are traded on the floor of the LSE and therefore, overstating 
their reserve is clearly a case of misleading investors and therefore amounts to market 
abuse. Although this may be treated from a different legal perspective if in Saudi, the 
idea of it being dealt with by the FSA is not out of place since the value of the oil 
company is closely related its reserve. 
 
                                                
634 Section 381 (1) FSMA 2000. 
635 FCA v Da Vinci Invest Limited and Others [2015] EWHC 2401 (Ch) 	
636 Section 381 (3) and (4) FSMA 2000. 
637 Avgouleas, E. (2005). The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis. Oxford University Press. See also Section 381(2) and (6) FSMA.	
638 FSA document available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/shell_24aug04.pdf. The result was a fine 
of £17m (which Shell paid without any admission of liability). The FSA stated that were it not for Shell's 
co-operation with the FSA and its efforts in addressing corporate governance and accounting issues 
(effectively 'systems and controls' improvements despite the fact that Shell was not an FSA-authorised 
firm), the penalty would have been substantially higher. 
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7.3 Challenges of market size in the UK 
In discussing the nature and character of enforcements, law reforms and penal policies 
in the financial markets, one also has to understand the challenges and constraints that 
emanate with the increasing size and scale of such market. Unlike Saudi, the UK 
financial industry has over a million employees, and accounts for approximately 7 
percent of the country’s GDP. Moreover, it has over 1,000,000 trades daily639 every 
day. Hence, its vulnerability to abuse, an especially insider dealing is an aspect that is 
always challenging to regulators.640  Compare this with the Saudi Capital Market that 
has approximately 400 professional staff to supervise approximately 150 listed 
companies and 84 authorised persons.641 Hence, it would be fair to say that the two 
markets are proportionately not at par in terms of trading and capital and therefore the 
character of regulation and the structure of enforcement would differ profoundly. These 
realities suggest that cases of insider dealing are likely to occur many times, and not all 
would be successfully uncovered. Despite the fact that identifying and enforcing 
penalties could be challenging due the variety of constraints, scholars suggest that it 
still easier when dealing with market abuse in the context of corporate and accounts or 
revenue announcement than it is for the day-to-day trades and transaction that happen 
in the market.642  
 
For example, unlike Saudi, in the UK, civil and criminal litigations for offences of 
market abuse are dealt with in different ways and under different laws. Perhaps one set 
of facts or behaviour in the UK can amount to both a criminal and civil responsibility, 
the choice of either pursuing both civil and criminal route or deciding on only civil case 
often depends on the circumstances of the case as well as the choice of authorities. 
Some observers also maintain that, public pressure and cooperation of the guilty party 
with the authorities have effect on how these cases are prosecuted. 
                                                639	See,	http://www.londonstockexchange.com/exchange/statistics/daily-trading/daily-trading.html	
640 Leitch, A. Criminalising market abuse - the shifting sands of enforcement by the FSA 
April 2007 - Litigation & Dispute Resolution. Legal Developments by SJ Berwin LLP. Available at 
http://www.legal500.com/developments/2955. 
641 Amico, A. (2014), “Corporate Governance Enforcement in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Evidence and Priorities”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 15, OECD Publishing.	
642 Leitch, A. Criminalising market abuse - the shifting sands of enforcement by the FSA 
April 2007 - Litigation & Dispute Resolution. Legal Developments by SJ Berwin LLP. See, 
http://www.legal500.com/developments/2955. 
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7.4 Regional legislation on enforcement 
Unlike Saudi, penal enforcements for market abuse which has not gone through any far 
reaching change, the UK is a different story. For example, amendments in 2012 have 
brought in additional rules that criminalises manipulation of benchmarks including 
LIBOR and EURIBOR (IP/12/846). The UK has criminalised this behaviour under Sec 
91 FSAct 2012. It is important to state here that, the MAD is the current EU-wide 
framework for tackling both insider dealing and market Manipulation since 2003. But 
with adoption of in April 2014, of a new Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) and a new 
Directive on criminal sanctions MAD 2 (also known as the Criminal Sanctions for 
Market Abuse Directive or CSMAD). MAR and MAD 2 will become applicable for 
most purposes from July 2016. But in this situation, it must be emphasised that the UK 
has a special position under the Lisbon Treaty as regards EU criminal law measures 
and is not bound by them unless it chooses to opt in. From what The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer stated in 2014, it appears the UK would not opt in to MAD 2.643 The Vice 
president of the commission stated: 
Investors who trade on insider information and manipulate markets by 
spreading false or misleading information can currently avoid sanctions by 
taking advantage of differences in law between the 28 EU Member States. 
Some countries’ authorities lack effective sanctioning powers while in others 
criminal sanctions are not available for certain insider dealing and market 
manipulation offences. Effective sanctions can have a strong deterrent effect 
and reinforce the integrity of the EU’s financial markets.644 
Complementing a further proposal endorsed by the commission in 2013 
(MEMO/13/774), the directive referred to the powers under the Lisbon Treaty, calling 
on members to enforce criminal sanctions for cases of market abuse, including the 
incitement, aiding or abetting such offences. 645  These resolutions were targeted 
towards increasing the convergence of national legislations and improve certainty over 
existing penalties for abuse of commodities and related derivative as well as over-the-
                                                
643 See, 
http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/Knowledge/MAR%20fact%20sheet%20241014.pdf. 
644 Ibid. 
645 See, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-77_en.htm?locale=en. 
 
 
154 
counter (OTC) transactions. 646  Moreover, any behaviour, which manipulates the 
calculation of a benchmark, or those that amount to misleading inputs, will be 
considered market abuse irrespective of intent or negligence. 
 
In the regional market situation, some observers argue that there are few insights into 
the full magnitude of market abuse across an expansive territory such as the EU, but it 
is estimated that investors were disadvantaged approximately 8.5 billion Euros as of 
2013.647 The UK being one of the largest markets has a fair share of these incidents. For 
example, the FCA publishes statistics on ‘market cleanliness’ in 2014 where it indicates 
some abnormal movements in the market in days preceding major takeover bids, which 
is an indication of insider dealing. However, records also suggest that these types of 
incident or movements in the market have gone down from 21.2 percent in 2010 to 
about 14.9 percent in 2012.648  
But as some scholars argue, the implementation of the EC Market Abuse Directive in 
the UK was a difficult issue because of relative asymmetry of the market abuse regime, 
the UKLA’s Listing Rules and the Directive’s definitions of what constitutes market 
manipulation and insider dealing.649  Yet, it is evident that the dual approach that led 
the amendment of Parts 6 and 8 of the FSMA i.e., Issuer Disclosure Rules and Market 
Abuse has succeeded in remodelling of the offence of market abuse under section 118 
of the Act.650 Hence, the FSA introduced in a new sourcebook the Disclosure Rules 
(DR) and effected a number changes to COMAC, including the endorsement of the EC 
Regulation on Share Buy-backs and Stabilisations. 651  The advantage of this 
remodelling, according to Avgouleas is that the UK market abuse regime has become 
more comprehensive.652 
                                                
646 See, https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2014/03/18/market-abuse-in-europe-harsher-
penalties-for-insider-trading-market-manipulation/	
647 See, https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2014/03/18/market-abuse-in-europe-harsher-
penalties-for-insider-trading-market-manipulation/  
648 Ibid. 
649 Avgouleas, E. (2005). The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis. Oxford University Press. 
650 FSMA2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/381. 
651 Regulations (EC) of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC on exemptions for buy- 
back programmes and stabilization of financial instruments 
652 Avgouleas, E. (2005). The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis. Oxford University Press.	
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Another important aspect that distinguishes the Saudi and UK financial market is on 
how laws are constantly reviewed or developed. In the sense, the UK financial industry 
have continued to see reviews in its legislation while in Saudi, these reviews rarely 
occur. Yet, it is evident that with the size of its market and the legislations coming out 
of the EU, the industry is bound by these kinds of situations. Referring to the need for 
these kinds of reforms, Martin Wheatley, former head of the FCA says, the changes 
were aimed at embedding “personal accountability in the culture of financial services 
and are a crucial step in rebuilding public trust”.653 It is however important to note 
recent developments e.g., section 32(2) of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013 that has now been amended by Section 25 of the Bank of England and Financial 
Services Act 2016 reverses the presumption of responsibility as originally enacted. In 
the sense that section 25 now provides that no senior manager will be guilty of 
misconduct unless the FCA or the PRA, as applicable, can prove that the senior 
manager did not take reasonable steps to avoid the breach occurring or continuing.654 
This suggests that the UK is backtracking to some extent on personal accountability, 
especially when it comes to the question of evidential burden.  
 
Another thing the rules were intended for according to FCA is “to address the inherent 
differences between incoming branches and UK relevant firms, while minimising the 
potential for arbitrage across UK relevant firms and incoming branches, which can pose 
similar conduct risks to the UK market.”655 Relating these to the Saudi regime, one can 
safely argue that the Saudi regime may not go through this kind of reforms as it does 
not have different bank branches spread across many countries in the world, except a 
few in the gulf states. Therefore, even if such reforms are to be proposed, they may not 
be overarching. 
 
7.5 Framework of penal enforcement under the Saudi Arabia financial market regime 
The legislative framework for financial market for both domestic and foreign 
companies listed in the Saudi capital market are subject to the general provisions of the 
                                                653	See,	https://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-publishes-rules-on-how-it-will-apply-the-new-accountability-regime	654	See,	https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=912d96de-9493-434f-8a89-ba0cc701cff0	
655Avgouleas, E. (2005). The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis. Oxford University Press. 
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Listing Rules, including those on continuing obligations, brokerage and rules on 
mergers and acquisition. For the purpose of breach of any regulations, including market 
abuse, the procedure in Saudi requires that the CMA refer the matter to the Committee 
for the CRSD. One of the distinctive features of the Saudi enforcement regime is that 
all powers, including those for criminal violations are vested in the CRSD as opposed 
to the UK where such cases are triable by regular criminal courts. Although this 
administrative overture over criminal litigation may appear to be contrary to the 
traditional principles of criminal justice, the idea behind this, according to findings is to 
give assurance to all investors, especially foreign investors that there matters would not 
be tried in regular Saudi courts which are guided strictly by Shari’ah laws.656  
Moreover, being that conventional courts in Saudi are Shari’ah courts and the judges 
are mainly trained in the application and procedure of the Shari’ah legal system, there is 
an obvious challenge over how they can be given the jurisdiction to deal with disputes 
between people or companies that do not necessarily succumb to all the provisions of 
the Shari’ah. Even if that is easy to achieve as the trades and indeed the offence could 
be said to have been committed in Saudi, it still not a good structural incentive to attract 
foreign investment. Hence, the authorities came up with a framework puts the entire 
jurisdiction of financial market disputes and offences in a single institution with the 
expertise over these issues and with knowledge of international best practices. 657 
Another rationale is to reassure investors that these disputes would be settled by an 
institution with expertise in investment disputes as against judges of courts that are 
mainly trained in Shari’ah law and procedure. 
The CMA and the CRSD work to ensure that market conducts are in line with Saudi 
laws while taking into account the need to maintain international best practices.658 
Hence, the general rules pertaining to trading of securities must be done without 
committing what may constitute manipulation and insider trading among other 
violations. There are clear sanctions and penalties for violations of any part of the law 
and it’s implementing regulations. The regulatory regime in Saudi has over the years 
                                                
656 Beach, J. W. (2005). Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in 
Developing Markets. The. Stan. J. Int'l L., 41, 307. 
657 Marar, A. D. (2004). Saudi Arabia: The Duality of the Legal System and the Challenge of Adapting 
Law to Market Economies. Arab Law Quarterly, 19(1), 91-124. 
658 Nick, T., and Hanna, C. (2010). An Introduction to the Principal Stock Exchanges of the UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. Gibson Dunn  publications 
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seen steady improvement in guarding the market against violations and in issuing 
sanctions. For example, a recent report by the IMF lauds the Saudi regulatory agencies 
for their successes in supervision and enforcement credentials, including issuing 
implementing regulations.659  
 
This effort to guard the market is the principal reason for the Royal Decree No. M/30 of 
July 2003 that established the CML.  The idea behind the sixty seven articles in the 
decree was to have a financial market regulation regime that would monitor, investigate 
and penalise acts of market abuse,660 as well as sanctions for the operation of the Saudi 
Arabian securities exchange.661 It is however important to state that even with these 
laws and monitoring policies Saudi Arabia had had its own fair share of market abuse 
cases. Hence, some critics have questioned the level of enforcement, especially the 
nature of penalties that are seen as insufficient and ineffective, perhaps due to the 
recurring allegations of market abuse.662 These kinds of criticisms however cut across 
both smaller and larger financial regimes across the world including the UK. What 
research shows is that, market abuse, particularly insider trading is a secretive 
endeavour that some may likely go unnoticed.663 
 
In a move similar to reform measures seen in the UK, the CMA in 2007 went further to 
introduce a new trading platform to deal with the market manipulation problem. The 
platform allows for detailed operation tracking, which was claimed to have rooted out 
over 400 cases of suspected illegal use of insider information, as well as closing down 
186 websites for the offence of dissemination of false rumours.664 The first penalty for 
insider dealing did not come until August 2009.665 This heralded the beginning of any 
sort of sanction to be enforced by the CMA. Observers also see this as an effort to 
                                                
659  IMF(2012). Saudi Arabia: Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes. See, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr1293.pdf IMF Country Report No. 12/93 
660 Royal Decree No. M/30, Articles 49 and 50.	
661 Ibid, Article 50-67. 
662 Ibid. 
663 Bris, A. (2005). Do insider trading laws work? European Financial Management, 11(3), 267-312. 
664 Ibid. 
665 In the said case, The chairman of the board of Bishah Agricultural Development company, Najm-
Eddine Ahmad Najm-Eddine Dhafer was sentenced to three months of imprisonment with a fine of US$ 
26.6 thousand, and additional payment of US$ 14 thousand because of gains obtained through insider 
trading with the company's shares.  Dhafer was found guilty of insider trading in Bishah shares based on 
him being the chairman of the company's board. He is the first individual in Saudi Arabia convicted for 
the unlawful use of insider information. His conviction echoes the Saudi effort to depict better 
dependability on its capital market, which is characterized by large retail investor participants
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reaffirm the Kingdom’s commitment to market transparency and a level playing field 
that will further appeal to investors and give them confidence both within and outside 
the kingdom.  
 
7.5.1 Causes of action in Saudi Arabia 
There are, according to the CML, four causes of action that can be brought by 
investors. The first, which is quite similar to the UK, is the ability to sue for recovery 
for misrepresentation in the prospectus. Where there is a false statement or omission of 
material fact, showing that it affected price at which the investor would have purchased 
the security, then such an investor has a legitimate case.666 In cases of these falsehood 
or misleading conducts, the CML focuses mainly on subjective standard of proving that 
the act actually affected the price the investor would have been willing to pay.667 
Although this is well within comparison with the UK, the CML has a clause, which 
states that, despite a prospectus not certified by an expert, the issuer may not be liable if 
he or she shows that they have reason to believe, and actually believed that there was 
no material omission or misstatement. But it has to demonstrate that after reasonable 
investigation, and on the basis of reasonable grounds he was convinced such part of the 
prospectus was not a violation of any part of the law.668  
Moreover, the law states for an action to be successfully prosecuted, the omission must 
occur on a prospectus that was approved by the authority.669 The paradox here is that 
which overlooks the significance of an expert in certifying a prospectus. This raises the 
question on the vulnerability of such prospectus to avoidable mistakes. Although the 
CML allows that, pending approval, the issuer may review and correct any misleading 
information that still does not take the place of an expert opinion. Another aspect is that 
the law exonerates any certifying expert from liability where he or she is able to show 
that he conducted reasonable investigation and has grounds to believe there was no 
material omission.670 The standard of measuring reasonable diligence according to the 
provisions of the CML is that it “shall be of the prudent man in the management of his 
                                                
666 Beach, J. W. (2005). Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in 
Developing Markets, The. Stan. J. Int'l L., 41, 307. 
667 Ibid. 
668 Article 55 (c) (1) CML. 
669 Article 55 (a) CML. 
670 Ibid. 
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property.”671 Another form of action is one that can be brought against unlicensed 
brokers. Any contract or other agreement related to any transaction restricted to 
licensed brokers that are entered into by an unlicensed broker is unenforceable. The 
unlicensed broker has no right to recover any money or property transferred under the 
contract. The other parties involved in the transaction, however, may recover any 
money or property transferred, so long as it also returns any money or property it 
received. The CRSD has sole jurisdiction over all suits on this matter.672 
As part of enforcing anti-fraud provisions, the CML also makes false statement in 
connection with another’s sale or purchase a violation. Again, for such violation to be 
actionable, it must be shown to be done out of negligence or recklessness.673 The other 
situation is to do with the general provisions under Article 49 that deals with market 
manipulation. Where a person can prove that he was adversely affected by the conduct 
of another person who deliberately interfered with the fair operation of the market and 
create misleading appearances with respect to the price market or commodity. In all of 
the mentioned circumstances, the cause of action is the same, and investors have the 
right to be indemnified.674  
The system of measuring indemnity or compensation is of a different character in 
Saudi. Where the committee decides that a victim of market manipulation is to be 
compensated, the damages would often be the difference between the prices actually 
paid for the security and its value at the date of bringing the action or the price for 
which the security could have been sold on the Tadawul before filing the complaint 
with the CRSD.675 This is quite similar to the principles of civil liability in the UK. In 
the absence of a prior agreement to indemnify among the defendants, the CRSD 
decides what indemnity is equitable. Another significant character of the procedure in 
Saudi is that where a person decides to avoid any proceedings before the CRSD, he is 
still liable to pay compensation by agreeing to pay the CMA a sum up to three times the 
profits derived from insider trading.676 The CRSD also has the powers to issue a prison 
sentence for market manipulation or insider trading, that only comes with the request 
                                                
671 Article 55 (d) CML.	
672 Beach, J. W. (2005). Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in 
Developing Markets, The. Stan. J. Int'l L., 41, 307. 
673 Ibid. 
674 Article 56 CML. 
675 See articles 55 (e), 56 (b) and 57 (b) CML. 
676 Article 64 CML. 
 
 
160 
from the CMA. Where the offender is to serve jail term, the length of imprisonment 
should not to exceed five years.677 
Similar to what is evident in the UK, the character of the Saudi system appears to be 
more centred on the civil approach to enforcement of penalties. But the fact that a 
person can be sentenced to jail by a committee and not a regular court brings in unique 
criminal justice process that many will question. Any criticism of this system therefore 
has some legitimacy, especially because even appeal from the CRSD can only be heard 
by the CRSD’s appeal panel which is also not an open court or tribunal.678 Therefore, 
any investor who suffers damage in their investment can only bring an action before the 
judicial bodies designated by the CMA, meaning that no conventional court in the 
kingdom has jurisdiction over these kinds of disputes.679 The same rule applies to 
disputes on securities between market participants. While the approach to enforcement 
and penalty for breach in Saudi market could be relatively lenient compared to the UK, 
especially that the Saudi regime does not appear to pursue both civil and criminal case 
over the same case, the regulatory agencies are no less concerned about market abuse 
than their counterparts in the UK. The 2006 Gulf stock crash has furthered the activity 
of these regulators to enforce penalties and make the market more attractive again.680  
7.5.2. Procedure for investigation and trial in Saudi 
The manner in which this action begins is via a complaint by the victim, which shall be 
investigated by the authority, and a case would be opened against the company before 
the CRSD.681 Where the committee establishes that an offence had been committed that 
involves either market abuse or any violation of the provisions of the CML or those 
contained in the Tadawul, the committee has powers to preside and to penalise. The 
CML further provides that, where such complained is filed to the Authorities by an 
investor, such investor has to wait for ninety days for the bureaucratic procedure to be 
concluded; after which he or she is informed that he can file his case to the CRSD.682 
                                                
677 Article 49-50 CML.	678	Article	25	CML.	679	Alanazi,	B.	M.	G.	A.	(2012).	Investor	protection	and	the	civil	liability	for	defective	disclosures	in	the	Saudi	securities	market:	a	legal	analysis.	680	Amico,	A.	(2014),	“Corporate	Governance	Enforcement	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa:	Evidence	and	Priorities”,	OECD	Corporate	Governance	Working	Papers,	No.	15.	681	Article	25	CML.	682	Article	25-26	CML	
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Moreover, no case tried by the CRSD can be appealed before conventional courts. As 
Gouda pointed out:  
 
“This means once the case has reached the Appeal Panel from the CRSD, it has 
exhausted all the available remedies under the Kingdom’s system. At this point, 
the case becomes, more or less, akin to a res judicata case in the common law 
system. The CML also contains antifraud provisions that bar fraud, 
manipulation, omissions and misrepresentations in connection with the sale and 
offering of securities.”683 
The general procedure is that once a case is before the CRSD, evidence can be obtained 
without warrant.684 Some scholars however question this process of obtaining evidence 
to be contrary to the civil rights granted to criminal suspects under section 3-4 of the 
Criminal procedure law of 24/08/1422H.685 However, one also has to admit that the 
CRSD is not a regular court. Moreover, the nature of penalty awarded for offences of 
market abuse are mainly in form monetary penalty and does not necessarily have the 
characteristics of a criminal litigation. Hence, even if scholars argue that the system of 
acquiring and tendering evidence violates the general standards of criminal laws of the 
kingdom, proponents claim that this system has proven efficacious over the years and a 
number of cases have been successfully prosecuted in this manner by the CRSD.  
Civil penalties are generally drawn in a way that there has to be clear evidence to 
suggest that there is actual harm to an investor. In the case of criminal sanction 
however, what is required is to establish that the act was committed, not necessarily 
that an investor suffered any loss. On the timing for action, the Saudi regime has a clear 
provision, which requires that actions for violations must be instituted within a year 
from the moment the complainant knew about the situation and not more than five 
years from the time the violation took place as provided under Article 58 of the CML. 
 
                                                
683 Gouda, B. A. (2012). Saudi Securities Law: Regulation of the Tadawul Stock Market, Issuers, and 
Securities Professionals under the Saudi Capital Market Law of 2003, The. Ann. Surv. International and 
Comp. L., 18, 115. 
684 Ibid.  
685 Gouda, B. A. (2012). Saudi Securities Law: Regulation of the Tadawul Stock Market, Issuers, and 
Securities Professionals under the Saudi Capital Market Law of 2003, The. Ann. Surv. International and 
Comp. L., 18, 115.	
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7.5.3 Nature of penalty in Saudi 
The nature of penalty to be imposed for cases of market abuse depends largely on the 
nature of the abuse. This is governed under Article 49 of the CML, which can be in 
form of restriction on the buying or selling of the security. The CML also makes 
explicit provisions on restricting persons who obtain insider information from family 
members or any other mutual party from trading directly or through another person in 
the security. The CRSD may order that the offender indemnify, or order an issuer to 
pay the gains derived from the violation into the CMA's account. Under the CML, any 
individual responsible for market manipulation is liable to pay damages to any person 
adversely affected by act.686 Penalties could also include barring the offender from 
acting as a broker, portfolio manager or investment adviser for the period of time that is 
necessary for the safety of the market and the protection of investors or bar the offender 
from working with companies whose securities are traded on the Tadawul.687 This may 
be added to any monetary penalty that may be enforced by the committee. Article 56 of 
the Saudi CML states clearly that “any individual who creates, or is responsible for 
another making, orally or in writing an untrue statement of material fact or omits to 
state that material fact, if it causes another person to be misled in relation to the sale or 
the purchase of a security, shall be liable for compensation of the damages”.688  The 
accused will be individually and jointly liable for damages by persons who purchase or 
sell the security in question whose price has been considerably unfavourably affected 
by such manipulation for the amount such persons are so affected. 
In the case of misleading or false content in the prospectus, senior officers, underwriters 
and issuers bear the liability.689 In the event of this kind of situation, the CMA referees 
the case to the CRSD. Depending on the gravity of the act, in the event the issuer was 
alleged to be attempting to commit such wrong, the committee may go ahead and take 
measures to avert the violation and issue a warning. But where the act had already been 
committed, the committee often orders the issuer to indemnify those that suffer loss and 
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687 Al Kahtani, F. S. (2013). The Saudi External Institutional Framework for Corporate Governance. 
688 Article 56 CML 
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all proceeds of such violation are seized from the issuer. In other situations, the 
committee may order the suspension of trading in the said security.690 
Despite the similarity between the UK and Saudi regime on regulators’ powers to 
ensure penalties for violations of securities and exchange rules, some scholars maintain 
that the Saudi enforcement authorities are less specific. 691  In essence, the Saudi 
enforcement laws allow authorities wider discretion in terms of shifting the detail to the 
implementing rule.692 The powers granted to authorities under the CML suggests that 
they can penalize persons engaging or engaged in violation through numerous kinds of 
penalties that are often based on discretionary overture.693 They range from seizure to 
restitution orders to censure.  The effect of this is the lack of certainty for companies on 
what the penalty would be in the event of a particular kind of violation.694 The law 
however allows for some form of negotiated settlement with the payment of specific 
fine range as discussed earlier. Where the violation requires that fine should be paid to 
the state, the offender is to pay fine of up to three times his gains or avoided losses.695 
This agreement is strictly between the CMA and the offender in form of a negotiated 
settlement. When this is achieved, then the CMA cannot forward the matter to the 
CRSD.696  
Moreover, regulators also have powers to revoke permanently a broker’s licence. 
Another penalty that is specifically described is the jurisdiction of the CRSD to enforce 
fines on any broker without a licence to the tune of 100, 000 Saudi Riyals and could 
also give an additional sentence of up to nine moths prison term, depending on the 
circumstances of the violation.697 But an important aspect worthy of note is the right of 
the offender to file an appeal with the Appeal Panel of the CRSD to review any 
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Developing Markets, The. Stan. J. Int'l L., 41, 307. 
692 Ibid.  
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decision of the CRSD.698   
 
7.6 Conclusion 
From the evidence in this study, it is clear that both Saudi and the UK authorities are 
more inclined to pursuing the civil route which gives more assurance of imposing 
penalty and indemnifying the victim than criminal litigations which are cumbersome. 
One of the reasons for making the civil regime more prominent, especially in the UK is 
the argument that turning every market offence into a criminal action is capable of 
resulting in enormous court cases and is unlikely to serve the general interest of the 
market or the investor. Another problem is that criminal matters had to be tried 
according to the general procedural standards laid down aspects of criminal justice 
where proof beyond reasonable doubt is a supreme principle. This process is therefore 
not only difficult; it is also cumbersome for cases involving market abuse. It is also a 
judicial procedure that prioritizes punishment more than compensation. Hence, the 
emergence of civil regime is seen as a move that increased the effectiveness of 
enforcement of penalties through compensation for victims through various 
mechanisms that allow investors to seek civil redress for their losses. Yet, it is also 
important to note that some critics vehemently oppose the idea of giving civil redress 
more priority, arguing that it is not an effective deterrence measure. But it must also be 
admitted that to the ordinary investor, recovering his loss is often more important than 
jailing an offender. But despite the apathy for criminal litigation in both regimes, not in 
all cases are regulators hesitant to pursue criminal sanctions. Cases involving 
misleading statement are mainly dealt with through criminal litigations, especially in 
the UK. This indeed is because, the offence of misleading statement is not so difficult 
to ascertain compared to other forms of market abuse. They are often successfully 
investigated and the facts disclosed in clear terms. This also lead to the question of why 
misleading statements do occur, which some scholars like Berwin believe that in very 
competitive markets like the UK, companies are often under pressure to deliver results 
that are close or equal to market expectations, which may compel companies to shape 
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the interpretation of an accounting policy.699 He further pointed to evidence that suggest 
only a few professionals in the financial markets consider what they do in the course of 
the professional work as is tantamount to market abuse. These common attributes of 
financial markets have in many ways resulted in altering certain parts of the of the 
disclosure or even be subject to or susceptible to different interpretations since 
accounting standards and policies are written documents. Perhaps, this difficulty is 
exacerbated by the fact that accounts are derived in part by the adoption of various 
accounting standards and policies, which is also what applies to market announcements 
about interim/on-going financial and performance. It is important to note that these 
demands and competitions are more common with world’s larger financial markets 
such as the UK and are not frequent in markets such as Saudi Arabia. 
In general, the character of penal regimes and the way of imposing sanctions are 
designed in what is deemed as best legal practices as much as what suits the different 
priorities of the different financial market regimes. This is clearly demonstrated in the 
fact that while the UK has different bodies to try civil and criminal offences, Saudi has 
centralised these roles in the CMA and CRSD, essentially avoiding regular courts, 
which are based on Shari’ah laws. What is synonymous with both Saudi and the UK is 
that, the regulation regarding enforcement of penalties in cases relating to dealings or 
attempts to deal in qualifying investment or related market instrument base on insider 
information is a breach of both the laws in Saudi, UK and beyond. While in certain 
situations, an offence and loss had to be established; in other instances even an attempt 
to commit such act is punishable. But like all other liabilities, the penalty for financial 
market violations differ based on the regulations applicable according to regimes and 
subject to the nature of the violations. Quite similar to what is applicable in Saudi, even 
an attempt to commit such offence qualifies as a violation in the UK. There is also a 
similarity with some of the exceptional rules. One of those is that which disallows the 
authorities in both regimes to impose a penalty where it is shown the alleged offender 
has reasonable grounds to believe his or her actions did not constitute market abuse, or 
where they took reasonable precautions through due diligence to avoid behaving in a 
way which constituted market abuse.  
                                                699	Leitch,	A.	Criminalising	market	abuse	-	the	shifting	sands	of	enforcement	by	the	FSA	April	2007	-	Litigation	&	
Dispute	Resolution.	Legal	Developments	by	SJ	Berwin	LLP.	See,	
http://www.legal500.com/developments/2955	Accessed	on	23/04/2015.	
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One important characteristic is that the Saudi regime has a limit to the extent of prison 
term to be imposed no matter what the offence is. This can be safely equated to the 
reality that these criminal sanctions are not imposed by courts but by administrative 
bodies. This indeed is a clear departure from the system in the UK. Moreover, the Saudi 
regime has made specific legal limitations on the amount of fine not be paid in the 
event of violations. Although this may sound restrictive, what is clear is that the 
financial market in Saudi is still one that is in a phase of development when compared 
to the UK financial market. Moreover, the laws in Saudi have not seen far-reaching 
changes and reforms. Yet, like other financial markets, especially those in the advanced 
world, reforms and law reviews are phenomenon that the Saudi regime had to deal with 
as its financial markets keeps expanding. 
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Chapter Eight  
General conclusion 
8.1 General conclusion and recommendation 
At the beginning of this study, it is shown that the last six decades have seen a major 
turning point in the structure of global financial market, with the proliferation of 
different kinds of products and services as well as new approach to regulation of market 
activities. Evidence shows that financial markets around the world have continuously 
become more interconnected through international trade and investment. This has 
increased growth but also increased competition and risk. Globalisation of the financial 
market, like other aspects of economics has made the system more sophisticated, driven 
by both large investment and new technology for the execution of trade and dealing in 
different types of commodities across continents. As the traditional barriers of trade and 
investment continue to shrink, they come with a new challenge on the complexity of 
these trades and the potential for market abuse.  
 
The study also shows that, the expansion of trade and the opportunities it presents has 
motivated countries, including those that rely on particular commodities for their 
national income to begin the process of diversification in the financial industry. Saudi 
Arabia is one of those countries that began an ambitious stride towards building a 
financial market that would serve domestic consumers and also attract international 
investment. However, it is shown in this study that legal culture and socio religious 
values of Saudi Arabia has restricted its ambition to introduce all sorts of financial 
products and services found in other countries, particularly in western markets such as 
the UK. This resistance was due mainly to the desire to preserve distinctive Shari’ah 
principles regarding finances and market transactions. Yet, the study also shows the 
willingness of the Saudi financial market to draw closer toward standardization based 
on global corporate governance. 
 
The questions raised here are in relation to the convergence and the areas of divergence 
between Saudi financial market system and the one in the UK, and on how Islamic 
financial principles akin to Saudi can be compatible to the wider framework of financial 
market practices across the world, especially the western hemisphere. This challenging 
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but significant question has brought to the fore the position of some writers, who 
opined that the development seen in modern Islamic financial system represents a 
revival and re-adaptation of Shari’ah principles along a broad spectrum of cultures and 
polities, and a potential bridge across gaps that have historically divided the Muslim 
world from western civilizations. It is shown how the field of legal pluralism, and the 
cross-fertilization of different legal traditions, both Western and non-Western have also 
affected the way financial markets are evolving in Saudi.  
 
It is predominantly evident that the financial market industry in Saudi, the UK and 
many other regimes across across the world has become a vehicle for allocating capital 
and also risk. Their operations have also become so interconnected that efficiency often 
lies in transnational corporation and transparency. This is an aspect that was discussed 
in this study from a comparative pluralistic context that shows neither of the two 
markets operate in absolute isolation. The most important area of contention and 
divergence is the debate on the perspective of Islamic economics, which has historically 
emphasised on developing interest-free and profit and loss-sharing models. This idea is 
deeply embedded in the notion of 'form over substance’, which is rooted deeply in 
Islamic philosophy, and has contributed greatly to the kind of resistance to complex 
structured financial products and services similar to those in the UK and other western 
markets.  Hence, the questions of compatibility and regulations become relevant to this 
research. 
 
In chapter three of this study, a detailed discussion was made on the different kinds of 
traditional Islamic financial instrument and how some were made to replicate modern 
financial products while keeping their substantive characteristics in line with customs 
(Urf) of Islamic finances. This transformation was shown in this study to affect 
different products including what is now known as a bond contract in the Saudi 
financial market. It is however important to note that, despite this transformation, the 
concept of Urf has remained relevant in all aspects of financial market development in 
Saudi emphasizing on the divine principality fairness and moral responsibility. Another 
important aspect of this discussion is the principality of the concept of public interest, 
which is a major factor both in trade and in market legislations under Islam law. Hence, 
speculations and interest based trades are seen as out rightly forbidden; a sticking point 
in every debate on market between the west and the Islamic world. 
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In this chapter, the research was able to expatiate on the nature, the character, the 
contentions and the distinction between the major forms of contracts that are 
traditionally known to Islam and those that have historically remained relevant in Saudi 
Arabia. The significance of this discussion is in relation to how they a similar to some 
products found in the UK and beyond. The main traditional market products are 
contracts such as Mudarabah, which is a trust, based financing agreement akin to 
Western- style limited partnership. Closely related to Mudarabah is Musharaka, which 
is a joint venture, whereby two parties i.e. the lender and the client contribute the 
capital for a business or project.700 The capital is managed by both parties and profits 
shared based on pre-agreed ratios. Although there are similarities between Mudarabah 
and Musharaka, this study found out that there are some obvious differences, because 
in Musharaka the capital comes from all the partners, while in Mudarabah, it comes 
only from one of the parties. 
 
Murabaha is a contract where the lender pays for a tangible asset at the request of a 
customer and sells the property to the customer on a deferred sale basis with a mark-up 
reflecting the institution’s profit. While this contract is common and generally regarded 
as permissible, there are a number of legal issues under Shari’ah, which include the 
prohibition of excessive profit; a situation that may occur in Murabaha. Another 
contract discussed in this chapter is Ijarah, which is mainly a hire contract that engages 
the services of persons. Ijarah is one of the oldest forms of Islamic contract and its 
permissibility is contained in different provisions of the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah. The 
permissibility of Ijarah is contained in the Qur’an and Sunnah.701 It represents both an 
employment contract, as rental of real property. This contract also falls under the 
category of what is termed in the UK as lease. However, it is important to note that 
despite its permissibility under Islam, this research also found that there are areas of 
unresolved issues among Islamic jurist. They contend that features of modern Ijarah in 
Saudi leaves areas that need to be clarified because it has evolved to become both a 
debt and an equity. In one way, it is similar to an asset-backed loan, and on the other, it 
has the features of an equity because the nature of estimation process of expected 
salvage value can be positive or negative. It is essential to state here that, the traditional 
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concept of Ijarah is clearly permissible, but as this type of contract begins to take new 
dimensions, they present areas of research that become open to new debate.  
 
Other products include Istisna, which is a pre-delivery financing and leasing used 
mainly to finance long-term capital-intensive projects. While this kind of contract is 
similar to Murabaha, this research shows a distinction between the two. The main 
difference is that in Istinsa contract, certain expenses that are not reflected in a sale and 
purchase agreement may be included in the fees payable to the financial institution by 
the lessor company. 
 
Another type of contract that is traditionally not common to Islamic finances but that 
which is now common is Takaful. With a contemporary model developed in Sudan in 
the late 1970s, it has since become part of financial service in Saudi Arabia. This type 
of contract entails the payment of instalments into a fund where the banks act as 
managing trustee. It was argued in this study that the idea of insurance has continuously 
raises controversy under the Shari’ah. Proponents however argue that unlike the type of 
insurance policies in the UK and other countries, Takaful is simply a mutual insurance 
where participants are regarded as the owners of the fund, reserved to salvage any of 
them who suffer loss or damage. The main argument against Takaful, as seen in this 
study, is in relation to the prohibition of gharar (uncertainty), since the benefits to be 
paid depends solely on the outcome of future unpredictable events. Others argue that 
Takaful closely resembles gambling. Evidently, life insurance cannot easily be regarded 
under Islamic principles as a kind of insurance in which a person benefits if they suffer 
loss or damage. Hence, this study argues that it does not fall under the category of 
contracts permissible under Shari’ah. Further arguments in relation to this type of 
contract is the possibility of Banks as trustees, reinvesting the premium monies in 
products which are unacceptable in Islam. Yet, other scholars including, Prof. Mustafa 
Al-Zarqa, concludes that all types of insurance are permitted under Shari’ah.702 While 
he agrees that insurance has elements of gharar, he states that it is insignificant to the 
degree that it can be overlooked. However, this study concludes that, even if other 
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forms of insurance are acceptable as form of mutual insurance, life insurance cannot 
stand the test of permissibility under Shari’ah.  
This research has also put forth discussion on the oldest form of financing in Islam 
known as Qard Hasan, which is based on lending without any form of interest or 
conditions other than the repayment of the original loan. This is a type of contract that 
is not common in western institutions, but still exists in Saudi Arabia through 
government supported facilities. It is a contract that is highly recommended by Shari’ah 
with its roots in the principle of compassion for those in dare need and a way for 
institutions or governments to promote growth by divulging money into the society to 
support failing trades and businesses. Other forms of finances are Al salam contract 
which is like the modern day bond regime as in the UK, but with the condition that any 
investment in those bonds must be specifically invested in Shari’ah compliant products 
that do not have elements of usury, speculation or gharar. In its literal sense, Al-salam 
refers to future sale, which has its root in earlier times when farmers in the Islamic 
world receive cash advances pending harvest. In modern times, this research found that 
the idea has transformed to include contracts where a seller undertakes to supply a 
specific commodity to the buyer at a future time and the buyer advances payment for 
the price of the goods. Another form of bond that is common is the Ijarah bond, which 
is more like a leasing agreement.  But unlike conventional lease in the UK, Ijarah is not 
permitted for contracts where there are uncertainties. Islamic scholars have emphasized 
that since Ijarah are for future periods, then it is to be considered as a bond and to be 
covered by certificates. Discussing the types of Islamic finances and their 
characteristics, it is evident that unlike the UK, financial markets in Saudi Arabia were 
largely conceptualised based on the kinds of trades and investment allowed under the 
Shari’ah. 
  
This study goes on to show the most significant development in the Saudi capital 
market was the opening of the Saudi stock exchange i.e., the Tadawul. As of 2015, it 
has listed 169 publicly traded companies, a development that heralds a major 
liberalisation of capital market and the introduction of new innovative products to 
compliment some of the products found in major capital markets around the world. Yet, 
it was shown in this study that in Saudi Arabia, a complete financial market system 
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with its identifiable instruments and markets is still at an early stage of evolution and 
still coping with numerous challenges relating to regulations and instruments.  The 
necessity to regulate the market stems from the fact that trades and investment are risky 
as much as they are beneficial and theories have shown how for markets to be safe to 
all participants there must be some degree of responsibility and role to be played by 
both market participants and authorities. 
 
In discussing the theoretical framework of this study in chapter four, the discourse 
looks at the various scholarly arguments about market activities. The study looks at the 
philosophical, moral, religious and economic arguments on market abuse and how it 
relates to both participants and regulators. Theoretically, this research first explores the 
major distinguishing factor between Islamic and secular western philosophies in the 
context of separating what is regarded as the sacred from profane. The general 
consensus under Shari’ah literature is that all forms of manipulation or abuse of market 
is prohibited. But unlike the Islamic position, this research found that some Western 
scholars are of the opinion that not all acts of market abuse are wrong. For example, 
there is the theoretical argument that insider trading is an elements that increase 
efficiency in the market. Yet, overwhelming evidence suggests that this notion in 
support of insider trading is not the prevailing opinion among most scholars. Also, in 
regulatory and legislative circles, all forms of market abuse have consistently been 
considered as criminal.  
 
Another important discourse is the paradox regarding the argument of ‘victimless 
crimes’, which consider some form of market abuse as acts without a definite category 
of people who can be considered as victims. However, the position of this research is 
more of the notion that when information was used secretly or illegally to benefit one 
group in the market, may likely have unfair effect on the other group. That is what 
market manipulation and insider trading does. This is also the position of the ‘fair 
playing field’ theorists who argued, any transaction of buying and selling is unethical 
when the information is asymmetric. This however does not automatically makes the 
market as level as scholars wish. In the real sense, the information is always 
asymmetric as some have more information than others. What is important is that such 
information not be used for personal benefit against the interest of others.  
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Another theoretical argument discussed is the theory of fiduciary duty, which places 
responsibility upon managers and other custodians of the interest of investors to treat 
such as trust. Despite the strength of this theory, critics opined that the responsibility is 
mainly placed upon officers and employees who sometimes have no fiduciary duty to 
shareholders. It is, however, important to further stress that the principle of this 
responsibility is not in the hierarchy or class of individuals in an organization but in 
ensuring that any person whose employment or professional status gives them access to 
sensitive information, then should not be used for personal gain or to assist others to 
gain from it at the expense at other market participants. Against the background of 
these debates, scholars have also argued about the fairness principle, which emphasises 
that morality and ethics of dealing in market transactions. It insists that for a market to 
be fair, all participants must have fair access to the market information and should be 
able to understand the kind of risk and reward that the contract presents. 
 
The theory of fairness and fiduciary responsibility is what underscores most religious 
argument regarding market transaction. Islam for example has clear commands in the 
Qur’an and the Hadith on fairness and sincerity in all dealings. It also prohibits greed 
including excessive profiteering, while mandating transparency and ruling against 
usury and gharar. This is a clear departure from western secular market economy 
which makes abuse illegitimate but allows for usury and contract that involve some 
degree of uncertainty. In terms of regulating the market, this research concludes that 
both western and Islamic systems have encouraged on the state interfering to ensure the 
safety, stability, accountability and transparency.  
 
Discussing market abuse from an Islamic context, it is a phenomenon well known and 
discussed in Islamic economics. The idea of fiduciary responsibility for examples is 
closely associated with the principle of Amanah and Fiqh al Muamalat’ (The doctrine 
of honesty in all human dealings); that he who holds other people’s wealth or has 
access to their investment must also exercise utmost honesty; not to cheat or defraud or 
to act against their interest. This dominant narrative of regulation and responsibility is 
the hallmark of rules on financial market in Saudi Arabia. Also, unlike in some western 
philosophies, the question of insider trading and market manipulation is not contentious 
under Shari’ah. The consensus all through history is that Islam prohibits any transaction 
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in which parties use certain hidden information or processes that were deliberately 
hidden from others to make profit for themselves.  
 
The majority of these philosophies supports the need to regulate the market in order to 
ensure fairness. To a larger degree, these debates have shaped how legislation has 
emerged in various systems across the world including Saudi Arabia and the UK. In the 
effort to make the financial market securer and more effective, legislative frameworks 
have continued to emerge, giving way to regulatory institutions. This happens alongside 
the proliferation of new products and services into the financial market.  
 
In chapter five of this study, it was shown that in Saudi Arabia, the development of a 
financial market has necessitated the enactment of several laws and the establishment 
of institutions to adequately monitor the market against abuse and insider dealings. This 
development is similar to what was seen in the UK decades ago and that which still 
continues in the constant reviews of laws to deal with new developments in the 
financial market. What this reveals is that, the more a financial market of any country 
becomes open to different kinds of products and services the more the need for 
legislative review to protect the market from illegal practices.  
 
This study has also shown that both the UK and the KSA have commonalities in terms 
of their approach to deal with financial abuses and boosting investor confidence. But 
their approach differs in some ways. As shown in this study, there are reasons for this 
disparity, which include the economic history of the two regimes. For example, it is 
shown that the UK is among the largest financial capitals of the world for a very long 
time, the KSA has traditionally been an economy that is reliant on energy export. 
Hence, the UK, unlike Saudi, has for long been saturated with all kinds of financial 
products and services that the need for regulation and review of law has always been 
present. This has resulted in different bodies been put in place alongside enormous 
amount of legislations that have seen some overarching reviews repeal and re-
enactments. Despite this difference in the character of the financial market, this study 
has shown areas of convergence between the two regimes, especially in terms of the 
contents of laws when it comes to market manipulation and insider trading. However, 
this research also reveals the difference in the way these financial offences are 
penalised.  
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Looking mainly at recent legislation i.e., the CML in Saudi and the FSA in the UK, an 
area of divergence is that the Saudi regime deals with almost all aspects of financial 
market, civil and criminal through a single piece of legislation the CML, while UK has 
other laws such as the FSMA and the CJA. The UK financial market regime is also 
affected by other legislations such as EU’s regional legislations (MAD). It is shown 
that the CML is a phenomenal legislative development for financial market regulation 
in the Saudi Arabia. It serves as a consolidation of other laws e.g., a Saudi Law against 
Deception in Trade of 1984,703 and the advertisement regulations law of 1992,704 and 
the Competition Law of 2004. 705  It also incorporates provisions of the Corporate 
Governance Regulations 2006, 706  Listing Rules 2006, 707  Securities Business 
Regulations 2006,708 and a host of other laws discussed in the chapter.  But even with 
the promulgation of the CML, one thing that remains contentious is that, unlike in the 
UK, the CML has no standard definition of ‘securities’.  The provision of Article 2(e), 
CML, which refers to securities, does not give the kind of clarity as was given under 
the FSMA. Therefore the exemption is mainly an exemption in transaction not an 
exemption in securities that are readily sold in the market. Interestingly, this research 
also found that despite the lack of clear definition of securities, the law now allows 
their issuance. Perhaps they were restricted to joint companies until the 2008 
amendment to the CML, which subsequently allows the issuance of both private and 
public securities.709  
 
The major areas under the CML, especially those to do with market abuse are quite 
close to international standards under IOSCO. Both laws prohibit any act or omission 
that creates misleading impression as to the prices or the value of any commodity for 
the purpose of creating that false impression or inducing other market participants to 
subscribe for security or to refrain from doing so. Both legal regimes also consider it an 
offence to engage in insider trading. Both the CML and the FSMA prohibit using any 
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information obtained by the insider and which is not available to the general public, or 
has not been disclosed.710 The CJA 1993 also criminalises insider trading. 
 
It is also found that both legal regimes make it mandatory for companies to disclose all 
relevant information regarding products and services to the public. It is a law for 
instance to ensure that companies do not omits any important information from the 
prospectus. Any such omission that result in damage to any investor is actionable. It is 
however important to state that the way these complaints are brought and resolved 
differ between the two regimes, an aspect that was covered comprehensively in 
chapters five and six of this study. For example, all disputes or criminal allegations in 
the Saudi market can only be brought to the CRSD and its appeal panel, which are 
bodies established by the CML and directly under the CMA. No civil or criminal court 
in Saudi Arabia has jurisdictions to entertain financial market disputes, whether it is 
market manipulation or insider dealings.  This is a clear departure from the approach in 
the UK where the RDC and the Upper tribunal can listen to a matter and also 
conventional courts have powers to entertain, especially cases of insider dealing as 
criminal offences, perhaps through adversarial proceedings under the rules of the CJA.  
 
Another important aspect of the CML is that where foreign laws are violated by persons 
carrying out business within Saudi Arabia, and the CMA is notified formally of such 
violation by a foreign regulatory institution, then the CMA may suspend the license of 
such company involves the suspension of the license of such violators for twelve 
months.711 But for such suspension to take place, the CMA must be notified formally of 
the violation by the foreign regulator.712 This provision further restates Saudi Arabia’s 
commitment to cooperate and work together with other institutions across the globe, a 
sign of internationalisation and cooperation. 
 
This research also found that unlike in Saudi Arabia, legislations in the UK deals with 
market offences in two ways. In the sense that, insider dealing which has been an 
offence defined under the CJA 1993 is dealt with within the framework of this law as a 
criminal matter before a criminal court, civil matters on the other hand are subject to 
                                                
710 CMA (2011). Manipulation and insider trading. 
711 Article 62(a)(4) CML. 
712 Ibid	
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the provisions of the FSMA. The major challenge which the UK faces in dealing with 
financial offences in conventional courts, especially those that involve criminal 
allegations is that the standard of proof is that which is required for every other criminal 
offence. Hence, it comes with enormous task of proof and evidence. Furthermore, is 
that the CJA does not involve civil aspects of compensation, which is seen as lack of 
sufficient protection for the investor’s interest for their loss to be made good. This is 
clearly distinct from what is applicable in Saudi Arabia where both civil and criminal 
aspects of the market are dealt with by the CRSD, and compensations readily offered in 
both situations. Another important aspect that distinguishes the UK and the KSA is the 
presence and influence of other external rules on domestic laws. The UK for example is 
also affected by EU legislation on European markets. Principally, what constitute 
market abuse, has close similarities in both jurisdictions, the major difference in found 
in the way these laws are enforced.  
 
Another important issue raised is that regarding the statute of limitation under the CML 
which mandates that a case must be brought within five years of commission. This 
provision is seen to be problematic especially with the likelihood that not all crimes of 
market abuse are readily discoverable. Hence, this research took a comparative 
perspective from the laws in the England and Scotland which both have statues dealing 
with limitation but unlike the Saudi law, they provide that the limitation period runs 
from the time the crimes was discovered. This is an important model that safeguards 
investors and worthy of consideration in the development of Saudi laws.  
 
Making a comparative analysis of the approach to enforcement of rules in the KSA and 
the UK, this study was able to show in chapter six that the CMA, which succeeded the 
SAMA is the sole enforcer of market regulations in Saudi Arabia. It plays a role closely 
similar to what the FSA does in the UK. But, more than the FCA, the CMA has far-
reaching monopoly over various issues of protection of investors, corporate governance 
and issues relating to mergers and acquisitions. It is also responsible for the every 
financial tool including IPOs, Sukuks and mutual funds. The CMA also has a role to 
investigate and adjudicate through the CRSD. This however is seen as a challenge to 
the concept of fair hearing since the CMA and its subsidiary the CRSD are the 
investigators, and the final adjudicative body when it comes to capital market. They not 
only investigate and settle dispute through the CRSD, they also have powers to issue 
 
 
178 
subpoenas. Other aspects that have raised concerns among scholars were such powers 
of the CRSD that it can admit evidence that was secured without warrant as against 
what is traditionally contained for criminal proceedings under Sec 3-4 of the Criminal 
Procedure law of 24/08/1422H. This difference on how offenders in the financial 
market are treated differently with other criminal offenders raises questions that touch 
on the rule of law itself. Proponents however argue that this system prevails and is 
successful because of the nature and characteristics of financial crimes, which must be 
dealt with differently with other offences.  
There are other differences between the KSA and UK, especially since the abolition of 
the FSA, which saw the enforcement regime in the UK split, with FCA dealing with the 
micro-prudential and PRA dealing with the macro–prudential aspects of the market. 
This however can be seen from the prism of the nature of investments and the size of 
the two markets. The UK is among the largest in the world and such decentralisation is 
often necessary to ensure effective regulation. The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 
is among the major reasons that brought to the fore the need to reform market 
regulatory framework in the UK and other countries that were heavily impacted by the 
crisis.  The UK saw not only the split of regulatory institutions, but it also saw the 
enactment of the FSA 2012, which imposed further duties on the FCA which are quite 
similar to the CMA. The decentralised nature of the UK system can also be seen in the 
presence of three major bodies i.e., the PRA, the FCA and the FPC. While the FPC is 
responsible for the protection of the stability of the financial system, the PRA shoulders 
the role of ensuring that risks in the financial system are minimised by effectiveness of 
regulated companies. In Saudi however, every major role of regulating the financial 
market and enforcement is centralised in the CMA.  
Also similar to the CMA, the FCA had a committee within it known as the RDC.  The 
FCA investigates market misconducts and refers them to the RDC. This referral is 
similar to what is obtained in the KSA. It is however worthy to note that, parties in the 
UK have other options, i.e., if dissatisfied with the decision of the RDC, they can take 
the matter to the Upper Tribunal. Courts proceedings in the UK are open to the public. 
This is a departure from the system in the Saudi Arabia, which has no option of an open 
court trial for financial market disputes; a situation that was heavily criticised by some 
scholars. Another aspect that is similar between the Saudi system and the UK are issues 
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relating to banks and insurance companies which were in Saudi Arabia dealt with 
through the SAMA, which as an institution independent of the CMA.  
One of the major achievements of the CMA according to this research is the abolishing 
of unregulated brokerage activities and introducing a standard form of IPOs. Both of 
these have helped in consumer confidence and investor attraction. Evidence from this 
study shows that the market had since grew exponentially to become the largest in the 
Arab Gulf region. This of course is not only due to opening the market but also because 
the system has introduced clear laws that protect the market from abuses and also clear 
penalties for offenders.  
 
In reference to the nature of penalties for financial market offences, this study in, 
chapter six, has shown that Saudi Arabia and the UK both have clear criminal and civil 
sanctions to regulate standards of financial market conduct. What also became evident 
in the course of this study is that both the Saudi Arabia and the UK regulatory 
authorities place more emphasis in pursuing civil proceeding than criminal ones. It was 
found that one of the reason why this approach is most preferred is because regulators 
are aware of the complexity of pursuing a criminal proceeding through the CJA 1993, 
which involves the rigors of the traditional adversarial method in open courts. The 
introduction of the FSMA is therefore a step forward to enable regulators take civil 
actions against offender. Moreover, evidence suggest that market abuse, especially 
insider trading is a crime that involves a great deal of secrecy. Hence, to establish such 
offence beyond reasonable doubt before a criminal court is no doubt a costly exercise, 
with no certainty of obtaining conviction. Hence, it is prudent to emphasis on civil 
proceedings. Despite this however, evidence suggests that in cases of misleading 
statement, which are often not as difficult to prove, regulators in the UK often pursue 
the criminal route. Another significant area of divergence between the Saudi Arabia and 
the UK is the limit to the extent of penalty that can be imposed, which has limits in 
Saudi. But it is also important to note that, all penalties in Saudi are imposed by an 
administrative body and there is no court involved.  
 
In general, this study has shown that financial market in Saudi Arabia and the UK have 
a number of similarities and differences. The similarities are often in the area of 
legislation and enforcement, while the differences are a result of some major historical, 
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cultural and economic aspects including the difference in the size of the two markets, 
the influence of Shari’ah on the Saudi financial market system and the nature of 
products found in both markets. What is evident is that the financial market of Saudi 
Arabia is still at its formative stage compared to the UK and therefore has a lot of room 
for reform and for future research.  
 
8.2 Recommendations. 
There are a number of areas in the Saudi capital market that can be improved, but it is 
also important to state that the kinds of risk and uncertainty of certain financial 
instruments in the UK and other western economies has made the system vulnerable 
and susceptible to crisis as much as it has also seen growth and development.  
In the cause of this study, it was shown that ‘securities’, despite the fact that they form 
a major part of financial market, were not clearly defined under Saudi Arabia laws. 
Hence, there is the need to ensure that the law defines every principal aspect clearly in 
order to avoid ambiguity. 
The second aspect is to do with the centralisation of all disputes under the CRSD. It is 
true that conventional courts in Saudi Arabia are governed solely by the principles of 
Shari’ah and to some foreign investors, Shari’ah laws are not applicable. Hence, there 
is the need to have professionals trained in both domestic and international commercial 
laws to head special courts/tribunals for the resolution of these disputes openly and 
transparently so that the CMA should stop being the investigator and the jury. Instead, 
they should also be a party or only an investigation and prosecuting body. The courts 
should be independent of the CMA. 
Lastly, there is the need to not only have disputes and cases of market abuse resolved, 
there should be a data base to capture all these cases and their trajectories, including all 
the facts and circumstances in order to have a clear picture of the nature and cause of 
market abuse, thereby giving the opportunity to review laws and regulatory approach to 
check them. 
In the interest of transparency, the CMA through CRSD should consider publication of 
details of facts and outcome of cases similar to the UK’s Upper Tribunal. The current 
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practice of releasing a brief detail of the outcome of their decision to media or on their 
website without giving a thorough review of the entire case and its outcome does not 
suggest transparency in the system.  
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